Expression is a unfurling flower, seeking to be perceived by the bee.
Not only perceived - but known intimately and slowly as it unfurls itself.
Expression is a unfurling flower, seeking to be perceived by the bee.
“Of all that is written, I love only what a person hath written with his blood. Write with blood, and thou wilt find that blood is spirit.
It is no easy task to understand unfamiliar blood; I hate the reading idlers.
He who knoweth the reader, doeth nothing more for the reader. Another century of readers--and spirit itself will stink."
Arcturus Descending wrote:The way I look at it, history will end when all of the books have been burnt, when there is no one left to remember it or to tell of it or to write it.
Arcturus Descending wrote:That's not necessarily the end of mankind.
Arcturus Descending wrote:cassie -
Freddie also said:“Of all that is written, I love only what a person hath written with his blood. Write with blood, and thou wilt find that blood is spirit.
It is no easy task to understand unfamiliar blood; I hate the reading idlers.
He who knoweth the reader, doeth nothing more for the reader. Another century of readers--and spirit itself will stink."
I may not be intuiting his meaning here but it seems to me that what he writes here is in contradiction to what he wrote there in that quote you gave. Of course, he isn't easy to understand.
Fixed Cross wrote:I propose then now as a Westerner - I AM THE FIRST OF MANY - that a new Western religion HAS RISEN. => #
History did not end with the fall of the Wall. From a US centered perspective, you had 9/11, the Patriot Act, and some wars. These were coupled with Changes in US relations to many nations. It led to a new era. It could lead to all sorts of discussions about politics, governance, separation of Powers, nation states, globallization, ethics of war.....and more, so it would seem strange to me to say that history ended with the fall of the wall, at least for US cits. This would all hold for Europé. Russia seems to be shifting historically as we type. China's role is changing and while much of this is economic and not the snazzy history of wars and famous people bios, it is history. Then lots of nations that have less Power are having wars, starvation, transitions into global economics, you had The Arab Spring, and while this did not change so much, it offers the potential for more Changes. Arab leaders have been put on notice and the technology that aided this is only going to improve. We also have technology on the government side allowing for all sorts of things, a la Snowdon. Where will the struggle between governments sliding towards fascism vs. people's awareness and resistence to this go?Arminius wrote:1.) Is the „end of history“ merely an idea of an idealistic philosopher, so that this idea will never be realised?
2.) Is the „end of history“ not merely an idea of an idealistic philosopher, so that this idea has or will have been realised?
2.1) Has the „end of history“ been realised since the last third of the 18th century, when the „Enlightenment“ („Aufklärung“) ended?
2.2) Has the „end of history“ been realised since 1989/'90, when the „Cold War“ ended?
2.3) Will the „end of history“ have been realised in the end of the 21st, in the 22nd, or in the 23nd century?
Moreno wrote:History did not end with the fall of the Wall. From a US centered perspective, you had 9/11, the Patriot Act, and some wars. These were coupled with Changes in US relations to many nations. It led to a new era. It could lead to all sorts of discussions about politics, governance, separation of Powers, nation states, globallization, ethics of war.....and more, so it would seem strange to me to say that history ended with the fall of the wall, at least for US cits. This would all hold for Europé. Russia seems to be shifting historically as we type. China's role is changing and while much of this is economic and not the snazzy history of wars and famous people bios, it is history. Then lots of nations that have less Power are having wars, starvation, transitions into global economics, you had The Arab Spring, and while this did not change so much, it offers the potential for more Changes. Arab leaders have been put on notice and the technology that aided this is only going to improve. We also have technology on the government side allowing for all sorts of things, a la Snowdon. Where will the struggle between governments sliding towards fascism vs. people's awareness and resistence to this go?Arminius wrote:1.) Is the „end of history“ merely an idea of an idealistic philosopher, so that this idea will never be realised?
2.) Is the „end of history“ not merely an idea of an idealistic philosopher, so that this idea has or will have been realised?
