Sage, dude - you flatter yourself, which appears to be your sole purpose here.
05.10.06.1302
Nothing, good sir; you did nothing wrong. You spoke your opinion, which is what should be expected in a forum as this. However, I admit my failure would have been found out had I continued, being as to explain what I have already said would no better bring clarity to he in whom it was lacking. Your added perception allowed him to understand what I was trying to tell him, from a different perspective that I could not possibly have achieved— this I say as I am not you and only you could have said such words in the manner which they were spoken of. Since he has now understood, I see no reason to continue a failing task of stoic proportion.
I am glad you have calmed down, but I still do not understand why you are persistent in corrupting this thread by making yourself the fool with comments such as that. Open your eyes! If anyone is to be flattered, it is Mastriani, who has helped you understand what you beforehand apparently had no grasp of.
Yet another assumption on your part. An erroneous one, at that.
Nothing like the degeneration of a thread built speculatively upon interesting discourse, falling prey to tripe and trash.
Exspectatus et hominis agrere
I think you have two different things here.
Morals and competitions.
Morals, well we are still working on that one.
and competitions are something else.
I don’t believe that competitions have a moral
component to them.
I have been involved in sports or competitions virtually
my whole life. I was playing T-ball at age 4 and I still
go hiking into the Sierra’s. (well not this year due to health issues)
I think the Greeks consider competitions to have an moral
component. And this was the idea of Arete, which roughly means
excellence. Excellence for the Greeks was moral in nature.
For one who did not exhibit the the highest moral virtues of
courage, of justice and moderation certainly could not excel in
competitions.
With all that said, athletics and morals do not mix.
Some of the best athletes have had the worst morals.
(define in modern terms) The Greek ideal is better defined
by our (now outdated) idea of the “Amateur” athlete.
So I think you have mix up two different idea’s.
Kropotkin
05.10.06.1303
Well spoken honorable one… I don’t don’t think anything can whittle a thread down quite like a stream of senseless one-liners. This should come to past to those who choose to deal the final blow to themselves than for others to do it to them. Not often do I see a thread destroyed by its creator… interesting discourse indeed. Shame me for falling victim to it.
Ye, would that the damaged ego be selfish enough to destroy itself?
This is why some can be nothing less than venerabilis aenigma.
Well done Sagesound, your complexity is unmatched, unrivaled, and as yet, still, undefined.
Salut`
Sage, dude, you can keep it going by answering my objection your position, that it is inconsistent. Or not. It’s only a thread.
Peter - I think there are two different things here. My overall point is that morality, as traditionally conceived in the west, has botched the job of handling competition, by trying to eliminate it. But morality and athletics,if that is the example you wish to use, must mix, or you wouldn’t be able to ascertain that athletes have inadequate morals.
The problem here, with you and with Sagenoise, is that you enter the conversation with a preconceived notion of just what moral values are in play. This is instructive for me, as a way of learning people’s starting points - their assumptions, and in the case of sage, as an IQ test.
Mastriani - I started this threads with a purpose. I have, indeed been sidetracked by trivial distractions. My overall point is that, within the context of morality as generally conceived, there are at least two incompatible schools of thought operant in contemporary thought. But it was not an essay. I wished to explore a single point. Anyone is free to make a point external to my context. But it should, if it is to be pertinent, be done selfconsciously. The main idea of this thread was interrupted, but not by me. There is no meaningful comment I can make to a position that is external to the basic assumptions of my position and fundamentally inconsistent except to point that out. My objection to that inconsistency has been ignored. Okay. But I cannot control the conversation. Comments about the thread are not comments about my point.
It is a hazard of conversing with children. My spelling is not relevant. My mood has been misread, and also is not relevant. Telling me what to worry about and what not to is not relevant. Relevant comments would solve the problem you speak of. Sage did not fall victim to this problem - he created it.
I’m not going to call anyone a punk. It would be impolite.
f
faust: Sage, dude, you can keep it going by answering my objection your position, that it is inconsistent. Or not. It’s only a thread.
F: I think there are two different things here. My overall point is that morality, as traditionally conceived in the west, has botched the job of handling competition, by trying to eliminate it. But morality and athletics, if that is that example you wish to use, must mix, or you wouldn’t be able to ascertain that athletes have inadequate morals.
