They gain peace of mind. Ignorance can in fact be bliss if you believe there is a loving, just and merciful God. If you believe in Paradise. Whether this in fact is true or not is irrelevant to the mind that believes it.
And, in particular moments: If I could believe it I would. If that makes me “inauthentic” then so be it.
But I see all this in the manner in which Ren viewed heroin in the film Trainspotting. The idea is to take away the pain. And, given the manner in which I view my current set of circumstances, that is often the center of the universe.
Yet I would never expect someone who is not me to understand this. After all, how in the world could they when they are not out in the world as me?
A frame of mind such as this is far beyond the reach of philosophy.
It is more analogous perhaps to this one:
From Simon Critchleys’ Very Little…Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy and Literature
[b]As Adorno writes in the closing chapter of ‘Aesthetic Theory’, ‘Those childlike and bloody clowns’ faces in Beckett, through which the subject disintegrates, are the historical truth about the subject’. What this means for Adorno is that the 'catastrophes that inspire Endgame, notably the fact of Auschiwitz which Beckett never calls by name…have shattered or disintegrated the conception of the individual still predisposed in the absurdist vision of existentialism. That is, although Camus might begin ‘The Myth of Sysyphus’ from the postulate of the world’s absurdity—i.e. the absense of meaning in a world without God— this absurdity is viewed from the standpoint of the individual. The task of existentialism, on this reading, is a shoring up of the individual subject and its claims to freedom. For Adorno, Beckett’s drama abandons this existentialist position, ‘like an outmoded bunker’…Adorno declares, ‘what is left of the subject is its most abstract characteristic’ merely existing and thereby already commiting an outrage. Beckett’s characters are simply ‘empty personae’, truly mere masks through whom sound merely passes.
In Adorno’s hands, Beckett engages in a reversal of existential philosophy, ‘which has been standing on its head, and puts it back on its feet’. What this means is that Beckett accepts the postulate of absurdity and hense the meaningless of existence as a starting point. In Jasper’s and Heidegger’s terms, he accepts the situatedness into which we are thrown. However, unlike existential philosophy, Beckett refuses to transfigure this initial meaninglesslness into a meaning for existence…For Beckett, the absurd cannot be turned into a meaning for the meaninglessness of existence, for if it did so it would become something universal, an idea.[/b]
What does it mean to be stare down into the existential abyss? In an absurd world, there is no way in which to differentiate “authentic” from “inauthentic” behavior.
It is the stark naked, brutal facticity of human existence—of life and death—that Beckett gropes futilely about to communicate knowing full well this sort of communication is as ultimately futile as the “action” up on the stage. Or out in the world.
And whatever emotional and psychological reaction we might have pondering this is, in turn, essentiallly interchangable with any other.
Nietzsche, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Camus, Heidegger and all the rest of the postmodern thinkers felt compelled to blink, in my opinion, in confronting the abyss that is oblivion. They told us human existence was essentially meaningless and absurd and then commensed immediately on philosophical projects to provide us with a script nonetheless: How [existentially] to live your life meaningfully [authentically] in a world that is [essentially] meaningless.
For me, there is only living your life and acknowleding this or living your life and refusing to. Or, if you are particularly fortuitous, livng your life completely oblivious to it.