2.1) Has the „end of history“ been realised since the last third of the 18th century, when the „Enlightenment“ („Aufklärung“) ended?
2.2) Has the „end of history“ been realised since 1989/'90, when the „Cold War“ ended?
2.3) Will the „end of history“ have been realised in the end of the 21st, in the 22nd, or in the 23nd century?
China and Russia and not hooking in to any end of History, so any announcement or predictions about when the end of history will happen is just speculation - which could be fun and good training, but still, speculation.
History also tracks the Changes in the way humans live. I see no reason to Think these Changes will happen soon.
Moreno wrote:History did not end with the fall of the Wall. From a US centered perspective, you had 9/11, the Patriot Act, and some wars. These were coupled with Changes in US relations to many nations. It led to a new era. It could lead to all sorts of discussions about politics, governance, separation of Powers, nation states, globallization, ethics of war.....and more, so it would seem strange to me to say that history ended with the fall of the wall, at least for US cits. This would all hold for Europe.Arminius wrote:1.) Is the „end of history“ merely an idea of an idealistic philosopher, so that this idea will never be realised?
2.) Is the „end of history“ not merely an idea of an idealistic philosopher, so that this idea has or will have been realised?
2.1) Has the „end of history“ been realised since the last third of the 18th century, when the „Enlightenment“ („Aufklärung“) ended?
2.2) Has the „end of history“ been realised since 1989/'90, when the „Cold War“ ended?
2.3) Will the „end of history“ have been realised in the end of the 21st, in the 22nd, or in the 23nd century?
Moreno wrote:Russia seems to be shifting historically as we type. China's role is changing and while much of this is economic and not the snazzy history of wars and famous people bios, it is history.
Arminius wrote:According to Ernst Nolte there are especially the following „historical existentials“, which are translated by me (or
):
• Religion (God/Gods, a.s.o);
• Rule (leadership, a.s.o.);
• Nobleness (nobility, a.s.o.);
• Classes;
• State;
• Great War;
• City and country as contrast;
• Education, especially in schools and universities;
• Science;
• Order of sexulality / demographics, economics;
• Historiography / awareness of history!
Ernst Nolte wrote (ibid, p. 10):
„Es wird also für möglich gehalten, daß bestimmte grundlegende Kennzeichen - oder Kategorien oder »Existenzialien« - der historischen Existenz tatsächlich nur für das sechstausendjährige »Zwischenspiel« der »eigentlichen Geschichte« bestimmend waren und heute als solche verschwinden oder bereits verschwunden sind, während andere weiterhin in Geltung bleiben, obwohl auch sie einer tiefgreifenden Wandlung unterliegen. Die Analyse solcher Existenzialien im Rahmen eines »Schemas der historischen Existenz« ist das Hauptziel dieses Buches.“
My translation:
„Thus, it is thought to be possible that certain fundamental characteristic - or categories or »existentials« - of the historical existence have been decisively only for the six thousand years lasting »interlude« of the »actual history« and now are disappearing as such or have already disappeared, while others continued to remain in validity, although they are also subjected to a profound transformation. The analysis of such existentials within the framework of a »scheme of historical existence«is the main goal of this book.
Ernst Nolte wrote (ibid, p. 672):
„Befinden wir Menschen ... uns bereits in der »Nachgeschichte«, wie wir den Zustand in Ermangelung eines besseren Terminus nennen wollen, oder doch mindestens im Übergang dazu?“
My translation:
„Are we people ... already in the »post-history« as we like to call the state for lack of a better term, or at least in the transition to that?“
Ernst Nolte wrote (ibid, p. 682):
„Alle historischen Existenzialien ... haben ... grundlegende Änderungen erfahren, und einige, wie der Adel und der »große Krieg«, sind nicht mehr wahrzunehmen. Aber selbst diese haben sich eher verwandelt, als daß sie ganz verschwunden wären: Der große Krieg bleibt als dunkle Drohung bestehen, und der Adel überlebt in gewisser Weise als Pluralität der Eliten.“
My translation:
„All historical existentialia ... have ... been changed fundamentally, and some, like the nobleness and the »Great War«, are no longer perceivable. But even these have been transformed rather than that they were all gone: the great war remains as a dark threat, and the nobility survived in some ways as pluralism of elites.“
That are some sentences Nolte wrote in his bulky book, which was published in 1998: „Historische Existenz“ („Historical Existence“).