K: I am not so sure that morality has “botched”
competitions. I just don’t think they have anything in common.
F: The problem here, with you and with Sagenoise, is that you enter the conversation with a preconceived notion of just what moral values are in play. This is instructive for me, as a ay of learning people’s starting points - their assumptions, and in the case of sage, as an IQ test."
K: oh, we all have preconceived notions, of this and of that.
No big deal. The key is the understanding of their assumptions
in regards to your assumptions. Actually an culture could be
simply one of shared assumptions. You can’t be too hard on
people because of their assumptions. Philosophy is really
no more then the rational means of understanding ones
assumptions.
Kropotkin
Peter, I agree. I wasn’t clear, here. I meant your asumptions about my use of the word. In fact, I use the NFL as a model of a good moral system. I mean morality only as a set of rules for conduct. Surely athletics has this. No?
faust: Peter, I agree. I wasn’t clear, here. I meant your assumptions about my use of the word. In fact, I use the NFL as a model of a good moral system. I mean morality only as a set of rules for conduct. Surely athletics has this. No?
K: morals are again a set of rules, as a game? As for the NFL as
a moral system, as a life long sports fan, I must say any
professional sport, any sport, not only expects cheating but
in making winning the only goal of sports, encourages cheating.
(Hockey does one thing right in having an award for “gentlemanly play”
the Lady Bing trophy) Is winning the only thing, or does it really
matter “how we play the game” I don’t know. Barry bonds by all
accounts “cheated” yet he is consider one of the 5 best baseball
players of all time. Remember he won 3 MVP’s awards
before, BEFORE, he was ever thought to have taken any
steroids. If winning at all cost is your goal, then cheating which
by any standards is not moral, then cheating is ok, because
you have set the standard at winning, not being moral.
It depends on the rules you have established, and if the main
rule is winning, you get different results, then if the main rule
is to play “gentlemanly” or moral.
Kropotkin
Kropotkin
Peter - I almost agree. Every moral system should expect infractions. And every moral system must account for dealing with those infractions. The NFL has rules, which if broken, are enforced with penalties. The fans expect cheating. The NFL knows that cheating will occur. The system of enforcement is not perfect, but deemed good enough for practical purposes. When it is not, they change the rules, or adjust the enforcement.
Bonds didn’t cheat, vis a vis the rules, if no rule was in place against what he did. The judgements made about him on talk radio are from a context external to the rules. The rules define the morality - they are the moral values. So it matters what those rules are. The main rule is not winning - there is no main rule. There are rules. Plural.
Morality doesn’t rightly assume that the individual’s goal is the same as the goals defined by the rules. If that were the case, then morality wouldn’t be needed.
Elicitly state please, or otherwise reference, your two schools of thought please.
If my opinion may be once again inserted: In any philosophical didacticism, there is oft likely to be an enumeration of ideology/belief/suppositionary, upon the original premise, as especially concerns, again, a general such as morality.
I will try to honor your desire to maintain between the two propositions of thought.
Mast - briefly - there is the notion that moral good is logically prior to moral systems, that moral systems serve a previously-knowable concept of the good. And there is the notion that the good is defined by logically previous social exigencies.
I was originally speaking within the context that the good, or the right, is not logically prior to moral systems, but defined by them. Sage’s criticism, so far as it is coherent, is then merely a truism. Yes, I set up the model so that the right was particularly defined. That is the purpose of the model, and not a flaw of it. The model was not, however, the transaction I described. To think this is to miss my entire point. The transaction was merely an instance of the model. It did not in any way describe a moral value, but merely a case. Moral values are necessarily more inclusive.
One may certainly criticise my first assumptions, or my inferences from them. But criticising both at once is nonsensical. If the assumptions are not acceptable, then the inferences are irrelevant.
Very nice faust.
Now I will think on this before responding, it does appear altogether different than the first sight opinion.
faust: Mast - briefly - there is the notion that moral good is logically prior to moral systems, that moral systems serve a previously-knowable concept of the good. And there is the notion that the good is defined by logically previous social exigencies.
