This is a very interesting question, which I have decided to tackle from a few perspectives. People may think themselves to have an individual sovereign self, which influences their own behavior directly, and a set of values and beliefs from which they operate morally. But when a social situation arises, which involves many people, the moral responsibility has the potential to become diluted to the form a collective self, therefore weakening the accountability of an individual to the point where they are able to take little or no blame for the actions which they may take. If a collectivist self is not clearly defined, the direction of the group will be displaced to whatever emotions sway the particular group. A certain degree of “moral ignorance” plays a part.
Where a particular morality is defined by an elite, people, in their desire to be productive and co-operative, will follow willingly. There is an essence of trust in the superiority of the elite, which does pose potential problems for the majority. However, there are also implications here to suggest that if morality is defined by the elite, a group does not necessarily operate “less morally”, and conversely, an individual person does not act “more morally”.
This of course can depend on the size of a group - from five students who cut school and receive a collective detention, to the massive population of Germany, during World War Two. In each situation, there is a conflict of individual morality and collective morality. The benefits derived from acting collectively, as well as the consequences of not acting in a collective fashion, are all elements which must be taken into account when arguing the question of whether or not people are less moral in groups.
People socially have a responsibility to remain as part of society, to contribute to the common good, and make productive use of themselves while they live on this earth and while they are physically and intellectually able to. These rules are consistent with the logic of capital, which suggests that if one is unproductive, one is bad and therefore useless to society and as a result, should be cast out or looked down upon.
I draw upon this example to relate in an analogy to the idea of a group moral. In the same way, anyone who is against a group moral such as having a responsible and cooperative nature, so as to contribute to the harmony of the society and remain on good terms with the authorities of that society are by the nature of their opposition, looked down upon. Their non-productivity to the group or society causes them to be shunned. People are taught therefore, to either conform or get out. It is in society’s interest that an individual strives to conform to this standard, promoting and enhancing liberalism through the logic of capital.
This example could be used in a flatting situation. Five students are part of the group, and are expected to contribute equally and fairly to their share of the rent. If one continues to cut, and not pay, and has no usefulness to the flat members other than to pay their share of the money, then the other four are unable to support this person and are compelled to kick them out. Then they may get someone else who will conform to these standards. Naturally these standards are defined on a type of “fairness” that everyone who is there has to serve a useful purpose, as in the logic of capital. Perhaps their friendship may be of value, but the main concern is that of a stable collective survival in the flat, as well as the equal contribution of every individual.
Evaluating more on the logic of capital, this logic fulfills a person’s direct desire to contribute. If one does not contribute, then they are by definition, unproductive. “Unproductive” is bad, or in the most extreme liberalist definitions, “evil”. I outlined in the paragraph earlier the effects of being unproductive in society. This makes productiveness the antithesis of “unproductiveness”, and productiveness, therefore, is “good”. This subtle “good v evil” distinction is common in liberal ways of thinking, and has effects on the perception of what morality is good and bad in society. Contribution is “good”, and a lack of contribution to the group is “bad”.
This effectively translates to the liberalist desire to fit in and work for a group. It is unnatural to liberalism for someone to be against what is defined as the norm. The elite commonly define the norm of behavior through a series of cultural values. The cultural values are created and shaped by this minority, which are then transplanted conveniently onto the majority by ascertaining a higher value.
An example of this can be seen in the Governmental System during the elections. Those who are running for office advocate certain value systems and beliefs about what is right and wrong for New Zealand in general. Voters from the New Zealand democratic system then pick from their menu, and decide which is the system of values and beliefs they approve of as representing the real needs for New Zealand people. The party that gains the vote of the majority becomes the Government. The Government then, theoretically, puts into place the cultural system, which they had advocated for from the beginning.
The fact that there is a predefinition of a system of values and beliefs for a population by political parties directly represents the notion that an elite minority defines cultural systems. However, this does not answer the question of whether this makes people less moral in groups. I have merely tried to show that a common moral shared by the majority as defined by an elite minority does not necessarily make an individual “less moral” in a group, and in fact only directs a collective morality which may in turn reinforce an individual’s personal moral system. This depends, however, on how an individual’s moral system matches up or is dissonant with a collective moral system.