Moreno wrote: Then lots of nations that have less Power are having wars, starvation, transitions into global economics, you had The Arab Spring, and while this did not change so much, it offers the potential for more Changes.
Moreno wrote: China and Russia and not hooking in to any end of History ....
Arminius wrote:Do you know Francis Fukuyama and his thesis?
According to Hegel's "Dialektik" e.g. Fukuyama interprets the "extreme liberalism" as the "Thesis", the "totalitarianism" as the "Antithesis", the "liberal democracy" as the "Synthesis". So for Fukuyama the "liberal democracy" is the final stage. According to Peter Scholl-Latour Fukuyama's thesis has been absurd since its beginning; the global spread of parliamentary "democracy" and an uninhibited market economy would bring mankind a final state of well -being and harmony; thus, the final line would be drawn under the obsolete antagonisms. In this way Fukuyama's notion of the "End of History" can be resumed. (Cp. Peter Scholl- Latour, Koloß auf tönernen Füßen, 2005, S. 47). In addition, Peter Scholl- Latour found - to his surprise - that Peter Sloterdijk coined the phrase: "By 'nation building' you get at best democratically cladded dictatorships with market economy." Scholl-Latour: "I would have added: 'Serving the market economy'." (Ibid., 2005, S. 50). Fukuyama's bold thesis of the "end of history" of eternal fights, because the Western model (i.e.: Western culture) has triumphed globally, provides at least for Huntington no substantial analysis. Rather, Huntington sees in the clashes, frictions , conflicts between the great cultures on the basis of different religions and divergent world views, the main role of future disputes.
Fukuyama's thesis is assessed by Norbert Bolz in this way: "In the initial diagnosis, there is a surprisingly large consensus among thinkers. The famous title of Francis Fukuyama*s book - The End of History and the Last Man - summarises quite simply together the positions of Hegel and Nietzsche." (Norbert Bolz, Das Wissen der Religion, 2008, S. 53). This world has been defined as "housing of servitude" by Max Weber, as the "Gestell" (something like "frame") by Martin Heidegger, as "managed world" by Theodor W. Adorno, as "technical government" by Helmut Schelsky), and that are only different names for the end product of a specifically modern process, which Arnold Gehlen has brought on the notion of "cultural crystallisation".
Peter Sloterdijk sees Fukuyama's work as "the recovery of an authentic political psychology on the basis of the restored Eros-Thymos polarity. It is obvious that this same political psychology (which has little to do with the so-called "mass psychology" and other applications of psychonalyse to political objects) has been moved to new theoretical orientations by the course of events at the center of the current demand. .... The time diagnostic lesson, that is hidden in The End of History, is not to be read from the title slogan, which, as noted, citing only a witty interpretation of Hegelian philosophy by Alexandre Kojève in the thirties of the 20th century (had for its part, the 'dated end of history' in the year of publication of Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes ["Phenomenology of Spirit"], 1807). It consists in a careful observation of the prestige and jealousy fights between citizens of the free world, who just then come to the fore when the mobilization of civilian forces has ceased for fighting on external fronts. Successful liberal democracies, recognises the author, will always and because of their best performances be crossed by streams of free-floating discontent. This can not be otherwise, because people are sentenced to thymotic restlessness, and the 'last men' more than all the rest ...." (Peter Sloterdijk, Zorn und Zeit, 2006, S. 65-67).
