A novel linguistic refutation of the Cosmological Argument

[u]Kalam is nonsense: a novel linguistic refutation of the Kalam Cosmological Argument for the existence of God from naturalist principles[/u]

Abstract: In this essay, we show by careful linguistic analysis that William Craig’s formulation of the Kalam Cosmological Argument for the existence of God is either unsound or nonsensical from a naturalist perspective. The argument falls upon examination of its first premise. This premise, while intuitively plausible, is in fact infected with nonsense from a naturalist point of view. To my knowledge, this is a novel refutation of the Kalam argument, as the premise I attack is typically agreed to be “relatively uncontroversial”. Perhaps most importantly, this refutation demonstrates that there is no reason for naturalists to be wary of a universe with a finite timeline and a beginning.

The Kalam argument for the existence of God is traditionally formulated as follows:

  1. Whatever began to exist has a cause of its existence.
  2. The universe began to exist.
  3. Therefore the universe has a cause of its existence.

The cause of the universe’s existence is then argued to have divine attributes, and therefore may be justly referred to as God. This argument is traditionally attacked by objecting to premise (2), denying that the universe began to exist. However, this method is scientifically weak, as Big Bang cosmology provides some scientific support for (2). In addition, this method of attack wrongly suggests that the atheist should be wary of the idea that the universe began some finite number of years ago; atheists should be comfortable with this possibility. Another method of attack on Kalam is to accept the argument and conclusion (3) but attack the post-argument analysis which identifies the universe’s cause as God. In my opinion this line of attack successfully shuts down the Kalam argument, but that is not the subject of this essay. In fact, the naturalist can and should shut down the Kalam argument at its very first premise.

In this essay I will analyze the Kalam argument’s premise (1) from a naturalist point of view. To my knowledge, premise (1) has never been seriously questioned. In this post and appended below I offer a proof (the “BC argument”) that the naturalist should deny premise (1) if he believes that the universe is the metaphysical beginning and cause of everything in existence. Since naturalism can be neatly summed up as the metaphysical position that “the universe (that is, nature) is all there is”, it would seem to follow from my proof that naturalists should be piling on to attack premise (1). But this has not been the case. Here I will describe why premise (1) traps even naturalist minds so forcefully, and I will explain the linguistic-philosophical ambiguity that should lead naturalists to deny it.

Let us begin by examining premise (1): “whatever began to exist has a cause of its existence.” William Lane Craig, one of the main defenders of the Kalam argument, defends this proposition as follows:

In this paragraph, Craig implicitly equates his premise (1) with the rather unclear assertion that “something cannot come out of nothing”; what would it even mean to “come out of nothing”, such that Craig can make a statement about whether “something” can do it? Craig then equates (1) with the somewhat clearer statement that “something [which begins] cannot come into existence without a cause.” It is this latter phrasing of Craig’s premise (1) that we will subject to linguistic analysis.

Premise (1), fully unpacked, states that “if any thing X began to exist, then X did not come into existence without a cause.” We know from the next premise that Craig will take X to be “the universe”; so let’s ask what happens when we do that. In particular, what does it mean for the universe to (a) “begin to exist” and (b) “come into existence”?

The notion (a) that the universe “began to exist” suggests that the universe simply has a finite timeline with boundary points on both sides. The “right” boundary point of this timeline would be the present, and the “left” boundary point would be the time of the universe’s beginning. This notion is supported by the Big Bang cosmological theory, which says that the universe’s timeline began when the universe was a point of singularity and ends at the state where we see it today. Craig also argues that the universe cannot have existed forever on philosophical grounds, again concluding that the universe has a finite timeline. I am more convinced by the Big Bang theory than by Craig’s argument; in either case, let us take it for granted that the universe began to exist and affirm (a). However, the BC argument previously mentioned demonstrates that (1) is false from the naturalist perspective, since it shows that for the naturalist, the universe itself began to exist but did not have a cause.

The assertion (b) that the universe “came into existence” suggests that the universe “came” from a state of not-being “into” a sort of background or framework called “existence”. Intuitively, (b) appears to be equivalent to (a); for in our ordinary experience, the beginning of something’s existence is identical to its coming into being. For example, we would be comfortable asserting that a car “begins to exist” once it is constructed, and its construction causes it to “come into being”. The beginning of the car’s existence and its coming into being are one and the same.

