Is it morally permissible to have an abortion? Is it morally permissible to stop someone who wants an abortion, from having one? Is it morally permissible to punch a baby? Is it morally permissible for a woman to copulate with a man for the purposes of insemination, and then, after doing so, kill the man, cook him, and eat him?
For that matter, what does “morally permissible” mean, anyway? Who or what is giving permission?
I think in these matters philosophy can help, but cannot give definitive answers. Those who seek definitive answers from philosophy are doomed to disappointment, unless, of course, they just make up something that sounds good or makes them feel good and then they go with that. But that’s not philosophy; that’s self-indulgence.
Science will never give you definitive answers, either. Science does not deal in proof positive, because it’s an inductive enterprise and induction can never yield absolute truths.
We can, though, use philosophy to clear some ontological and epistemic grounds. We can ask, is there an objective morality? And if so, is that objective morality necessarily true? Or is there a difference between objective truth and necessary truth?
A useful heuristic is possible worlds, due to modal logic. A “possible world” refers to a logically possible world. Such a world does not have to be physically possible. For example, there are logically possible worlds at which pigs fly and donkeys talk. Such is not our world, however. Such things are physically impossible in our world.
The test for a logically possible world is as follows: can you conceive it, without bringing about a logical contradiction?
Since I can conceive a world in which pigs fly without logical contradiction, then it is a possible world.
A necessary truth is one that is true at all possible worlds. That is, such a truth cannot ever fail to be false.
Here are some necessary truths: Triangles have three sides at all possible worlds. Bachelors are unmarried at all possible worlds. Two plus two equals four at all possible worlds.
However, there are some propositions that may be necessarily true but are not known to be such.
One such is Goldbach’s Conjecture. It is not known whether it is true or false. But if it IS true, it is necessarily true — true at all possible worlds. However, if it is false, then it is necessarily false — it cannot obtain at any possible world.
That is, the conjecture cannot ever be contingent — meaning that it is true in some possible worlds, but false in others.
Another is the existence of the omnimax God as postulated by certain Christians, a god who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent (morally perfect and all-loving).
Hundreds of years ago St. Anselm sought to prove the existence of such a god by logic alone. It’s called the ontological proof. Very few people think he succeeded.
However, in the 20th century there arrived modal ontological proofs, one such by Kurt Godel.
To cut to the chase, Godel’s proof seems to show only that the omnimax God is like Goldbach’s Conjecture: Either God necessarily exists, or necessarily fails to exist. Knowledge of this, as of Goldbach’s Conjecture, is not a priori but a posteriori, a matter of evidence. The evidence is not yet in for either Goldbach’s Conjecture or God, and may never be.
Unlike necessary truths, a contingent truth is one that is true at some possible worlds, and untrue at others. Unlike necessary truths, contingent truths could have been otherwise.
If it rained today, it’s a contingent truth that it rained. The Kennedy assassination is a contingent truth. The existence of humans on earth is a contingent truth. And so on.
What has this do do with morality? Unfortunately perhaps, philosophy can’t be done in sound bites or even in short message board posts. The argument I am presenting is perforce long and therefore I shall be obliged to break it up into a series of posts. This is Post One. More posts later. I do this in the hope of stimulating a real philosophical discussion among those of you who might be interested in this subject.