For Fukuyama "thymos" is nothing other than the psychological seat of the Hegelian desire for "Anerkennung" (appreciation, recognition). (Cp. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History, 1992, p. 233 ); this is the "real engine of human history" (ibid., p. 229). The main features of which Fukuyama is based and from which he derives his ideas are the Hegelian view of history and the Platonic-Hegelian conceptual constructions, especially that what is concerned with thymotic. Something near that ist what Sloterdijk has done in his work "Zorn und Zeit" ("Rage and Time", 2006). Both Sloterdijk and Fukuyama are also influenced by Hegel and Nietzsche, Sloterdijk in addition by Heidegger.
But Sloterdijk's work mentiones also the Christan era refering to revenge and resentment:
„Vor allem muß heute, gegen Nietzsches ungestümes Resümee, bedacht werden, daß die christliche Ära, im ganzen genommen, gerade nicht das Zeitalter der ausgeübten Rache war. Sie stellte vielmehr eine Epoche dar, in der mit großem Ernst eine Ethik des Racheaufschubs durchgesetzt wurde. Der Grund hierfür muß nicht lange gesucht werden: Er ist gegeben durch den Glauben der Christen, die Gerechtigkeit Gottes werde dereinst, am Ende der Zeiten, für eine Richtigstellung der moralischen Bilanzen sorgen. Mit dem Ausblick auf ein Leben nach dem Tode war in der christlichen Ideensphäre immer die Erwartung eines überhistorischen Leidensausgleichs verbunden. Der Preis für diese Ethik des Verzichts auf Rache in der Gegenwart zugunsten einer im Jenseits nachzuholenden Vergeltung war hoch - hierüber hat Nietzsche klar geurteilt. Er bestand in der Generalisierung eines latenten Ressentiments, das den aufgehobenen Rachewunsch selbst und sein Gegenstück, die Verdammnisangst, ins Herzstück des Glaubens, die Lehre von den Letzten Dingen, projizierte. Auf diese Weise wurde die Bestrafung der Übermütigen in alle Ewigkeit zur Bedingung für das zweideutige Arrangement der Menschen guten Willens mit den schlimmen Verhältnissen. Die Nebenwirkung hiervon war, daß die demütigen Guten selbst vor dem zu zittern begannen, was sie den übermütigen Bösen zudachten.“ - Peter Sloterdijk, Zorn und Zeit, 2006, S. 4.
My translation:
„Especially must now against Nietzsche's impetuous résumé be considered that the Christian era, on the whole, just was not the age of the force exerted revenge. Rather, it represented a period in which very seriously the ethics of revenge deferral was enforced. The reason for this must be sought not for long: He is given by the faith of Christians, God's justice will one day, at the end of times, make the correction of the moral balance sheets. With the prospect of a life after death in the Christian sphere of idea the expectation was always connected of an hyper-historical suffering compensation. The price of this ethic of renunciation of revenge in the present in favour of a backdated retribution in the afterlife was highly - Nietzsche has clearly judged that. It consisted in the generalisation of a latent resentment that projected the repealed revenge desire itself and its counterpart, the damnation fear, into the heart of the faith, the doctrine of the Last Things. In this way, the punishment of the proud in all eternity became a condition for the ambiguous arrangement of people of good will with the dire conditions. The side effect of this was that the humble good ones (do-gooder) began to shake theirselves against what they intend for the wanton evil.“
obe wrote:And the revenge has best to be avoided by a shift ....
obe wrote:This may work on the short term, but long term?
obe wrote:You may object that the synthesis always plays musical chairs, and the center doesn't always occupy the current political correctness, of a game of expediency.
Amorphos wrote:History cannot end. That would require something there to stop it from progressing.
Amorphos wrote:Equally; death is not a thing.
