A lie = a lie?

First hypothesis: The act of telling a lie is morally wrong.

Question: Is the act of telling a lie always morally wrong to the same degree?

[Morally wrong] is already an ambiguous idea but it is not totally unintelligible. We could begin this investigation by questioning if there are different degrees of moral wrongness.

Is there something different in the moral wrongness between:

  1. lying to your wife telling her that she looks good in a dress that is not actually flattering AND
  2. telling your wife that you have never cheated on her when in fact you have had a mistress for several years?

If there is a difference, I hypothesis that there is, then what causes that difference?

Or would you argue that there is no difference in the degree of moral wrongness between these two lies?

Xander,

It is seems to me that in order to tell a lie, you must assume a factual knowledge of a state and then to dissemble this knowledge in some way. At bottom this is a kind of what-do-you-really-think is the case. The contract of exchange requires this kind of representation of your “self” to others. By declaring yourself as a reporting observer of the “truth”, you take your place within the social matrix. But the method of social exchange is a constructed fiction, the position of observer and reporter of the truth is an assemblage (in short, a kind of lie – hence Lacan’s observation that the truth is structured like a fiction). So the question becomes one of lying within the lie, reporting a perceived “untruth” within the untrue function of a reporting subjectivity. Here we get the problem hinted at in Plato’s Phaedrus, that of the counterfeit coin, the painted copy of the “true” coin of virtue.

“My dear Simmias, I suspect that this is not the right way to purchase virtue, by exchanging pleasures for pleasures, and pains for pains, and fear for fear, and greater for less, as if they were coins, but the only right coinage, for which all those things [69b] must be exchanged and by means of and with which all these things are to be bought and sold, is in fact wisdom;”

When the subjective position from which truthful utterances is understood as a construction, is it possible to tell “the truth”?

  1. lying to your wife telling her that she looks good in a dress that is not actually flattering AND
  2. telling your wife that you have never cheated on her when in fact you have had a mistress for several years?

In simply lending the impersonation of your subjectivity to authenticate a “reality”, (or to place it within the Phaedrus metaphor, passing the coin of truthfulness, minted under your auspices as a copy of the “right coinage”), in order to circulate that reality, you produce real consequences. What it comes down to is not the representational content of each version, but the truth-effect consequences of each utterance. Each “version” made within the context of social exchange works in two simultaneous directions, one that subverts the social order, one that supports it. The “truth” can be as destructive as a “lie”, and a lie as structuring as a truth. Because fiction is inherent in the production of truth, I do not think that you can say that all lies are morally wrong. The guideline that seems most productive to me is not categorical, but that of experienced intent, knowing that the “intent” of respect and community between you and your wife has to be translated into the cultural and therefore linguistic categories of “truth” and “lie”, and knowing as well that history may very well prove your intent to be fictious or mis-directed. You may artfully lie about your mistress out of sincere respect for you marriage in Italy or France for instance, and be proven a (relatively) noble husband. You may lie about your mistress, in defiance of a cultural prejudice to “self-confessional honesty” in America and be proven a selfish bastard. The subject in each case is constructed within a meaning field, and must suffer the consequences of the revealed meaning of the intent of one’s behavior, as only history will prove. There is no place to stand outside of the cultural domain of your decision, no universal template stamped from the outside upon the “coin” of your discourse. Rather, it is within the heuristic horizon of your learning, the experience of the material consequences of your decisions, as interpreted within that cultural awareness, that “you” become “revealed” to yourself. Living a life of “lies”, either consciously, or unconsciously so, has real effects. Living a life of “truths”, either consciously, or unconsciously so, has real effects. One must act within a personal understanding of yourself and of your circumstance, and in doing so express that culture, and that substance of which one only is part. “You” are not the master of your truth, but your “truth” will be determined by all that you do.

