Faust
The former is certainly no improvement on the latter. The latter is an improvement, in my book if one says I withhold judgment on it all while at the same time exploring possibilities.
This was my question: A denial to “believe” might also be agnosticism. Why aren’t you an agnostic?
That was my error. For whatever reason, an atheist [does] deny a god’s existence, doesn’t believe.
So no, you’re not an agnostic. An agnostic, in my book, withholds all judgment either way. There is no Yes nor No. They know there can’t be any certainty, any real certainly. Just possibilities.
Now that is Your error. I certainly do have an idea of that. Perhaps it’s also because I do not know the philosophical jargon but I may be wrong.
I’m not sure if I am actually asking you to describe those conditions but I suppose in a sense you may be right if I’m musing about what caused it all. I can, in a sense, understand your need or decision to “see” no god since it’s utterly impossible to know or to describe something which is inconceivable to us, except in human language according to physics and the human heart, et cetera. But I don’t like to throw the baby out with the bathwater even if the baby is invisible to us.
What do you mean by that? You could be saying that there was Something which some might call god.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of … philosophy
In philosophy, a theory of everything or ToE is an ultimate, all-encompassing explanation or description of nature or reality.[1][2][3] Adopting the term from physics, where the search for a theory of everything is ongoing, philosophers have discussed the viability of the concept and analyzed its properties and implications.[1][2][3] Among the questions to be addressed by a philosophical theory of everything are: “Why is reality understandable?” “Why are the laws of nature as they are?” “Why is there anything at all?”[1]
In his 1996 book The Conscious Mind,[5] David Chalmers argues that a theory of everything must explain consciousness, that consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical, and that therefore a fundamental theory in physics would not be a theory of everything. A truly final theory, he argues, needs not just physical properties and laws, but phenomenal or protophenomenal properties and psychophysical laws explaining the relationship between physical processes and conscious experience. He concludes that “[o]nce we have a fundamental theory of consciousness to accompany a fundamental theory in physics, we may truly have a theory of everything.” Developing such a theory will not be straightforward, he says, but “it ought to be possible in principle.”
Okay, well I can see that…
The woods are lovely, dark and deep,
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.
Gees, how little I know.
plato.stanford.edu/entries/sufficient-reason/
I’ll read this. It might help me to comprehend something. Then I’ll probably be back in the woods.
I think that you were about the banana.