So you are saying that progressing and history are not dividable, or they are even the same? Progressing and history do not have to have, but can have to do with each other. Progressing and history are not the same. History is a development, evolution is a development, but history and evolution are not the same. History is a part of evolution because history is an artefact, a product by humans, and humans are as part of the evolution as other living beings.
finishedman wrote:All you have to do is understand the way your own individual personal past operates. The past is always active. If the past ends, you end. That is the reason why you will never allow that, no matter how hard you try. The past is everywhere in you. Every cell in your body is permeated by it. Every nerve is involved in it. The past has this body so much under control that it will not let it go. The past will not come to an end through any effort you make or whatever will power you effect! The more effort you put into it, the more willpower you use, the stronger it becomes. You came across many insights in this process, but every insight reinforces the past. It does not in any way help to understand anything and to thus free yourself from whatever. Every insight that you obtain with your investigations only strengthens and solidifies that.
obe wrote:Arminius wrote:Do you know Francis Fukuyama and his thesis?
According to Hegel's "Dialektik" e.g. Fukuyama interprets the "extreme liberalism" as the "Thesis", the "totalitarianism" as the "Antithesis", the "liberal democracy" as the "Synthesis". So for Fukuyama the "liberal democracy" is the final stage. According to Peter Scholl-Latour Fukuyama's thesis has been absurd since its beginning; the global spread of parliamentary "democracy" and an uninhibited market economy would bring mankind a final state of well -being and harmony; thus, the final line would be drawn under the obsolete antagonisms. In this way Fukuyama's notion of the "End of History" can be resumed. (Cp. Peter Scholl- Latour, Koloß auf tönernen Füßen, 2005, S. 47). In addition, Peter Scholl- Latour found - to his surprise - that Peter Sloterdijk coined the phrase: "By 'nation building' you get at best democratically cladded dictatorships with market economy." Scholl-Latour: "I would have added: 'Serving the market economy'." (Ibid., 2005, S. 50). Fukuyama's bold thesis of the "end of history" of eternal fights, because the Western model (i.e.: Western culture) has triumphed globally, provides at least for Huntington no substantial analysis. Rather, Huntington sees in the clashes, frictions , conflicts between the great cultures on the basis of different religions and divergent world views, the main role of future disputes.
Fukuyama's thesis is assessed by Norbert Bolz in this way: "In the initial diagnosis, there is a surprisingly large consensus among thinkers. The famous title of Francis Fukuyama*s book - The End of History and the Last Man - summarises quite simply together the positions of Hegel and Nietzsche." (Norbert Bolz, Das Wissen der Religion, 2008, S. 53). This world has been defined as "housing of servitude" by Max Weber, as the "Gestell" (something like "frame") by Martin Heidegger, as "managed world" by Theodor W. Adorno, as "technical government" by Helmut Schelsky), and that are only different names for the end product of a specifically modern process, which Arnold Gehlen has brought on the notion of "cultural crystallisation".
Peter Sloterdijk sees Fukuyama's work as "the recovery of an authentic political psychology on the basis of the restored Eros-Thymos polarity. It is obvious that this same political psychology (which has little to do with the so-called "mass psychology" and other applications of psychonalyse to political objects) has been moved to new theoretical orientations by the course of events at the center of the current demand. .... The time diagnostic lesson, that is hidden in The End of History, is not to be read from the title slogan, which, as noted, citing only a witty interpretation of Hegelian philosophy by Alexandre Kojève in the thirties of the 20th century (had for its part, the 'dated end of history' in the year of publication of Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes ["Phenomenology of Spirit"], 1807). It consists in a careful observation of the prestige and jealousy fights between citizens of the free world, who just then come to the fore when the mobilization of civilian forces has ceased for fighting on external fronts. Successful liberal democracies, recognises the author, will always and because of their best performances be crossed by streams of free-floating discontent. This can not be otherwise, because people are sentenced to thymotic restlessness, and the 'last men' more than all the rest ...." (Peter Sloterdijk, Zorn und Zeit, 2006, S. 65-67).