The collective moral system as defined by the elite is made up of values and beliefs which are explicitly held by individuals who participate within this system, as well as being inclusive of the undefined and unquestioned aspects of cultural moral practice. I will evaluate on this point later, but for now I will refer to western liberalism as being a type of collective moral system. The collectivist self, then, is the individual whose beliefs are consistent with the collective moral system, and who acts accordingly with other individuals to form the group which then supports and works within this system.
Another way to read the question would be not only to ask whether individuals are less moral in groups, but to also ask whether people are sacrificing a certain amount of individual autonomic morality in order to better suit a group’s idea of morality, and so fit in as effectively as possible. Consistent with the logic of capital earlier in the essay, one’s ability to contribute to a group is one of the most important values when operating effectively within a group. In this sense we can find some argument as to whether an individual loses some of their personal morality when operating and cooperating within a group.
A sense of individual morality could be defined as one’s sense of right and wrong, their values and beliefs and how consistently they act according to these morals they hold. An individual would like to think that they have autonomy over their own beliefs and actions, and can make up their own mind about what and what not to do in a given situation.
If a person’s desire to fit into a certain group requires them to forego one of their moral convictions, the fact that they give up a moral in order to gain acceptance qualifies them to be “less moral”. The act of giving up an individual moral to join the morality of the group makes them individually less moral in the act of joining, but does not necessarily make the group “less moral”.
In analysis, a non-smoker looking for acceptance in the smoking crowd may forego their moral of “do not smoke”. The act of smoking and giving up a moral immediately suggests a change in their moral stance, making them less moral than they were compared to their previously held self by foregoing a moral which was important to them in order to feel important in the group. Their individual self - the non-smoker - then becomes part of the collective self - the smokers. The significance once held by their acceptance of the individual self now becomes significance through the acceptance of a collective identity.
This individual thought pattern of decision making is affected by extrinsic elements which do play quite a subconscious and unconscious role in how we act and react. In Gordon Matthew’s article, “On the Meanings of Culture”, he defines these extrinsic elements as “commonly unquestionable actions”. Actions such as the defamation of religious names, or openly ill feelings towards another country such as China, are perceived by his students, and generally the western society, to be normal, justified by the liberal and democratic value of freedom of speech.
We can see this in anecdotal evidence, supplied in the form of the religious leader Mohammed being depicted in a cartoon by mass media , to which Muslims find offensive to the extreme. This offense is justified in the western sense of freedom of speech through the press, and advocated by those who hold these beliefs. Matthew’s then outlines the act of destroying capital in front of his students, usually tearing a bill of significant value into shreds, which shocks and stuns the majority of the spectators. His point is to outline the unquestionable elements of culture, which in fact do play a role in shaping our actions.
The main way which they apparently can shape our actions, is to stop us from doing “the unthinkable” - i.e. an action which is not consistent with a general cultural belief, one which we take for granted. Working through this logic, I make the argument that it is quite straightforward to see that people are able to be less morally favorable to actions or beliefs which are held outside their moral reality. The fact that these moral behaviors are taken for granted, supports my claim even further that a group has the potential to be less morally inclined to support any other moral than their own. This leads people to regard their own morality as superior by nature to cultural values differing from their own.
These conflicts are therefore seen in both worlds, in the Islamic and in the Western society. The value of the freedom of press usurps a cultural moral of Islam to be respected, and disassembles the Islamic moral right for their figurehead Mohammed to remain unscathed by western cynicism. The “unspeakable and unthinkable” occurs in the act of depicting Mohammed in a way which is acceptable to Western scrutiny, but unacceptable to Islamic scrutiny.
The way this relates to whether a group, namely western liberalists, is “less moral” is found in their failure to recognize the importance of other moral systems. From the Islamic perspective, western civilization in this sense can be viewed as “less moral”. The reason for this is that a certain moral standard, important to Islamic religious groups, has not been held by the western press. This ignorance to other collective moral systems implies superiority of western liberalism, and so then their dominance through media influence and censorship.
In conclusion, I argue that groups can be less moral in the sense that by acting through the medium of a collective self, we condone the actions which are defined and justified in the collective value systems, regardless of the alternative moral systems. This makes groups “less morally inclined” or even “less morally obligated” to be culturally sensitive to morals held outside of the given ways of thinking. By acting collectively, a person may give up a moral in order to be as effective in the group, and by doing so become less moral than they were as an individual.
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