Mr_Lady
November 24, 2004, 9:32pm
1
Whilst trying to write an essay, I have succeeded in greatly confusing myself. If Natural Law, an absolutist theory, follows that we use our reasoning – or inbuilt sense – to work out what is right and wrong, how come G.E. Moore talks about using this same inbuilt sense to work out right and wrong, but says that absolutists commit the naturalistic fallacy? Am I wrong? Is someone else wrong? Am I just confused?
Future_Man
November 24, 2004, 9:43pm
2
what is the naturalistic fallacy?
Mr_Lady
November 24, 2004, 10:13pm
3
The naturalistic fallacy is committed when people (namely ethical naturalists) argue that moral statements can be verified by using our 5 senses. Deriving an “ought” from an “is” would be committing the naturalistic fallacy.
She
November 24, 2004, 10:19pm
4
Links on the Naturalistic Fallacy:
iep.utm.edu/n/nfallacy.htm cuyamaca.net/bruce.thompson/ … listic.asp utilitarian.org/texts/prior.html radicalacademy.com/adlernaturalisticfallacy.htm
Quote from the last link (Adler), which also discusses Moore’s form (not here):
"The logical fallacy to which Hume called attention is formally similar to the violation of the rule governing considerations of modality in reasoning. It is logically invalid in reasoning to infer a necessary conclusion from premises that are contingent in their modality, or to assign contingency to a conclusion that is inferred from premises that are necessary in their modality. It is similarly and just as obviously fallacious to draw an ought-conclusion from premises that consist entirely of is-statements; for the difference in logical type between descriptive and normative propositions is as great as, if not greater than, the difference in modality between two descriptive propositions.
“That is why I regard the logical mistake pointed out by Hume – the violation of the rule that an ought-statement cannot be validly inferred from premises that are is-statements-as an analogue or special form of the modal fallacy.”
Hume:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.
Found in:
MORAL DISTINCTIONS NOT DERIVed FROM REASONetext.library.adelaide.edu.au/h/ … ter71.html etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/h/ … ter72.html
zenofeller
November 25, 2004, 1:50am
5
mr lady, where does G.E. Moore talk about using this same inbuilt sense to work out right and wrong, but says that absolutists commit the naturalistic fallacy?