For Fukuyama "thymos" is nothing other than the psychological seat of the Hegelian desire for "Anerkennung" (appreciation, recognition). (Cp. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History, 1992, p. 233 ); this is the "real engine of human history" (ibid., p. 229). The main features of which Fukuyama is based and from which he derives his ideas are the Hegelian view of history and the Platonic-Hegelian conceptual constructions, especially that what is concerned with thymotic. Something near that ist what Sloterdijk has done in his work "Zorn und Zeit" ("Rage and Time", 2006). Both Sloterdijk and Fukuyama are also influenced by Hegel and Nietzsche, Sloterdijk in addition by Heidegger.
But Sloterdijk's work mentiones also the Christan era refering to revenge and resentment:
„Vor allem muß heute, gegen Nietzsches ungestümes Resümee, bedacht werden, daß die christliche Ära, im ganzen genommen, gerade nicht das Zeitalter der ausgeübten Rache war. Sie stellte vielmehr eine Epoche dar, in der mit großem Ernst eine Ethik des Racheaufschubs durchgesetzt wurde. Der Grund hierfür muß nicht lange gesucht werden: Er ist gegeben durch den Glauben der Christen, die Gerechtigkeit Gottes werde dereinst, am Ende der Zeiten, für eine Richtigstellung der moralischen Bilanzen sorgen. Mit dem Ausblick auf ein Leben nach dem Tode war in der christlichen Ideensphäre immer die Erwartung eines überhistorischen Leidensausgleichs verbunden. Der Preis für diese Ethik des Verzichts auf Rache in der Gegenwart zugunsten einer im Jenseits nachzuholenden Vergeltung war hoch - hierüber hat Nietzsche klar geurteilt. Er bestand in der Generalisierung eines latenten Ressentiments, das den aufgehobenen Rachewunsch selbst und sein Gegenstück, die Verdammnisangst, ins Herzstück des Glaubens, die Lehre von den Letzten Dingen, projizierte. Auf diese Weise wurde die Bestrafung der Übermütigen in alle Ewigkeit zur Bedingung für das zweideutige Arrangement der Menschen guten Willens mit den schlimmen Verhältnissen. Die Nebenwirkung hiervon war, daß die demütigen Guten selbst vor dem zu zittern begannen, was sie den übermütigen Bösen zudachten.“ - Peter Sloterdijk, Zorn und Zeit, 2006, S. 4.
My translation:
„Especially must now against Nietzsche's impetuous résumé be considered that the Christian era, on the whole, just was not the age of the force exerted revenge. Rather, it represented a period in which very seriously the ethics of revenge deferral was enforced. The reason for this must be sought not for long: He is given by the faith of Christians, God's justice will one day, at the end of times, make the correction of the moral balance sheets. With the prospect of a life after death in the Christian sphere of idea the expectation was always connected of an hyper-historical suffering compensation. The price of this ethic of renunciation of revenge in the present in favour of a backdated retribution in the afterlife was highly - Nietzsche has clearly judged that. It consisted in the generalisation of a latent resentment that projected the repealed revenge desire itself and its counterpart, the damnation fear, into the heart of the faith, the doctrine of the Last Things. In this way, the punishment of the proud in all eternity became a condition for the ambiguous arrangement of people of good will with the dire conditions. The side effect of this was that the humble good ones (do-gooder) began to shake theirselves against what they intend for the wanton evil.“
And the revenge has best to be avoided by a shift, away from what Freud has recognized as erotic discontent. This may work on the short term, but long term? You may object that the synthesis always plays musical chairs, and the center doesn't always occupy the current political correctness, of a game of expediency. The appearance of ultra liberalism may just as well be a current fascination with recurrent material dialectics , a pragmatic tour de force, a wait and see attitude, based on some program or another, as a measure of congruence between oriental and occidental ideas in an emerging world market of opinions?
cassie wrote:obe wrote:Arminius wrote:Do you know Francis Fukuyama and his thesis?
