I think this deserves its own thread so we don’t bog down Heidegger’s thread with Cartesian-like Meditations that would make him puke Nazi puke.
The argument:
If there is verbing [i.e. thinking], then something exists.
There is verbing.
Thus, something exists.
Not concerned with the truth value of these statements, just the validity of the argument. Some claim that the argument is circular. I fail to see how this is the case. It looks like a straightforward conditional to me. The argument does not use proposition 3 to prove either prop 1 or 2. Those are independent statements.
Can someone explain to me how this is circular so that I can understand? Or does someone out there want to agree with my position that it is not circular?
where “(Ex)” means “there is a thing x such that…x…”, “Tx” means “x is thinking”, “x=x” means “x is identical to x” and “->” means if-then.
So far as I see, your argument is a simple instantiation of modus ponens.
But merely because an argument is valid doesn’t mean it’s not circular. Consider the following argument.
The sky is blue.
Therefore, the sky is blue.
This is a valid argument, but it’s circular. If you’re out to prove (3), though, your argument is circular because we’d ask “Why accept (3)?” You’d say “because it follows from (1) and (2)”; but then we’d ask “Why accept either (1) or (2)? They are at least possibly false; thus, they need supplementary argument to show (1) and (2) are probable,” something which the argument doesn’t provide. Thus, if we skeptical about (3), we’ll be skeptical about your premises (that is, if we’re pressing doubt).
Indeed formally valid argmuments can be circular - but this one just isn’t. You say: “Why accept either (1) or (2)?” The arguments for them are perfectly distinct from the conclusion that something exists.The first one is simply necessarily true - there is no possible world in which something which does not exist can be doing something. The second is formed by a basic and obvious observable truth - it is impossible to doubt that you are thinking (because doubting itself is a form of thinking). Put together they lead to the distinct conclusion that something exists.
Essentially - I can’t see how the argument could possible be circular.
And now for an interesting point on the logic:
(Ex)Tx → (Ex)x=x
(Ex)Tx
(Ex)x=x
I find this interpretation unsatisfactory (even aside from the fact that the first line should be [ ALLx (Tx > (x=x)) ]. By putting the argument in to quantified logic you have presupposed existence. Quantified logic is only applicable to non-empty domains - so if the conclusion is not valid (i.e. if nothing exists in the domain) then the inference is invalid. For this reason I believe the argument would be better placed in to simple predicate logic:
([I = all things]. P = a thinking thing . Q = an existing thing)
1 P > Q (premise)
2 P (premise)
1,2 :Q (Modus Ponens, 1,2)
But then - we all know the shortcomings of PL in general on determining open sentences like these.
There are, though, seperate systems of logic which deal with the possibility of empty sets, and thus would be able to interpret the argument in hand without pre-supposing existence. These are known as free logics - a chapter on which exists here (books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&l … #PPA259,M1) . I’m not sure my logic is good enough to delve in to the free logics withouta long time spent familiarising myself with them, but if yours or anybody else’s is I’d be fascinated to see it done. In fact, the cognito ergo sum argument is probably a good reason on its own to use free logics - QL seems unable to interpret it (and PL is just a generally useless system taught to first years ).
Circular nor not, I think there is too much ambiguity in “there is” and “exists”.
These are actually the same thing. But what do they mean?
Does it mean it always “exists”?
Does it mean it “existed” at the certain time period/moment?
Dos it mean it “exists”, sometime?
I think “there is verbing” implies the existing of verbing at that moment. Before or after that, we aren’t sure.
However, then something exists seems to be implying the permanent existence of something.
In other words, it’s a false statement because it’s tricking the subconsciously implied “time frame”, if we see like this.
“1” can be rephrased like this, with this view: If there is something at certain moment, something always exists.
But it can be a circular (or just tautology) is we see like this: If there is something at certain moment, something exists at certain moment.
I think many of so called Paradoxes are made with the ambiguity or mistakes of subconsciously implied premises/conditions.
And when we talk about “existence” of something, I think we should be careful about the (implied and/or specified) time frame (and/or spacial context: exists here, exists everywhere, etc).
is not a valid argument. In fact, as it has only one premise, it’s not an argument at all.
The argument that Radiohead expresses is a crossroads between epistemology (or ontology) and semantics.
It can be re-written as a simple implication thusly:
An event (verbing) implies an object (something that exists that does the verbing).
But this is, in the end, a semantic problem, for the distinction between objects and events is arbitrary.
