Note to iambiguous:
Stay out of this! 
Lol. To the people who said this about God you said âtell me what he looks like.â
But I get why you do it. Itâs kinda fun. But, mostly, a real-life demonstration of the inconsequence of Wittgenstein.
Some arguments for idealism:
As Kastrup notes, it solves, or dissolves, the hard problem of consciousness. OTOH, many naturalists insist there is no problem to begin with. They are eliminativists. One must judge the merits of their arguments.
Idealism comports well with some interpretations of quantum mechanics, and in one of his essays Kastrup specifically invokes relational quantum mechanics. OTOH, not all interpretations of QM support this kind of idealism and at least two of them, MWI and superdeterminism, rule out idealism altogether. The problem is there is no way to decide between the competing interpretations of QM.
If I encounter a rose, to to take one example, I judge it to be red, to have a pleasant aroma, to have prickly thorns. All of these sensations are entirely in the mind. So what is a rose independent of the mind? Other species will have entirely different mentations of a rose, so where is its mind-independent existence?
An objection is that minds evolved late in the history of the universe, so how can the universe depend on minds? Apart from the fact that just because our minds evolved late, it doesnât follow that other minds did not precede us, there is the simple point that we do not have direct access to the past, only to records of it. These records are all in the mind. They are mental states. So the idealist would say that the past and the current records of it are just more mental states.
It may be objected that there is no explanation of how mind can be the irreducible ground of reality. Just so, however, there is no explanation of how matter and energy can the irreducible ground of reality. Positing either as the ground just looks like accepting that some things are brute facts, and that at some point explanations must stop.
One may ask, what would the universe be like, without minds in it? The question self-destructs because to ask what the universe would be like without minds is to presuppose minds that can liken the universe to anything. Thus no minds, no universe.
The necessity of consciousness for this conversation is self-evident. Whether or not âGodâ is self-evident for this conversation seems to depend upon how âGodâ is defined. God appears in both the metaphysics of some materialists and idealists and not in othersâ. I assume thatâs why weâre talking about it here. So it seems to me that what youâre doing above is question begging.
It absolutely is not. The very word is less than 200 years old.
You just donât like that your thing that isnât as simple as Jesus walking across the room be put in question.
Obviously not. Many feel it is considerably more self-evident than some abstract oblique reference to some substance behind thought.
Many things appear in many places and not in others. This is not even the beginning of a shadow of an argument.
'Tis thee, who begs the question.
It seems to me you want to take this argument off topic to address a comment I made in a different context on another thread on a different subject. What does your argument with me have to do with materialist versus idealist metaphysics which is what this thread is about?
One pitfall I think the idealist must address is that it can easily collapse into solipsism.
If itâs off topic, you donât have to address it.
Just thought it was funny.
The hypothesis of Kastrup explains how a (cosmic) consciousness could be at the very basis of all that makes up your and my experience. That is, that consciousness is the ground of being out of which everything else emerges.
There is no indication that a âCosmicâ Consciousness (or Mind at Large) needs to be personal, but there is the question whether it is equivalent to the Collective Unconscious of Jung, where Jung saw the archetypes of dreams and mythology came from. This could be a collective memory that is âobfuscatedâ (a word Kastrup likes to use) but not âunconsciousâ in the way we understand the word. This has been addressed in experiments with psychoactive drugs, in that experiences have a common underlying âgeographyâ that people who have experienced the effect recognise when speaking to each other. The interesting thing is that, as Kastrup noted, the psychoactive substances donât actually activate but effective deactivate areas of the brain that were effective in norming our perceptions.
Treatment with Psilocybin Relieves Major Depression, it appears, and does so by releasing the proband from his/her previous obsession with a perception of reality which has made them sick.
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/newsroom/news-releases/psychedelic-treatment-with-psilocybin-relieves-major-depression-study-shows#:~:text=In%20a%20small%20study%20of%20adults%20with%20major,study%20participants%20achieving%20remission%20through%20the%20four-week%20follow-up.
The concern of people like Kastrup is that the Pharma-Industry doesnât want to release their grip on patients and so try to fight this treatment, which isnât repetitive or addictive, and possibly delivers a subjective experience that could give people confidence in Metaphysical Idealism.
I have read some of his essays but not his books. Are you saying, here, that Kastrup has demonstrated idealism to be true? If so, I should like to see the demonstration. If he does not have that demonstration, then he is question-begging in exactly the same way that the naturalist and the supernaturalist are.
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Right, well, I oppose scientism, so there we go. But scientism isnât science.
Well, isnât that what I wrote? That scientists shouldnât be telling the public that the practice of science retrodicts or supervenes on metaphysical naturalism? Because I have said twice that scientists should not do that.
The problem with this is that the Mind at Large is not just the plural of mind.
It might be related to the OP topic here in terms of Kantian metaphysical skepticism. Per Kant a mental image or concept should not be confused with the-thing-itself. If thatâs true of every object of perception and apperception, how much more so of God?
The governor of the state in which I live referred to God yesterday as âthe big guy upstairsâ. Now I can imagine that guy walking across a room. But but to me to take that literally is absurdly anthropomorphic. That people on a philosophical site like this one take it literally, I find that shocking.
Maybe that makes you a bigot.
This is me dignifying that supposition with a response.
So you think there is literally a âbig guy upstairs,â and if one rejects such literalism, the person who does so is a bigot? Really?
It is honorable of you to reduce yourself to our level.
What is important about you being a bigot is not so much any political implications, though they are important, but how it clouds your judgement.
Wow. 
Very good Pedro! And Iâm confident that I can look to you for help with my cloudy judgment in the future.
I think itâs you that has to do the work. But Iâll be glad to discuss stuff with you once you have, you are an eminently smart guy.
Till then, you know, Iâll be here reminding you that itâs only Wittgenstein when it suits you.