According to Hegel's "Dialektik" e.g. Fukuyama interprets the "extreme liberalism" as the "Thesis", the "totalitarianism" as the "Antithesis", the "liberal democracy" as the "Synthesis". So for Fukuyama the "liberal democracy" is the final stage. According to Peter Scholl-Latour Fukuyama's thesis has been absurd since its beginning; the global spread of parliamentary "democracy" and an uninhibited market economy would bring mankind a final state of well -being and harmony; thus, the final line would be drawn under the obsolete antagonisms. In this way Fukuyama's notion of the "End of History" can be resumed. (Cp. Peter Scholl- Latour, Koloß auf tönernen Füßen, 2005, S. 47). In addition, Peter Scholl- Latour found - to his surprise - that Peter Sloterdijk coined the phrase: "By 'nation building' you get at best democratically cladded dictatorships with market economy." Scholl-Latour: "I would have added: 'Serving the market economy'." (Ibid., 2005, S. 50). Fukuyama's bold thesis of the "end of history" of eternal fights, because the Western model (i.e.: Western culture) has triumphed globally, provides at least for Huntington no substantial analysis. Rather, Huntington sees in the clashes, frictions , conflicts between the great cultures on the basis of different religions and divergent world views, the main role of future disputes.
Fukuyama's thesis is assessed by Norbert Bolz in this way: "In the initial diagnosis, there is a surprisingly large consensus among thinkers. The famous title of Francis Fukuyama*s book - The End of History and the Last Man - summarises quite simply together the positions of Hegel and Nietzsche." (Norbert Bolz, Das Wissen der Religion, 2008, S. 53). This world has been defined as "housing of servitude" by Max Weber, as the "Gestell" (something like "frame") by Martin Heidegger, as "managed world" by Theodor W. Adorno, as "technical government" by Helmut Schelsky), and that are only different names for the end product of a specifically modern process, which Arnold Gehlen has brought on the notion of "cultural crystallisation".
Peter Sloterdijk sees Fukuyama's work as "the recovery of an authentic political psychology on the basis of the restored Eros-Thymos polarity. It is obvious that this same political psychology (which has little to do with the so-called "mass psychology" and other applications of psychonalyse to political objects) has been moved to new theoretical orientations by the course of events at the center of the current demand. .... The time diagnostic lesson, that is hidden in The End of History, is not to be read from the title slogan, which, as noted, citing only a witty interpretation of Hegelian philosophy by Alexandre Kojève in the thirties of the 20th century (had for its part, the 'dated end of history' in the year of publication of Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes ["Phenomenology of Spirit"], 1807). It consists in a careful observation of the prestige and jealousy fights between citizens of the free world, who just then come to the fore when the mobilization of civilian forces has ceased for fighting on external fronts. Successful liberal democracies, recognises the author, will always and because of their best performances be crossed by streams of free-floating discontent. This can not be otherwise, because people are sentenced to thymotic restlessness, and the 'last men' more than all the rest ...." (Peter Sloterdijk, Zorn und Zeit, 2006, S. 65-67).
For Fukuyama "thymos" is nothing other than the psychological seat of the Hegelian desire for "Anerkennung" (appreciation, recognition). (Cp. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History, 1992, p. 233 ); this is the "real engine of human history" (ibid., p. 229). The main features of which Fukuyama is based and from which he derives his ideas are the Hegelian view of history and the Platonic-Hegelian conceptual constructions, especially that what is concerned with thymotic. Something near that ist what Sloterdijk has done in his work "Zorn und Zeit" ("Rage and Time", 2006). Both Sloterdijk and Fukuyama are also influenced by Hegel and Nietzsche, Sloterdijk in addition by Heidegger.