K: I am not so sure the notion of “the moral good” is logically
prior to a moral system, unless your point is the moral system is
prior to the morally good. I must admit I am confused.
F: I was originally speaking within the context that the good, or the right, is not logically prior to moral systems, but defined by them. Sage’s criticism, so far as it is coherent, is then merely a truism. Yes, I set up the model so that the right was particularly defined. That is the purpose of the model, and not a flaw of it. The model was not, however, the transaction I described. To think this is to miss my entire point. The transaction was merely an instance of the model. It did not in any way describe a moral value, but merely a case. Moral values are necessarily more inclusive.
K: ok, defined by them. My problem here is I don’t really understand
where you are and where you are going with this.
You say" that is the purpose of the model and not a flaw of it" Ok,
Then you say “the model was not however, the transaction I described”
then you say, “the transaction was merely an instance of the model”
As far as I can tell, you say “look at the model” then “but the model
doesn’t count for anything” and then again, “the model is right”
I am sure the confusion is mine. quite often I have found
communication failure is really in the listener, (that’s me in this case)
So if you could please straighten me out on my obvious
misunderstanding of your position.
F: One may certainly criticise my first assumptions, or my inferences from them. But criticising both at once is nonsensical. If the assumptions are not acceptable, then the inferences are irrelevant.
K: I have so failed to understand your position so far, I won’t even
comment here.
Kropotkin
Mast - this was not included in my original post. I did not include in my previous post the context of those thoughts. Nor the context of that context. I can’t start at the beginning each time. Just letting you know what it is I am doing here. I am, or was, examining a particular moral idea with a case study. In moral theory, cases count. I follow Rawls here in that moral precepts must be checked against cases. Even Kant discussed cases, although I’m not sure why. All I was doing.
faust,
I don’t remember in which thread or under what subject you wrote about concentric circles of [moral- (ly relevant relationships, ly satisfactory standards) ity]. I don’t even know if I correctly interpreted what you wrote. Even if I didn’t completely understand what you were saying, I was able to relate to it, as the morality I define for myself is largely based on a pattern of concentric circles. The manner in which I judge someone, and also the relative importance I place on any duty (small “d”) I might owe to that person, is in large part based on that person’s position within the matrix created by those concentric circles. For example, I will often rather harshly judge someone for actions that violate the standards of the culture with which I am associated if that person is also closely associated with that same culture. Whereas if the violator is from another culture, I will, even when the violation occurs within a region (geographic or otherwise) that is also associated with my culture, not judge that violator as harshly. Culturally speaking, the violator is outside the concentric circle which deserves my harsh(est) judgment for violations.
I think this (concentric circle approach) applies to your example of lying in almost every circumstance. Lying to yourself, obviously the central circle, is the worst. Lying to those close to you–spouses, friends and family–tends to often bring about pretty bad results. Lying to those beyond this circle can bring about mixed results–your boss, the FBI, the IRS. Beyond these circles, lying will seldom result in bad news for you. Now this is not to say that the complications that you may suffer as a result of lying are the only consideration you have; I’m just saying that if you look at lying in a vacuum of the 1st, 2nd or 3rd concentric circles, independently, you’ll probably reach these conclusion.
But this is only looking at one set of concentric circles, the personal relationship circle. Let’s imagine a business relationship circle as well. Now, it’s likely that the car salesman, in this situation, falls within this circle. Do you live in a small town with one used car salesman? If you do, then this particular salesman occupies a circle pretty close to the center. Lying to this car salesman this time may affect you in your future dealings. You get the picture. And the more sets of concentric circles you are able to consider in your interactions, the more morally justifiable the act is to you (or actually to me, as it’s my moral system).
That’s enough for now. Either you get it or you don’t. Incidentally, faust, I find it ironic (maybe ironic, depends on the definition of irony we use) that the posters that have been pestering you in this thread hold the top two and only spots in my hall of shame - see my signature line.
05.10.06.1304
Once more I am humbled by your graciousness that I have yet to see any yeild so subtly. A shame we live in an age corrupted by conceptual morality— so easily it conceeds to those that speak strongly of it, yet have no understanding of mastering it.
Humored I am, this day… by the attempts of petty ignorance. As Roger Daltrey said: “We won’t get fooled again.”