Dunamis

Perspective is everything. If you dont think its morally wrong, then its not. Also, technically your not lying to your wife if you say she doesnt look fat, since being fat is relative to perception. She can never truly be ‘fat’ in fact.

xand, your question is nonsensical. behold :

the inquiry wether something is wrong or not is a matter of “should”, not a matter of “is”, bacon has more on the issue. now, for any inquiry about matters of “should” to make sense, they must be included in an explicit set of moral norms. if such a set is not supplied, one can be implied, although it’s not very reasonable to imply morals for people you never met. thus, one or the other :

either you are asking an “is” question about a “should” subject, which is a logical flaw

or you are asking a “should” question about a “should” subject not saying precisely what system of norms you are considering, which is bad practice.

so, pick your complier error : 200, wrong class or 101 missing dependancy.

Perhaps it is better to say: “This dress does not complement your beauty,” since you don’t mean to say she looks bad in it. Would that work to state the truth unoffensively?

If it does, I might have some scenarios you can help me with in dealing with saying delicate things.

on a procedural note, i will proceed to imediately dump any girlfriend who can’t take the truth in the form of “you look like a pregnant mare in that thing”

HELL(O) F(R)IEND(S)

Xanderman, different lies have different consequences.

Basically: Lie = Lie, has the same value. X = X.

Thus,

The moral wrongness of lying does not change. However, if we add further moral wrongness to the consequences to the person(s) being lied to then the immorality of the equation of lying is changed because the morality is judged upon those consequences and not upon the lie. To make it as clear as possible: telling a lie about a dress is nearly inconsequential to the wife while lying about a mistress has a much bigger consequence for the wife.

In logical terms, I think it would be expressed: ~(Lie X = Lie Y). Logically speaking, Lie X is very different from Lie Y… much like the lies you described in your hypothetical.

Does anyone agree? Disagree?

Those two examples aren’t good to compare because one of them is a lie about how you perceive things and the other is a lie about an action that you deliberately did that affected people, AND was wrong in the first place…

It makes one lie seem worse, but really, the… wrongness lol, yeah wrongness, of each lie is equal. It’s the things that you’re lying about that most people think of as making the difference in a little white lie or a big, nasty black one

The intention is important. Lying to flatter is about intention, lying to cover up is also about intention. The consequence of each lie is different, but there are consequences nontheless. Even if the intentions are honourable, thus making the lie moral in some way, there are consequences. The degree of lie is of no importance, the consequence is of great importance. I would say that it is the intention that causes the difference.

A

not to question procedure, but if she looks like a pregnant mare in that thing, then when she is not wearing it, she no longer looks pregnant… is that what you are trying to say?

if that is the case- when she is naked- does she still look like a horse? and was this a truth condition prior to your courting of her?

just had to ask…

-Imp

So many relativists, so little time. :smiley:

hyperbole = A hyperbole, largely synonymous with exaggeration and overstatement, is a figure of speech in which statements are exaggerated or extravagant. It may be used due to strong feelings or is used to create a strong impression and is not meant to be taken literally. It gives greater emphasis. It is often used in poetry and is a literary device.

(from wiki)

-zeno

(just had to do that once in my life :smiley: )

To lie or not to lie, that is the question. One must ask, is my intention to help or to hurt? Even if I intend to help, will the consequences finally result in hurt?

If the wife asks the fat question, and I lovingly say “no, of course not.” my intent is good. If she wear’s the ‘fat’ dress in public and hear’s the titters, sees the laughing and pointing, have I truly helped her? She has been humiliated twice: by wearing an unflattering dress, and by my well-intentioned lying to her.

And so, Not only are intentions important, but anticipating the consequences is necessary.

FWIW, the morality or lack thereof doesn’t mean squat. Am I helping our hurting? That’s the question

JT

by your rationalle robbing banks is a wholesome activity, under some circumstances ? for instance right before the republicans were going to cash their campaign funds ?

Zeno,

by your rationalle robbing banks is a wholesome activity, under some circumstances ?

