Like I said, it’s a struggle to extract what you’re actually talking about - the title of the thread is whether any of us still doubt you about platonic forms and I was giving you reasoning to doubt platonic forms.
Now you’re telling me I didn’t talk about what you were speaking about… - was I not thus approaching your thoughts logically?
1)i) Sticks in space and time
ii) Sticks can be observed individually as different events
iii) These different events can be differentiated as one, then two, then three, then four
iv) These numbered events are not the sticks themselves in space and time
v) The classifications of one, two, three and four can be used generally for not just sticks
vi) Oneness, twoness, threeness and fourness are not bound specifically to that which they denote in space and time
2) One, two, three and four (and all numbers in general) themselves do not have the same reality as sticks in space and time
3) If numbers don’t have spatio-temporal reality like sticks, they exist outside space and time
There’s presumably at least this number of layers to the abstraction of something such as numbers into Platonic forms. Don’t think the “logic” isn’t apparent to those who see a problem with it - and by all means we should respect it in its historical context as brilliant for the time.
I bring up Nietzsche because he truly brings philosophy back in touch with its physiological origins, psychologising in these terms only to diagnose the mentality of inverting reality with the imaginary. This is what Plato did when he proposed “an eternal realm that doesn’t begin or end”, and the added sense of “means, motive, and opportunity” really puts into perspective the musings about whether such a conclusion is valid.
In terms only of the validity of the conclusion, looking at the logical progression that I reeled off above from the top of my head, I think it’s something that goes on at around 1)vi)
There has to be a sleight of hand performed at some point that removes “the general” from the embedded reality of “the specific”.
Only then can you jump to a notion of “the essence” of numbers as removed from space and time, and thus conclude that they exist outside of space and time.
Allow me to put the whole process in real terms - are you ready?
Numbers and any words that “denote” a real, tangible, physical thing are in themselves real, tangible and physical. On the surface they are a sound, a visual symbol, a tactile impulse such as with braille and so forth. They are a sensation of a specific codified type that is not the same things as that which they denote, but which is much easier to deal with and more compact - e.g. you can write about a whole world in something as portable as a book. But “underneath the hood”, the brain is merely reinforcing (myelinating) neural pathways that occur more often, such as the one that connects “the signified” and “the signifier”. This is why kids love asking “what’s that?” constantly - they are myelinating together their reality with the code of language. “One” stick ends up lighting up similarly to “one” stone, and so forth, until the sensation of “oneness” in your mind is consolidated into its own neural pathway in and of itself - without necessarily applying to something in particular. That’s how the brain works: association.
Thus numbers are entirely real as a chemical response that feels like “recognition”, with or without a code (e.g. the written symbol “1”) that “signifies” something “signified” such as a single stick.
The error in thinking is the conception of reality as the “signified” as separate from the “signifier”, which by black-and-white contrast can be lumped into “not reality”. Perception occurs in the brain, not in the eyes and ears etc. and “stick” and “one” are not one bit different in this respect. Given this fact, Plato et al. need only re-conceive what reality is - except “tragically” they did not have access to the scientific knowledge that we have today.