Well, because the thread is discussing normative/moral theories. That’s the context in which freedom is being discussed, no? Physical laws are a different concern.
Would be great to see you explain how freedom and “physical laws” can be so completely separated.
I think he’s simply saying that immoral agents can violate freedom as well.
You mean this post,
?
No, that doesn’t make clear your position in light of the objections that I raised.
You seem to be in the habit of stating things without explaining them. I’ve noticed that in academic philosophy there is a tendency to think that labeling an idea is the same as explaining it… not so.
Yep.
Saying that freedom can only be violated by “free agents” (saying that freedom can only be violated by something else that is also free) is not only not answering the question at hand, but is an absurd categorical conflation.
Maybe you have to read his whole thesis, which is here I think:
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=191769
Well, wyld, I misspoke then, because for that formulation freedom can not only be violated by immoral agents, but also amoral agents.
I agree with this expansion of what I wrote
Instead of telling me to read something, why don’t you tell me where I’m actually wrong? Daniel so far hasn’t been able to.
Because neither you nor the thread merit that kind of investment of my time. :-"
So you have the time to post meaningless comments telling others to read something you obviously haven’t read yourself, and you have time to come back and tell me you don’t have time, but you can’t be bothered to make a single actual point to the issue at hand?
Yeah in that case you’re not a philosopher, you’re a fucking human refuse, a sub-creature with no mind and no intellectual honesty whatsoever.
I was hopeful that Daniel would turn out to be different, to at least have some potential. After all it’s his own thesis, it should be easy to copy and paste something that’s relevant to the points he’s ostensibly trying to address with me. But I can see that he too, like you, can’t be bothered to hold down an actual fucking conversation.
If you’re going to be snarky then I can be snarky too.
But then you go off the deep end with this “fucking human refuse” nonsense. 
Wyld: As for where you are wrong, allow me to begin by pointing out your completely over-the-top, rude and fairly stupid string of insults to Phyllo here. I’m not sure what a sub-creature is, I’m picturing some kind of pest that frequents submarines, but I certainly won’t be engaging in conversation if you are prone to labeling those who point out sources to you “fucking human refuse”. His suggestion of further reading seemed perfectly reasonable to me.
Ecmandu: Yes, freedom can be violated by lots of things that aren’t moral agents. My freedom can be violated by a volcano erupting in my backyard and engulfing me in lava. The thread Phyllo linked to is probably pretty helpful for a bit more understanding of what I’m saying.
Phyllo: Thanks for the link to my first two chapters, that was a good idea. Not sure why it got met with overly aggressive insults.
I don’t need to. The key word is “context” - freedom in this context is normative freedom and not freedom from electromagnetic impulses. Since you’re keen on spotting categorical conflations, you can see where you’re doing that in responding to me as though I’m talking about freedom in every possible context.
Since you appear not to have read the OP, nor to care about the OP, nor to do any work to understand the discussion at hand, I’ll leave it at that.
Well actually OH, if we can control magnetic impulses to have an effect on biology, then that would also be a subset of normative.
Please define “normative freedom” and “freedom from electromagnetic impulses” (where did that come from?), and “freedom in every context”, then. You are using these three concepts, so I assume you have functioning definitions for and understanding of them.
I still haven’t gotten Daniel to respond to me where I asked him to define freedom. Now, you want to talk about conflation of categories, that is great: here is Category 1: the freedom that an entity possesses or is capable of having. Now here is Category 2: Something which imposes on or limits/prevents the freedom as understood in category 1. I’m sure you saw how Daniel confused these. Specifically, he was saying that freedom can only be violated by other free agents; even if we restrict to the class “normative freedom” which I will wait for you or Daniel to define, saying that normative freedom (which is part of Category 1 however you define it) can only be violated by other agents or entities which also possess Category 1 freedom is conflating the fact that the answer to the question “what is a violation of freedom?” is a Category 2 answer, which means at a minimum that Daniel must explain exactly what it is about Category 2 that requires anything included in that category to also be included in Category 1. He didn’t do that.
Something has freedom (whatever we want “freedom” to mean), and that freedom is never infinite but is subject to limitations, it exists within boundaries. There are two categories here, the freedom to or from, and then the limitations or boundaries that would impose against the freedom to or from.
An example: I have the freedom to drink coffee or tea in the morning; I have the freedom from needing to fight a wolverine when I leave my house.
The above indicates two different kinds of freedoms both of which are of Category 1, namely a freedom to and a freedom from. In the first case of freedom to drink coffee or tea, the limitation or boundary here would be the extent to which I am unable to drink either coffee or tea, for whatever reason; in the second case of freedom from needing to fight off a wolverine, the limitation or boundary is the fact that I could potentially have to fight off a wolverine, for example if someone throws one on me as I leave my house in the morning.
Every freedom, even ones like the wolverine example, have limits. They are never infinite or boundless. So when someone claims that freedom can only be violated by other free agents that is like saying my ability to choose coffee or tea can only be violated by another person with the same freedom that I possess, or is like saying that my freedom from needing to fight off wolverines can only be violated by another person who also has the freedom from needing to fight off wolverines.
