I have a complete causal argument for the existence of a Supreme Being, to which I will only present here the premise as follows:
The ultimate beginning to all things (that is, the universe) is not nothing, but rather, it is an Absolute void.
Before defining this concept further, however, one might ask: Why would an Absolute void constitute a logical premise, over other possible beginnings?
There is something that we can call our natural, intuitive need to press the question concerning the origin of all things as far as logically possible. Therefore, all complex conditions are open with regard to this question: “What brought about these conditions?” or “From where did these more complex conditions originate?” The only possible premise that escapes our natural, intuitive need to ask this question is an Absolute void. It makes little or no sense to ask, “From where did this Absolute void originate?” but it does make sense to ask, “From where did super strings originate?”
This is why the ultimate answer to the question of the origin of all things can only come from metaphysics, not from physics. Physicists must postulate as a premise, some condition, however simple, that is itself left open to question regarding its origin. They cannot provide a solution, in other words, that satisfies our natural, intuitive insistence on pressing the question of the ultimate origin of all things as far as possible.
The premise of an Absolute void must then be defined further, if it truly represents the most logical beginning that is available for our reflection. It is impossible though for our finite minds to grasp the totality of an Absolute state (even an Absolute void), for there are no finite boundaries or conditions that we can impose on our idea of such an Absolute state. This concept therefore presents to us not just one idea (this being the common sensed dictionary definition of nothing) but rather it presents the two following, a priori, and necessarily related ideas: A) The external, infinite, objective state of an Absolute void, and this only and necessarily in relation to B) The internal, finite, subjective idea that we possess of A.
This presents the simplest of possible beginnings. The only philosopher to have postulated anything analogous to such a beginning was Hegel, in his “Science of Logic” where he speaks of “a bare beginning as such.”
I’ve written an essay putting forth this same premise in answer to Kant, called “Beyond Kant and Hegel,” (published in the March 2013 issue of “The Review of Metaphysics”). The essay provides more quotes of Kant and Hegel than I can provide here in support of this premise. But my argument is that these A and B representations fall in line with Kant’s critical demands, and they provide a resolution to Kant’s first antinomy that is somewhat similar to the solution that Hegel presents; but they offer something more than Hegel in that they provide the grounds for a complete causal argument in response to the challenge presented by Kant in his critical philosophy.
I am presenting this post only to gather what others might have to say about this.
For one to see any sense in such a premise they might need to be open not only to metaphysics as a viable means toward answers to the most difficult cosmological questions, but to what cosmologists have discovered, that is, that our universe has not always simply existed, but it had a beginning some 13-14 billion years ago. Their findings overturn Kant’s proof for his antithesis (which has it that the universe had no beginning) of the first antinomy, which put simply is: “only nothing can follow from nothing.” My contention is that Kant’s proof of his antithesis rests on the common sensed dictionary definition of nothing. The A and B representations provide a critical redefinition of nothing that is fundamentally important in that it overturns this common sensed notion that stands as an obstacle on the path of pure reason (and metaphysics).