Apart from explaining why statements are opinions (which none of you who have replied have taken to my post), isn’t the paradox simply the statement “All statements are opinions” being a statement of opinion itself?
Edit: That is if he is implying that there can be no such thing as “truth”; only opinions.
The claimed paradox is that statements are at once opinions and not opinions. Why they should not be opinions hasn’t been even suggested in the OP. It seems that no one but the OP belives that this is the case. The paradox remains a mystery.
A definition isn’t an opinion, it’s a definition. When I call my child John it’s not my opinion that he’s called John, I ‘define’ him as John. If that becomes his accepted name, then it’s not like my partner can be of the opinion that he’s not called John. She might want to call him something else, but thats not the same thing. At least if we’re talking in terms of everyday use of these words, that seems right, surely?
When you name a child at birth your expressing your opinion as to what they shall be named or called by your own preference.
In reality there is no reason why such and such a person should be called this or that but in our opinion we believe that they should have a label to be addressed as.
She could call him Joe for short or give him a nickname.
Do you agree that most facts are assumed to be true?
The only thing true or real about a object and thing is the object and thing by themselves without labels.
If I read somthing or describe somthing that is only a constructed opinion but if I feel, see, and expirience somthing without labeling definitions only then does it become real.
Feeling is the only thing more then just opinions and some feelings are best felt without definitions or opinions in that there are some things that no language can describe.
The biggest problem with opinions, perceived facts, classifications, and categorizations is our habit of lobotomizing objects or things where instead of looking at a object directly we instead look at it through lens of mere words.
Irving - as it happens, a proper name is not a good example. Proper names are names if anything is a name (there has been some dispute, historically), but even if everyone uses that name for your son, the proper name that you chose, all this does is point to an individual - “John” doesn’t constitute an assertion about this individual. You haven’t defined John, you have only labelled him.
A fact is a “generally accepted” - something: belief, opinion, piece of knowledge - you pick it. I’m sure not going to champion the idea that we can have certain knowledge. But a fact is generally accepted, as opposed to being held by only the speaker, for instance.
All men are mortal - is this a fact? Or is it merely a partial definition? Is it news, is it synthetic knowledge to learn that men die? Or do we define “man” partly as something that lives and dies?
It depends on the context. Facts are malleable. And they exist only in language.
The Sun is that star that “rises” every day. But maybe it’s a god. Maybe once you know the science, it’s still a god.
Facts are funny that way.
Statements must be accepted as making assertions - the statements that Ayer would approve of must be accepted by all users as containing a fact, prior to being used in a logical argument. Kripke agrees that common acceptance is vital, but also includes some purely hallucinatory considerations.