In other words, it is meaningless and as I said a stupid conflation of categories.
Now you said that I have conflated categories here? I have defined freedom in the universal sense of a capacity to do or be subject to something, or in the negative a capacity to not have to do or be subject to something. That is a basic logical definition of freedom. If you want to restrict the meaning of freedom to “normative freedom” (whatever that means, I will wait for your definition) that is fine only in so far as you have established that it is meaningful to talk about freedom in that narrow context – you mention context but you have not yet contextualized the kind of narrow freedom you seem to have in mind, into the broader idea of freedom as such, or into a larger group of various kinds of freedoms other than the one you are wanting to talk about.
You would need to define the kind of narrow freedom you are talking about, and then define other alternative kinds of freedom and/or define freedom in the logical universal definition, as best as you can, and show how your narrow category fits into the broader picture of many kinds of freedoms and/or into the broader picture of freedom as such. Go ahead and do that, because once you (or Daniel) does it we can actually start to look at the claim that “with regard to “normative freedom” it is the case that freedom can only be violated by another agent/entity who already possesses normative freedom”.
I have read some of the OP, not all of it by far. I do care about these issues, and I have asked Daniel to explain and/or back up various of his ideas and arguments, which generally speaking he has failed to do to any reasonable standard whatsoever.
And based on what I have seen it appears that Daniel isn’t passionate about truth, isn’t interested in actually dissecting and understanding these issues and ideas at all. He is basically trying to construct a thesis, for whatever reason, and seems only interested in that construction regardless of the larger truths that may or may not pertain to it. Sadly this kind of myopia and apathy is par for the course in academia, based on what I have seen.
The larger truth is hidden in it’s exhibition of detail, which have seemingly been conflated, rather than distinguished. Therefore my point should be well taken, that this exposition has been reduced toward absurdity, revealing a very wide gap between a general normative theory, and its signifiers. The meat and substance of it, has been stretched to the near limit by non elegant contra aesthetic forms, which go against the rules of formal arrangement, (for it is an arrangement which seems to predicate the edifice ) throwing the assemblage into criteria of objective versus subjective inconsistency.
Please don’t take this as anything but an observation of the trend that the argument seems to progress toward, and at this point, the route is not toward a normative theory, but a demonstration of diversion away from it. This is not the OP’s fault, but the effect of a positivist lean , as a weakening of the substantiality in efforts to generalize any thesis, especially those dealing with attempts to establish a norm. The argument can go foreword n his manner, but I am afraid , it’s fruirptfullness will consist of ever lessening significance, as the signifiers gain more and more focus.
I have indeed defined freedom as I am using it. By freedom I mean “the ability of persons to understand and make choices” and I have also specified that it is only their freedom to make their own choices which is morally relevant… This is different from free will, which is the capacity of an entity to make choices that are not the product of the preceding causes and which cannot, in principle, we predicted with complete certainty. To illustrate this difference, a person’s freedom is violated by being locked in a box against their will, but their free will is not. If you would like a more detailed explanation of freedom, I recommend reading the chapters linked by phyllo.
Normative freedom is the ability to make moral choices and act upon them. The EM impulses was an example of freedom from physical laws; a bit oblique, perhaps - you’re not free to keep your leg still if your knee is hit by a small hammer, you;re not free to choose not to fall if you step off a cliff, but this is unrelated to your ability to make moral choices. The final is freedom in its most general, unspecified case, lack of constraint. I hope that helps.
We’re talking about the types or classes or contexts of freedoms being discussed, not whether something is freedom or a constraint on freedom.
The latter is not really a normative freedom, unless there’s a moral injunction of pacificism towards mustelids, say.
The unavailability of coffee is not a normative constraint on your choice. I’m not sure why you think it is.
And that’s fine. That’s your right to do so, and you have been clear about that. But you’re applying that definition to argue against statements that are using a different definition, which isn’t an effective mode of argumentation.
A bold, sweeping conclusion based on something you’ve not even bothered to read properly? Also not effective.
What is or isn’t normative is what he is trying to newly establish.
He has defined his normative “freedom” concept as
The contention that arose was that he also specified that “in most cases lying is permissible”. Such a freedom to lie contradicts the freedom to understand and make choices. His retort is merely that if someone hasn’t the [government or God granted] right to do something, then lying about whether it is available to be done, is not wrong. His example was that in order to encourage a man to come to a party, lying to the man about how many pretty girls are at a party, is not wrong or immoral, because the man has not been granted the right to go to parties with pretty girls.
The issue arises because every lie distorts the information with which a person forms the “understanding” with which they “make their own choices”. He claims that the person is still making their own choice thus the misinformation causing a misunderstanding is not relevant. He denies their ability to understand accurately.
So he is denying his own concept of freedom by granting the freedom to lie. And he doesn’t seem to be able to come up with a reasonable argument to support his proposal for such a norm. An extended problem arises because he has also granted his moral right to lie about what is morally right (because we do not have the government granted right to know). So why believe anything he says about any of it?
It is not merely a poor dissertation, but rather pathetic.