Which implies that arguments for the object “of” the event are circular, but not necessarily viciously so.
In the end, all arguments are circular. Viciously circular arguments are redundancies.
Radiohead’s argument is a redundancy if the object/event dichotomy is considered real, and it is not if that dichotomy is rejected. But we do not either accept or reject this dichotomy always - it depends on the context.
The rock cannot think about us - so do we?
We can think about ourselves, so yes we do.
But to the rock, we don’t. The rock can’t even think about itself.
Existence = percievance?
We exist, in our percievance of the world, but to the rock’s, we don’t.
If you read all predicate expressions as necessating existence (like the Russelian analysis), you encounter a (the) problem of non existents. Thus maybe radiohead’s argument was presumpteous (if not necessarily incorrect).
We could easily adjust the argument, though:
If there is real (verbing) then something exist
There is real verbing
Something exists.
Arguably this is pretty much what the original argument meant anyway. The point is that there is always at least one actual thing that is verbing, (namely - that I am thinking), therefore there is something that is certainly existing. (2) is still undoubtable. And neither does it necessarily pre-suppose (3) - (2) can be a truth realisable from simple self reflection.
I’m not sure how there could even be the illusion of discussing philosophy on a message board if nothing existed. To me the illusion self-evidently exists, which again implies that something exists.
Trying to prove exsistence with logic is tricky - thats why it requires free logics (most logics assume existence, perhaps fallaciously). But I don’t see why it should be impossible. I think the argument ‘I am thinking, therefore I am existing’ works perfectly well in English (and french) - it therefore shouldn’t be impossible to interpret it with logic.
The premise ‘I am thinking’ is a fact, because it is true.
"Well, yeah - if verbing (or anything else) is real, then…it’s real - it exists.
Your 1. and 2. are then equivalent - they are identical statements. "
This isn’t actually the case. (1) says that if a property is instantiated then it is instantiated by something. (2) Says that the property is instantiated. They simply aren’t indentical statements For a start - they have a different logical form. One is a hypothetical statement, the other a proposition. They therefore have different semantic properties. The first is the universal truth - Ax(Fx → x=x) - this is true even in an empty domain (in fact: its necessarily true in an empty domain - remember that :~p → (p ->q)!) (providing you are using a system of logic that can cope with empty domains, of course - which standard QL doesn’t). The second, however, is false in an empty domain. So it possible that (1) is true and (2) is false. Statements with different semantic properties are not equivelent by defintion.
Seeing as I found an example of where the two statements have different truth conditions, we can probably agree that the two statements have different Tarskian style semantic properties (I realise their are alternative deinitions of semantics but Tarski’s is the predominent one, I believe).
For two statements to have different Tarskian-semantic properties there must be instances in which one is true and the other false (as was here demonstrated). Otherwise the two statements are equvilent (if P is true in exactly the same instances that Q is true, one can replace P with Q within an argument without any alteration to the argument)
So if there were instances where, say, P was true and Q was not true (if the two had different truth conditions [semantic properties]), P and Q would surely have opposite logical properties and therefore be logically different (not equivelent). If you substitue one with the other in an argument the argument would change. The two are not replaceable.
I am interested in your point of view - I sense you know a lot more about this than me. But I do find your argument suprising. I’m rather hoping you’ll enlighten me - nothing tickles my boat more than learning more about logic!
There is going to be a problem with language here - with vocabulary. But let’s try.
Existence itself - existential instantiation - is a special case, linguistically.
That’s because statements themselves - inherently, are about existence.
Or lack thereof.
To make matters worse, statements are also about the maker of the statement - at least in that we assume that someone made the statement.
The best way to look at this is with fiction - sentences that are deliberately not directly referent and which are intended to be understood as such by all who hear.
Hopefully, we can leave “A Million Little Pieces” which is a novel that was, for a time, passed off as a memoir, and passing references in Moby-Dick (like “New Bedford”) as special cases, but not exceptions.
The assumption that there is an external reality has to be unchallengable in order for any scienfific investigation. If the assumption is everything is an illusion we might as well close up shop and go home. Or we would have to at least change the rules.
I would take it this far - a statement, which is the only type of utterance that logic is concerned with, assumes the existence of
This is what distinguishes it from other utterances.
So, “This statement exists” is strictly devoid of content, and is not a statement at all.
To assign a truth value, statements must be verifiable, which assumes that something exists - and we could get more specific about that.
To form an argument, which must be made of statements, that at least one thing exists, is impossible, but not problematic to logic, for it is also not necessary.