Xander,
It is seems to me that in order to tell a lie, you must assume a factual knowledge of a state and then to dissemble this knowledge in some way. At bottom this is a kind of what-do-you-really-think is the case. The contract of exchange requires this kind of representation of your “self†to others. By declaring yourself as a reporting observer of the “truthâ€, you take your place within the social matrix. But the method of social exchange is a constructed fiction, the position of observer and reporter of the truth is an assemblage (in short, a kind of lie – hence Lacan’s observation that the truth is structured like a fiction). So the question becomes one of lying within the lie, reporting a perceived “untruth†within the untrue function of a reporting subjectivity. Here we get the problem hinted at in Plato’s Phaedrus, that of the counterfeit coin, the painted copy of the “true†coin of virtue.
“My dear Simmias, I suspect that this is not the right way to purchase virtue, by exchanging pleasures for pleasures, and pains for pains, and fear for fear, and greater for less, as if they were coins, but the only right coinage, for which all those things [69b] must be exchanged and by means of and with which all these things are to be bought and sold, is in fact wisdom;”
When the subjective position from which truthful utterances is understood as a construction, is it possible to tell “the truth�
- lying to your wife telling her that she looks good in a dress that is not actually flattering AND
- telling your wife that you have never cheated on her when in fact you have had a mistress for several years?
In simply lending the impersonation of your subjectivity to authenticate a “realityâ€, (or to place it within the Phaedrus metaphor, passing the coin of truthfulness, minted under your auspices as a copy of the “right coinageâ€), in order to circulate that reality, you produce real consequences. What it comes down to is not the representational content of each version, but the truth-effect consequences of each utterance. Each “version†made within the context of social exchange works in two simultaneous directions, one that subverts the social order, one that supports it. The “truth†can be as destructive as a “lieâ€, and a lie as structuring as a truth. Because fiction is inherent in the production of truth, I do not think that you can say that all lies are morally wrong. The guideline that seems most productive to me is not categorical, but that of experienced intent, knowing that the “intent†of respect and community between you and your wife has to be translated into the cultural and therefore linguistic categories of “truth†and “lieâ€, and knowing as well that history may very well prove your intent to be fictious or mis-directed. You may artfully lie about your mistress out of sincere respect for you marriage in Italy or France for instance, and be proven a (relatively) noble husband. You may lie about your mistress, in defiance of a cultural prejudice to “self-confessional honesty†in America and be proven a selfish bastard. The subject in each case is constructed within a meaning field, and must suffer the consequences of the revealed meaning of the intent of one’s behavior, as only history will prove. There is no place to stand outside of the cultural domain of your decision, no universal template stamped from the outside upon the “coin†of your discourse. Rather, it is within the heuristic horizon of your learning, the experience of the material consequences of your decisions, as interpreted within that cultural awareness, that “you†become “revealed†to yourself. Living a life of “liesâ€, either consciously, or unconsciously so, has real effects. Living a life of “truthsâ€, either consciously, or unconsciously so, has real effects. One must act within a personal understanding of yourself and of your circumstance, and in doing so express that culture, and that substance of which one only is part. “You†are not the master of your truth, but your “truth†will be determined by all that you do.
Dunamis