“What is robbing a bank compared to founding a bank?” - Bertolt Brecht

Dunamis

Although I have very strong opinions about what’s morally wrong and right, moral objectivism makes no sense to me. That being said, I think that there are different degrees of moral wrongness, which are of course up to individuals.

Setting fire to your neighbor’s house is morally worse than keying his car in the driveway.

It follows that there are different degrees of moral wrongness to telling lies, as the fact that they’re all lie tellings could be considered an incidental category. (Every act is unique.) I think that for most morals for most people, immorality is proportional to how much damage something causes.

To analyze 1 and 2:
1:
Pros:
Makes her feel good
Telling her that the dress looks ugly and causing her distress would seem to be unnecessary
She probably just wants you to say it looks good
Cons:
The more people lie about something, the less meaning the truth has. So it’s bad to abuse the truth, especially on a routine basis. The desecration is subtle, incremental, and collective.
She might find when she goes out in the dress that she doesn’t get as positive reactions from people as she had hoped, and get disappointed. And if not that, her attitude may be less happy than it would have been with a good dress because of the subtle influence of other people’s behaviour toward her without her knowing why.
2:
Pros:
Doesn’t cause a stupid fight or break-up that’s totally unnecessary because the only thing that could be damaging that she wouldn’t know about is her knowing about it.
Monogamy is a cultural tragedy whereby 2 people agree to suppress their passions for everybody but their partners in order to spare eachother’s egos. Cheating without telling is the most efficient solution to this problem.
Cons:
None

Conclusion: Lying about the dress is much worse than lying about cheating. (i may have cheated a little with my assessment, but i showed that it’s at least possible that 1 is worse than 2, just to turn some heads around. in any case, i hope it’s obvious that either way it means that one could be worse than the other.)

Forgive me if I misunderstand, but logic says that if two things are false then they are the same. Thus if both lies are false (information) then they are both the same.

However I also have to agree with thirst that you need soemthing more. Since morals are perspective then need need a valrible that change be changed as well.

So realy it is your option to say either way.

I think you might even be able to get away with saying the first lie is moraly wrong, and the second correct. The first lie will make her go out in public looking fat but not knowig it. The second will save their marrage.

A lie is usually perpetrated to avoid negative consequences. If the negative consequences are just, the lie is immoral. The more just the negative consequences, the more immoral the lie. If the consequences are unjust, the lie becomes less immoral, until the point when the lie and the unjust consequence are on equal ground. Then at some point the unjustmess of the consequences may exceed the unjustness of the act of lying in this case, and the lie actually becomes moral.

The question becomes whether a given consequence is just. While this is somewhat subjective, there are times when consequences, even though springing from a consensual and arbitrary bedrock premise (such as, it is wrong to cheat) are arrived at in invalid and unsound ways. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to lie to SHE who is irrational to the point that the consequences they’d initiate would be disproportionate to the transgression; or, the punishing LADY might mistake something for a trangression when SHE has no grounds to see it universally as a transgression of common laws or pre-established idiosyncratic laws for that matter.

It is not my contention that lying is always the lesser of two evils. Rather, lying can be a highly moral act, albeit an unfortunate one. A person with the rational high ground – one who is just –– should not want to be forced to misrepresent reality if doing so is distasteful to him or her. If there is any vicitm of the lying in this case, the liar is the victim, choosing, in this case, between the lesser of two evils.

Next time some simple simon claims that “a lie is a lie” be sure to cite my passge. SHE will not be amused.

ehh gamer, if you admit things are not inherently imoral, there is no cause to even consider the morality of anything. so i suppose you’re playing with the straw man.

Were it not for straw we’d never have anything to discuss. Were it not for playing my name would not be Gamer.

Xander made it clear that “moral” was ambiguous, so I didn’t need to. All my arguments are part of an unwritten book entitled how to deal with idiots. So in it I use words like morals since that’s all they understand. We do have to live among idiots, so I dance the rhumba on false premises all the time. Almost all premises are false, but some are moreso than others.