If it is true for all possible subjects, its objective.
It is true for all possible subjects that nobody wants their consent violated. Thatâs an objective law of good / bad. Someone tried to claim that masochists are the obvious exception, this is false. Masochists feel pleasure where most people feel pain, this is not a statement of consent, there are probably an infinite number of ways that you can violate the consent of a masochist.
Since everyone in existence is having their consent violated in one form or another, we reach a second law of morality - existence is morally wrong as it currently is. Itâs bad. Itâs currently evil.
This always gets tricky [for me] because in discussions of morality [in philosophy venues], we can slide in and out of the âtechnicalâ components embedded in logic and epistemology, and the âexistentialâ components embedded in points of view regarding particular conflicting goods.
âIâ is ever and always the subject inherently citing subjective points of view about morality as an objective truth.
Were there no subjects around there would be no discussions.
After all, up until the evolution of matter into self-conscious minds [assuming some measure of free will] this whole controversy would be entirely moot.
So, sure, âIâ is the subject. But in regard to human interactions âIâ seems clearly able to establish some things and some relationships as true objectively for all of us.
And isnât that really as far as we can go?
We are no less subjects when we point out that 22 human beings were killed by Patrick Wood Crusius in a recent mass shooting in El Paso. And there are many, many facts that all rational men and women would be able to concur regarding.
But when he explains why he felt justified in doing what he did, how are philosophers/ethicists able to establish that in fact this constituted [objectively] an immoral act?
Or that objectively it is immoral for private citizens to own assault weapons.
Or that objectively it is possible to establish the optimal or the only rational argument in regard to immigration policy.
My own subjective frame of mind âhere and nowâ is basically in sync with this. It seems a reasonable manner in which to think it through.
But in turn I deem it to be nothing more than another existential contraption. There does not appear to be a way in which to establish beyond all doubt that all rational men and women are obligated to share this frame of mind.
And that is because there does not appear to be a way in which to rule out entirely the existence of God. Or, sans God, the existence of an argument able to be demonstrated as in fact an obligatory frame of mind for reasonable and virtuous human beings.
I can only note instead how âhere and nowâ I think this instead of that. Knowing that a new experience, a new relationship or access to new information and knowledge might result in me changing my mind.
Admittedly, Iâve never been exactly sure how seriously to take you. Sometimes you come off [to me] as just another godawful Kid here. Other times as [even worse] another godawful objectivist Kid.
But, sure, maybe Iâm wrong.
All I can do is to bring your âgeneral descriptionâ argument above down to earth.
Now, in regard to the El Paso shooting above, how does someone not wanting his or her consent violated factor into your overall view of objective morality.
The people he shot did not consent to being killed by him. On the other hand, he did not consent to people coming into the country that violate his own sense of what makes America great.
How [philosophically] is it determined which consent here takes precedence?
Same with the argument over assault rifles.
Some give their consent to owning them while others give their consent to living in the country where they are banned.
And neither want their respective consent to be violated.
So [philosophically] which consent takes precedence?
Weâre done here. You know, this being the philosophy board. Iâm more partial myself to dealing with retorts of this sort in rant. There it just makes more sense not to take them seriously.
You did not. You failed to establish your quantifier transformation which resulted in biconditional disjunction and irreflexivity. Therefore there was no proof of the sequent.
I told you about this, man, and youâre still doing it.
Question of the Month
âIs Morality Objective?â
From Philosophy Now magazine
Graham Dunstan Martin
Ever and always the ambiguity embedded in the part where the subjective âIâ ends and the objective world begins. Sometimes the arguments are wholly technical, making little or no contact with the world of actual human interactions. Other times the arguments are wholly existential, making little or no contact with the tools of philosophy.
What I figure is that in regard to actual conflicting goods there has yet to be an argument made that seamlessly combines both approaches such that one or another deontological assessment allows us, both technically and for all practical purposes, to know how all rational men and women are obligated to behave.
But, further, only in bringing both approaches down to earth and examining human behaviors revolving around a specific context reflecting value judgments at odds, will the arguments become more comprehensive, more substantial.
But: How on earth is this to be understood more comprehensively, more substantially? âIn principleâ, sure, lots and lots of things can be agreed upon. But what particular inquiry and agreement are we talking about?
âIn principleâ any actual community can agree that abortion is murder or that immigration must be stopped or that government ought not to regulate gun ownership.
And if those in power in that community can sustain what is agreed upon âin principleâ, sure, call that objective morality.
But what if conditions and events change calling into question this principle? What if folks from other communities that champion conflicting principles make contact?
What is this if not a classic example of the âgeneral descriptionâ that allows for the existence of objective morality âin principleâ?
Bring these 5 points down to earth and explore them in regard to an actual context in the modern world, and see how long this âgeneral descriptionâ of morality âin principleâ can be sustained.
Objective facts do not demonstrate objective morality because this is a non sequitur and therefore a logical fallacy
Facts are not necessarily objectively true but only taken to be true at the time in the absence of any contradiction
Also facts are empirical whereas morality is abstract so any comparison is a false equivalence and therefore invalid
I can only react to this by pointing out the obvious: it does not reference any particular facts relating to any particular context in which a discussion of morality might be expected.
There are objective facts that rational people can find agreement regarding with respect to gun ownership in America.
Now, given the facts that are able to be accumulated, what can in fact be concluded in turn regarding the moral obligation of the American government [federal state local] insofar as regulating gun ownership amongst its citizens?