However, we will show that (b) is NOT equivalent to (a) when applied to the universe as a whole. In fact, from the naturalist’s perspective, (b) is nonsense when applied to the universe. According to the naturalist, the universe, or nature, is all that there is. That is, the universe is the entire content of existence itself. To the naturalist, therefore, it is absurd to assert that the universe “came into existence”. The universe could not possibly come into some background or framework of existence, for the universe is itself the entire metaphysical background and framework of existence. For the naturalist, to say that the universe came into existence would be equivalent to asserting that a room came into itself – a metaphysical and linguistic absurdity. Thus from the naturalist’s point of view, the assertion (b) that “the universe came into existence” with or without a cause is nonsensical.

To summarize: in the fully expanded premise (1), Craig asserts the relatively uncontroversial premise (a) but then slips it under the table, pulls out (b), and claims that it is identical. The naturalist should not be convinced. More formally, we have argued that premise (1) is false because when its defense is fully unpacked it is revealed that the underlying syllogism does not depend on (1) at all, but on two different formulations of (1) which are claimed to be equivalent but are not. Depending on which formulation is chosen, the Kalam argument is either unsound (if (a) is chosen, we reject premise (1) by the BC argument) or nonsensical (if (b) is chosen, we reject (1) as nonsense).

We have described a novel analysis and refutation of the Kalam argument from the naturalist perspective based on careful linguistic analysis. We have shown that the argument depends on the intuitive equivalence of statements about existence and becoming which upon closer examination are not equivalent from a naturalist point of view. For the naturalist, the nonequivalence of these statements is the juncture at which the Kalam argument fails. Since Kalam fails on grounds having nothing to do with whether or not the universe actually has a beginning, naturalists need not be wary of this possibility. On the contrary, they are free to believe whatever scientific evidence suggests about the world’s timeline.

Appendix

The BC argument

Not everything that begins has to have a cause (contra the Kalam argument). In fact, there is a specific thing which, if it exists, begins but does not have a cause (except possibly itself, depending on how you feel about self-causation). Namely, it is that thing which is itself the cause of everything. Here is a proof.

Definition: “X is the cause of Y” or “X causes Y” means that X is responsible for bringing Y into existence. [This is the cosmological definition of cause.]

Proposition: That thing which begins and is itself the cause of everything (call it B) either (1) does not have any cause C, or (2) its cause C is B itself: C = B.

Proof: Suppose the following sentence is true.

(*) B does have a cause C.

If so, then since B is the cause of everything, C must be among the things B causes. Therefore B caused C which caused B. Now if C and B were different, then by the definition of cause, B was brought into existence by C, which did not exist until B already existed. This is absurd. Therefore we must have C = B.

If on the other hand our supposition (*) is false, that is equivalent to saying that B does not have any cause. QED

I can not put my finger on it yet… but something about this argument does not sit right with me…

I think it’s when you say:

At first glance I want to say that “existence” being the “room” in which a thing is placed… to the naturalist that room in which things exist would be “space” one could not equate matter/energy with empty space… and so matter/energy can not be said to be “all there is”… empty space exists as well… So one might ask… how did Matter/energy come to occupy space… which should translate quite well to “how did matter/energy come into existence?”

this is only at first glance… I’m still trying to wrap my head around the issue here… I’ll think on it further…

Mad Man P,

The modern scientific approach to the universe considers it as an integrated whole containing matter, energy, and empty spacetime. It is in fact vital to general relativity that we think about the underlying “empty spacetime” in the universe as part of the universe dynamically interacting with the universe’s matter and energy, for in relativity spacetime is stretched like a rubber sheet in the presence of mass. And in quantum mechanics, so-called “empty space” is in fact a froth of particles spontaneously coming into being and self-annihilating on a very small scale. Science does not allow for the concept of the universe as being merely the matter and energy inside empty space. Matter, energy, and spacetime are in constant dynamic interaction and together form the universe as a whole.

The very notion of spacetime and its close tie to the universe’s mass and energy together suggest that neither space nor time exist outside the universe, which seems strange until you realize there is no such thing as “outside the universe”. The natural universe is all that is, existence itself, and there is no reference point outside of the natural universe from which to judge it.

To push this further, one has to give up the idea of space being “empty”. Without space, there is no differentiation of anything. I see two balls, but without space between them, there is no differentiation. So what I really see is two balls AND space at the same time. Part of you as a “thing” includes the space around you. Space is an integral part of ‘thingness’.

tentative,

Yes! That is exactly the position we must take as naturalists for our philosophy to be consistent with science.

To all:

I would appreciate your feedback on making this as readable and widely distributed as possible. I believe that this paper blows open the conventional wisdom on Kalam and I would like it to be as widely read as possible by those who might conceivably be interested. I’ve already published a copy at philosophyforums and IIDB’s “Existence of God” forum and sent a copy to Craig himself. I’m also thinking of getting it published in a more scholarly form on the secular web’s library. I think this could be a lot of fun if we get enough people interested.

