Anmalous monism.

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
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After studying all the major solutions to the mind body problem: Dualism, eliminativism, behaviorism, identity theory, functionalism, instrumentalism, I think that Davidson’s Anomalous Monism best encapsulates what I have been arguing on this forum sporadically for years. That is, the mental supervenes on the physical, but is not reducible to the physical.

Davidson’s quite ingenious resolution of the paradox created by this position is worth exploring, even though I am not certain that I completely understand his argument, here goes.

There are three major premises that I hold in common with Davidson, these are:

Causal Interation: Mental events can cause physical events, and vise versa
Nomological character of causality: Causally related events fall under laws
Anomalism of the Mental: There are no strict psychophysical law

The paradox is obvious so I will hold off explaining why these three premises seem contradictory unless asked to do so.

The resolution of the problem is, in true Davidsonian fashion, vague and ambiguous, but it is along the lines that mental events are mental events only insofar as they are described that way. They can be described in both physical and mental terms ,and while psychophysical causation requires laws, it does not require psychophysical laws. That is, if you want to say “I desire X” causes you to go get “X”, there is no requirement that “I desire X be described in mental terms. Instead for this example to instantiate a law, it must be described in terms of the physical. “Neural pattern Y”(associated with desire of X” causes the behavior of obtaining “X”.

More to the point, mental and physical properties are apriori incompatible. That is, mental connections in the general sense are related according to logic, reason, intentional states ect., while physical events are related in terms of physical laws like F=MA, gravity, inertia ect. Nomological laws require properties that are apriori compatible. That is, if events instantiate a law, they have to appeal to the same kind of properties. As such, any bridging laws between the mental and the physical will impose mental properties on physical processes and vice versa…thus will be incoherent and confused.

By way of an analogy

When sodium and water mix there is a violent reaction. Agent X pours Kool Aid onto Sodium and concludes that there is a law that says Kool Aid + Sodium = explosion. When infact it is water+Sodium=explosion. Agent X has used improperly described the law.

He is employing incompatible descriptions. Kool Aid will always cause sodium to react, but there is no law that says Kool Aid + sodium=reaction. KoolAid, afterall, is a brand name that does not reference physical properties, namely H2O, thus any law between sodium and koolaid would be confused.

-edit-
A.M. applies to intentional states but not sentient states. Desire,beliefs, wants, attitudes, but not pain, tickle, itch ect.

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So, what are left with? Supervenience. That is, if X and Y are in the same total physical state then they are in the same total mental state. No difference in the mental without a difference in the physical.

Hence, we preserve monism, but not at the cost of doing away with folk psychology or reducing the mental to the physical, And we can all be functionalists in terms of sentient states, and allow for multiple realizability.

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Hi Nihilistic. I thought I’d take the liberty of interjecting here with the fruit-of-the-forbidden-tree-card, if you will. That is, we understand that causality itself is in question, do we not? Causality itself - not unlike time - could be merely a homopsychological state (cf. the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, Kant, Hume, Berkeley, Einstein v. Newton, etc.). As such, I cannot accept this axiom.

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I think, as is often the case, one has to assume causality to have any meaningful theory or discussion. With the exception of occasionalism and parallelism which posit god as the link between the mental and the physical, any solution to the mind-body problem assumes causality. That is, stimulus input -->(internal states)–>behavioral output, with the internal state being optional. The frame-work of the mind body-problem itself implicitly implies causality…However, Davidson will claim that “our concept of a physical object is the concept of an object whose changes are governed by laws”. Which is a linguistic or epistemic understanding of causality, rather than a strict ontological claim.

If you look to Davidson’s argument for the first “axiom”, it is an argument for the dependency of a background of theoretical principles. Davidson will claim that employing any notion of “change” presupposes a body of assumptions regarding causation and laws. His example being that under Aristotelian physics, perpetual motion is not change, but under Newtonian physics it is change. Change being understood as “change in predicate”. As such, “change” is theory dependent, and assumes “laws”. Insofar as we employ notions of “change”, we seem to employ notions of causal laws. He even allows Goodman’s riddle to be an appropriate instance of predicate projection under the right circumstances. Admittedly, I do not know enough of the necessary background philosophy and arguments to completely follow Davidson’s arguments on the cause-law principle, but the principle is strongly intuitive, implicit within grammar, and assumed by notions of “change”

What I think is ingenious about Davidson is that if causality is nomological, and the mental causes the physical and vice versa, it does not follow that there are strict psychophysical laws. And I think any possible discussion/solution to the mind body problem assumes causality…Hence, insofar as the discussion is being held, Anomalous Monism.

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You’re way over my head, homie (read your post like five times). Sucks to be me. Hope someone else can clear the waters. Sorry.

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You posted as if the reader will already be familiar with Davidson’s A.M.

So, I have no clue of your implications in the OP.