Perhaps it’ll help if you think about it this way:
Prior to any rovers landing on mars, there were 4 possibilities:
Detectible life exists on mars. (D)
Undetectable life exists on mars. (U)
Both of the above statements are true. (D&U)
No life exists on mars. (~D&~U)
Now, it doesn’t matter which probabilities you give to them all. As long as they’re all mathematically consistent, it doesn’t matter a single bit.
Once you find out that the entire category (or at least nearly the entire category) of detectible life has been pretty much falsified, you’ve eliminated at least some amount of the probability of there being life on mars. You certainly still have remaining the entire probability of U, but D is completely wiped out.
I can explain some potential priors you could have that wiping out D completely shouldn’t change your posterior probabilities, and it should be fairly clear why those priors are untenable:
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If you assumed that p(D) was 0 prior to the trip, you could get away with not lowering your posterior probabilities.
Now, in this case we’re dealing with a person who’s arguing that there still remains a possibility of undetectable life. So, p(U) > 0 but p(D) = 0? Why in the world would the probability of undetectable life be greater than the probability of detectable life? (Reminder: this is before the trips, these probabilities are being considered) It’s a strange prior to say the least. And besides, it’s been argued that probabilities of 0 are nonexistent (as well as 1).
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I had another one, but upon review, nope, 1 is the only one.
So, the only way to get away with not taking the absence of evidence as evidence of absence is to have the frankly strange and truly mathematically incoherent belief that undetectable life on mars was possible while simultaneously believing that detectable life wasn’t.
No matter what your prior probabilities were, as long as they were mathematically sensible (eg p(B&U) cannot be greater than p(B) or p(U)), the math says that the probability of life is lowered.
Now, let me get back to what I said above: the idea that when an entire category of possibility is wiped out, the probability has to be lowered. I think it’s fairly clear to see why this is the case. Let’s say we’re playing some strange dice-betting game. Before I roll the dice, you bet that the number will be 4 or above. I roll the dice, but hide the results from you (as per the rules of this strange game). You ask me “Is it a 5?” and I tell you “No.” What would you give the probability that the dice was 4 or above afterward? The only reasonable option is to lower it (assuming, I suppose, that the rules of the game dictate I must answer you, and I must answer honestly, but we can assume that). I’ve wiped out an entire sub-category of the category “4 or above”. As long as that category had p > 0, you MUST lower, to some degree, the probability of the category that it was a subcategory of.
[edit] With the inapplicable exception being times when the category that the subcategory is a subcategory of (lol) has a probability of 1 (or near-1, if we’re being sloppy). Like for example, when I roll the dice, the statement “It landed on a number” has a probability near 1, and a subcategory of that is “It landed on 5”, so when I say that it didn’t land on five, this is a rare (and inapplicable in relation to Mars) exception in which you don’t have to lower the probability of the higher category.
“Detectable life exists on mars” is a subcategory of the statement “life exists on mars”. The first is pretty much eliminated. The second must be lowered.