I’m definitely treading in deep water when quantum enters the picture, but ‘entanglement’, at least as I understand it (probably don’t) makes sorting out matter/energy/space problematic which in turn creates problems for any beginning-end scenario. Additionally, since a singularity is supposition at this point, (we don’t know what might be going on in there), beginning-end would have to be an imposed POV with nothing to validate it. We perceive from a perceptival point: A beginning and without proof of infinity, a supposed end. But that is our limitation. There is nothing to suggest that reality has either beginning or end. That we have trouble wrapping ourselves around this is of little or no concern to the universe.

Tentative,

Certainly – and my argument adds on to that lack of knowledge the following fact: there is no trouble for naturalists even if the universe actually can be accurately thought to have some sort of tidy beginning and end.

Just a side note: The Kalam argument includes the same fallacy encountered in the theism thread. The notion that process must have a beginning CAUSED by something, and that that cause has conscious agency (God). There is no validation of either cause nor ‘intelligent design’. It is simply an apriori assumption that allows God to be created.

I’m having truble here… For this to work you will have to give up “empty space”.

But then… if space were never empty… then what is “space”? The whole thing seems confused…

Aporia,

We know much less than we pretend. The fact that the naturalist admits to that is the very thing that keeps us asking questions, exploring, and looking for better answers. Not only could there be a beginning and end, but when we get there, we might find God sitting there ready to push the red button. But no form of past or current knowledge or understanding has gotten us even close - yet.

Mad Man,

Just give up the idea of ‘things’ and ‘not things’ and you begin to see the continuum of energy/matter/space. You’re a solid 'object, right? Wrong. The atoms you are made of is mostly ‘space’ Hard to hang on to isn’t it? Western thinking of no-thingness is what you have to get past. A couple of Xanax helps… :wink:

My being solid is the work of electromagnetism… My mass, however, is not… I am occupying space… However little that may be… the electromagnetic force that keeps me from passing through walls and other “solid objects” occupies space… space is the “room” in which we all exist…

I have no idea what “nothingness” means… Space is not “nothingness”… it’s space… when I say “empty space” I mean space in which there is no matter/energy… unless you mean to say there is no such kind of “space”…

Awesome, this is exactly the kind of thing I love to see. You’re breaking ground in a direction I haven’t seen anyone work in before, and I’ve seen this argument analyzed from a lot of angles.
If Craig gives you a detailed response, can you ask him permission for our website to use it? Or, rather, can I ask you to ask him for permission for our website to use it? It would be a great publicity launch, perhaps.

Anyways, to the point. 

I worry that the argument might be tautological.  It seems the description of the hypothetical object as 

“That thing which begins and is itself the cause of everything”

takes as a given everything you go on to demonstrate.  Yes, something that began to exist and caused everything would be the cause of itself (or else uncaused) by definition of the set 'everything'.  But I see William's position being that [i]there are no such things as that[/i].  When he says

WLC

That seems very much to be to be saying that there are no things that begin by pulling themselves into existence by their own bootstraps. I would agree with him that something seems intuitively wrong with the notion, but a deductive argument trumps intuition. That might be the angle to pursue.

My other criticism I pointed out in my response to your post. Even if your argument does demonstrate something, I don’t see how your description of B can be applied to an actual object we discover non-arbitrarily. In that case, the reasons why scientists look for the causes of things in the first place (whatever those may be) remain unaddressed. It seems to me a scientist will always reject declaring “This is B” for the same reasons they always reject “God did it”.

EDIT: A simpler way to put it: My shoe cannot come into existence uncaused. What does “…caused everything to exist” add to the powers of my shoe? Nothing at all, other than stipulating that it caused itself by definition of ‘everything’. I don’t have the logic worked out, but this suggests to me that you’re demonstrating a tautology.

Mad Man P

That is exactly what I am saying. According to modern physics, matter/energy/spacetime exist as a dynamic unity, mutually affecting and mutually dependent on one another. There is no such thing as matter or energy without spacetime. There is no such thing as spacetime without any matter or energy. Quantum mechanics and general relativity depend entirely upon these assumptions. I promise you this upon my modest authority as a (bachelor of science-educated) physicist. Read Stephen Hawking’s Brief(er) History of Time if you don’t believe me. I haven’t read it myself but I’m sure he’ll back up what I say.

Uccisore

I’d love for this paper to give publicity to ILP. Much of my philosophical education occurred here, at the hands of folks like Dunamis, Gamer, yourself, SIATD, Xunzian, et al. and I’d love to see this place get the cred it deserves. I’ve probably gotten overexcited and sent off too preliminary a version to Craig; but hopefully he will get involved, as I am highly confident that I have set him a serious challenge.

