Logic and Morality
Colin McGinn
They are not descriptions of what we actually do but prescriptions about what should be done. These prescriptions can take a number of forms: on the one hand, logical laws, rules of inference, and avoidance of logical fallacies; on the other hand, moral laws, rules of conduct, and avoidance of immoral actions. Thus we have the three classical laws of logic (identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle) and the utilitarian principle, or a list of basic duties (corresponding to consequentialism and deontology). We also have rules for making inferences: modus ponens and the Kantian principle of universalizability, sayâas well as warnings against fallacious inference (donât affirm the consequent, donât try to infer an âoughtâ from an âisâ).
Yes, I know: I may well be misunderstanding his point.
So, if you think you do understand it, please note how, given a moral conflict of particular interest to you," logical laws, rules of inference, and avoidance of logical fallaciesâŚmoral laws, rules of conduct, and avoidance of immoral actions" are applicable to you.
Same with thisâŚ
Given a particular set of circumstances, what do you construe to be your own moral obligations?
The natural world? Well, if human beings are a part of nature, how could anything that we say and do not be natural? Instead the more appropriate word might be normal. Only â click â this too is rooted historically and culturally in dasein.
Practical.
What else can I do here but to note how âbeing practicalâ can mean many different things to many different people. My own contention here is that democracy and the rule of law is far more suitable to pragmatism.
Then the part where, in regard to any number of moral objectivists, true beliefs and true actions revolve around sustaining [psychologically,emotionally] their soothing comfort and consolation all the way to the grave. And then for others, beyond the grave.