But Sloterdijk's work mentiones also the Christan era refering to revenge and resentment:
„Vor allem muß heute, gegen Nietzsches ungestümes Resümee, bedacht werden, daß die christliche Ära, im ganzen genommen, gerade nicht das Zeitalter der ausgeübten Rache war. Sie stellte vielmehr eine Epoche dar, in der mit großem Ernst eine Ethik des Racheaufschubs durchgesetzt wurde. Der Grund hierfür muß nicht lange gesucht werden: Er ist gegeben durch den Glauben der Christen, die Gerechtigkeit Gottes werde dereinst, am Ende der Zeiten, für eine Richtigstellung der moralischen Bilanzen sorgen. Mit dem Ausblick auf ein Leben nach dem Tode war in der christlichen Ideensphäre immer die Erwartung eines überhistorischen Leidensausgleichs verbunden. Der Preis für diese Ethik des Verzichts auf Rache in der Gegenwart zugunsten einer im Jenseits nachzuholenden Vergeltung war hoch - hierüber hat Nietzsche klar geurteilt. Er bestand in der Generalisierung eines latenten Ressentiments, das den aufgehobenen Rachewunsch selbst und sein Gegenstück, die Verdammnisangst, ins Herzstück des Glaubens, die Lehre von den Letzten Dingen, projizierte. Auf diese Weise wurde die Bestrafung der Übermütigen in alle Ewigkeit zur Bedingung für das zweideutige Arrangement der Menschen guten Willens mit den schlimmen Verhältnissen. Die Nebenwirkung hiervon war, daß die demütigen Guten selbst vor dem zu zittern begannen, was sie den übermütigen Bösen zudachten.“ - Peter Sloterdijk, Zorn und Zeit, 2006, S. 4.
My translation:
„Especially must now against Nietzsche's impetuous résumé be considered that the Christian era, on the whole, just was not the age of the force exerted revenge. Rather, it represented a period in which very seriously the ethics of revenge deferral was enforced. The reason for this must be sought not for long: He is given by the faith of Christians, God's justice will one day, at the end of times, make the correction of the moral balance sheets. With the prospect of a life after death in the Christian sphere of idea the expectation was always connected of an hyper-historical suffering compensation. The price of this ethic of renunciation of revenge in the present in favour of a backdated retribution in the afterlife was highly - Nietzsche has clearly judged that. It consisted in the generalisation of a latent resentment that projected the repealed revenge desire itself and its counterpart, the damnation fear, into the heart of the faith, the doctrine of the Last Things. In this way, the punishment of the proud in all eternity became a condition for the ambiguous arrangement of people of good will with the dire conditions. The side effect of this was that the humble good ones (do-gooder) began to shake theirselves against what they intend for the wanton evil.“
And the revenge has best to be avoided by a shift, away from what Freud has recognized as erotic discontent. This may work on the short term, but long term? You may object that the synthesis always plays musical chairs, and the center doesn't always occupy the current political correctness, of a game of expediency. The appearance of ultra liberalism may just as well be a current fascination with recurrent material dialectics , a pragmatic tour de force, a wait and see attitude, based on some program or another, as a measure of congruence between oriental and occidental ideas in an emerging world market of opinions?
Extreme adaptability of ultra-liberalism is the sloth of the cynic is what Sloterdijk was pointing out.
Arminius wrote:finishedman wrote:All you have to do is understand the way your own individual personal past operates. The past is always active. If the past ends, you end. That is the reason why you will never allow that, no matter how hard you try. The past is everywhere in you. Every cell in your body is permeated by it. Every nerve is involved in it. The past has this body so much under control that it will not let it go. The past will not come to an end through any effort you make or whatever will power you effect! The more effort you put into it, the more willpower you use, the stronger it becomes. You came across many insights in this process, but every insight reinforces the past. It does not in any way help to understand anything and to thus free yourself from whatever. Every insight that you obtain with your investigations only strengthens and solidifies that.
Finishedma, hystory and the past are not synonyms. Please! For example: the history refers to the past, the past can, but does not have to refer to the history. If we lose our history, we do not lose our past at all. History has to do with handwriting, with script. If history loses handwriting, then it becomes story. Story refers to the past too. Humans do not need history in order to be humans.
finishedman wrote:As long as events are dependent upon, caused by, or are led to by other events, there will be stories. The linking up of certain events to promote a designed idea are the stories that precede history.
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