You are correct that WLC asserts there are no things that begin by pulling themselves into existence by their own bootstraps. My response in this essay is that the universe’s beginning to exist does not involve pulling itself into existence at all. To assert that the universe must do so in order to begin existing is to incorrectly extrapolate from our metaphysical intuition and experience about ordinary objects within the universe. This intuition suggests that “beginning to exist” and “coming into being” are the same thing, but on the level of the universe they are not. Beginning to exist involves having a finite timeline, while coming into being involves entering a larger framework of being/existence. The two coincide in ordinary objects, since ordinary objects both have finite timelines and come into being within the larger framework of the universe. But in the universe itself, these two distinct concepts do not coincide from the naturalist perspective. In fact, “coming into being” is nonsense when applied the naturalistic universe, for the reasons I described in the essay. [I have been revising this paper significantly since its posting – you may want to look again at the latest version for more clarity on this point.]

EDIT: Your example of the shoe illustrates my discussion here perfectly.

I too would expect a scientist to resist declaring that s/he has found the uncaused cause, and that no further explanation is necessary. It is in the nature of science to always seek more and deeper explanation. But this tendency must be balanced by a philosophical warning – it is possible, provably possible, to reach the end of the road, with no more explanations ahead. Whether this end of the road is God or the universe itself is a question science will surely never answer conclusively. I have merely argued that the universe itself is philosophically no less preferable a stopping point than God, should the stopping point exist. So what you call a “will to ignorance” on the part of naturalists, I call a recognition of ignorance and a lack of pretension to knowledge where it does not – perhaps cannot – exist.

So, would you be drawing a parallel between ‘the beginning of the universe’, and ‘the edge of the universe’, in the sense that talking about what’s beyond either boundary is senseless? The angle you’re going reminds me very much of people who imagine there to be an infinite void of emptiness that the universe expands into, and who need to be corrected on this point. Are you saying that people who suppose that the universe needs a prior cause might be making the same kind of mistake?

You may also want to send something to Richard Swinburne: users.ox.ac.uk/~orie0087/

He’s an advocate of the cosmological argument as well, probably more accessible than Craig.

Uccisore

Exactly. Exactly Exactly.

The initial compelling mental picture I had which planted the seed for this paper was of the universe, stretched out before me in time and space, and encased in steel. The steel symbolized our inability to intellectually cross the boundary between the universe and the void of nonexistence (not empty space) “surrounding” it. I had attempted to convey this picture intuitively a couple times over the past two years but failed. It is difficult to convincingly carry this insight over from space to time, since our experience of time is so much more limited and local.

But now I believe I’ve done it, as you’ve just now demonstrated, and Kalam has much to answer for.

Sending it to Swinburne does seem like a good idea, since I can contact him directly by email rather than through the feedback form on LeaderU I had to fill out for WLC. But being an academic-in-training myself now, I know how annoying it can be to be pestered with thoughts and arguments you’re not interested in. I will try to determine if he is likely to care about my refutation, and email him based on my decision.

Awesome. Put that way, I definitely think you’re on to something. I still think the “That thing which begins and is itself the cause of everything” is problematic for the reasons I described, but you’ve successfully given me the image you’re after, I think it’s powerful, and the wording will come.

So I did send it off to Swinburne (he likes cosmological arguments, perhaps not Kalam but close enough).

Also there’s gonna be some fun related to this over at IIDB over the next week or two. It so happens that as I was writing my Kalam paper this evening, a debate on Kalam was created in the IIDB forums with a Peanut Gallery in the Existence of God(s) forum. I expect that this divine coincidence will lend my essay some extra attention and hopefully sharp scrutiny. So the resulting discussion over there should be fun. And of course, I’ll make sure they know that you heard it here first at ILP :slight_smile:

Ok, I didn’t read much past the first few paragraphs of the original post… But I just wanted to make a fast comment. You said:

“This argument is traditionally attacked by objecting to premise (2)”

and

“In this essay I will analyze the Kalam argument’s premise (1) from a naturalist point of view. To my knowledge, premise (1) has never been seriously questioned.”

Premise 1 states: Whatever began to exist has a cause of its existence.

Maybe I’m just being crazy… but isn’t this premise commonly attacked? I know for sure both Hume and Russell claimed it to be false. And I think it is a somewhat general consensus among philosophers that not everything need have a cause. Perhaps I am misunderstanding or should have read more of your post but those two claims you made strike me as odd. Any refutation of the Cosmological Argument or the Kalam Argument that I have ever seen always deny premise 1.