I apologise for derailing the discussion into abortions. My point was only to give an example of three moral “arguments” that couldn’t be rationally reconciled.
It doesn’t make them irrational arguments, though. Of even a-rational arguments. Simply, arguments based on premises you disagree with. And the disgust isn’t anything to do with reasoning, so much as the smug self-satisfaction or the wheedling righteousness or the devious chicanery with which he presents the arguments.
I’m also somewhat familiar with Wittgenstein, especially the later stuff. He said (more or less, and in various ways)that “reason” is the grammatical rules we apply in certain language-games - as is mathematics for others, say. Personally, it’s where I think his theory oversteps its use, so I’m not going to argue for it; but it’s no argument that reason and morals are talking past each other. Rather, reason has no privilege at all. I think he kept his stance that it was a ladder to be kicked away.
Reason is what you do with your premises. I’m not going to argue for Rationalism pur sang, I only disagree that reason has no power over moral premises. I’ve reasoned myself out of premises I would rather have kept hold of.
But my interests regarding the limitations of language revolve around the extent to which the “realm of philosophy” is applicable to human interactions that come into conflict. What argument regarding what position regarding what circumstantial context?
In my view, even if you know precisely how to distinguish these terms it does little to lessen the gap here between words and worlds.
You say:
Clearly, an argument’s conclusion does not validate the argument itself. My point is that no conclusion is necessarily the optimal one—however many arguments you hear regarding moral and political conflicts.
iambiguous wrote:
And though you acknowledge the limits of deductive reasoning here, others do not.
For Kant, one’s moral duty revolved around the rational pursuit of it. And in this pursuit, he did not focus his critiques on the limits of the categorical imperative. And to the extent folks believe we can use reason to clearly differentiate right from wrong behavior is the extent to which I argue to the contrary. But this is not the same thing as saying we should abandon rational discourse in deliberating about these things—only that there are profound limits regarding how reasonable we can be in accummulating the premises used to argue for any particular conclusion.
Again, my chief aim is to tap those on the shoulder who have studied logic [and are skilled in philosophy technically] and to probe their views on my views regarding human identity, ethics, political economy and the limitations of language.
From past experience I’ve found my “neo-nihilist” agenda appalls many. So I am curious the extent to which my proposals are viewed as reasonable by those who do have a facility with logic, epistemology and linguistics.
Also, I enjoy reading the arguments of those who disagree with me about the nature of dasein and value judgments. And the relationship between them.
Existentialism can be equally liberating in turn. If for no other reason it subsumes our choices in existence itself. Among other things, it effectively deconstructs objectivism, essentialism, realism and political idealism. It expands your options considerably.
And that is because it situates philosophy out in the world of actual human interaction. Or the best of it does.
Sure, but in a philosophy venue all we can do is try to make as sense out of it all as possible. We do that with language by and large. I just keep pointing out the profound limitations of language. To wit: The disjunction between words and worlds once we go beyond knowledge that transcends dasein.
You say here that philosophy is by and large a language activity. If you say language is limited, then on that basis, it seems you want to say philosophy is limited. That’s fine, of course it is. You want to say philosophy is as limited as language, and language is limited. I wonder, on those terms, could this possibly be a “philosophical” problem?
Heidegger says that discourse is primordial to dasein. This must mean that somehow words are constitutive of worlds, right?
Being and Time, H160 (I’m going to continue to quote from Part 1, Section 4, #34)
This quote implies that there are limitations to discursive interpreting of understanding, but nonetheless places discourse as primordial to being-in-the-world.
“Equiprimordial” means:
Discourse is existentially, I mean has its real-world manifestation, in language.
However, I think the limitations you want lie in the possibility that not all language consists of statements about what there is. It is especially important that not all arguments consist of deductive statements of what is rational, or statements about what is. Heidegger’s Rede, “talk,” is not defined as “the complete set of assertions of matters of fact” or anything like that. Communication need not have anything to do with facts or matters of fact.
In fact, and in your favor, Heidegger says:
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I’ve lost my train of thought (as often happens when explicating Heidegger).
This isn’t really relevant, though. Newtonian mechanics is fundamentally limited, but such that it’s still perfectly adequate in all ways for designing bicycles. The tool far outstrips the requirements of the ability; the limiting factor is the will to agree. Which is a matter of politics, and not philosophy or linguistics.
Unless you can think of an example whereby language is fundamentally inadequate to resolving a dispute between two people who want to co-operate and find a best solution; I can’t. That would mean that not only are assumptions behind a given word/concept different, but language cannot even describe the assumptions sufficiently to give understanding of what the difference is.
What I care about is the extent to which philosophy is useful in discussing:
1] human identity
2] moral and ethical conflict
3] political economy
4] human psychology [and, in particular, psychological defense mechanisms]
In other words, what, philosophically, are the limits of “rational discourse” out in the world of actual human interaction?
On the other hand, I am also curious about metaphysical connundrums and the mysteries of “mind”
Yes, the capacity to invent and to utilize a sophisticated language is first and foremost a biological tool afforded only the human species. Words and worlds are profoundly symbiotic. But: Is this acquisiition merely a random mutation of the Big Bang?
But that does not mean acquiring language enables us to explicate every aspect of how the world functions—or of how we function in the world. Some things appear to be wholly true and applicable to all daseins. But other things can only be expressed connotatively as points of view.
This is just another way of suggesting that “certain understandings” are grounded historically, culturally and experientially. And thus those interacting in each particular context are able to communicate “for all practical purposes” about many things.
But when conflicts occur some things can be resolved and some things cannot. That’s the distinction I focus on.
Discourse is the articulation of what is either able to be denoted objectively or what is only able to be connoted in subjective [intersubjective] narratives.
That’s basically my point. What can be communicated as matters of fact and what can be communicated only as matters of opinion.
But there’s nothing better than for one to have a first person experience of the event. Once you recognize an object (even without giving it a name/word) it becomes part of you, part of your past.
The basic elementary nature of wordage is a reflection of limited nature of our thoughts and their limitations. Sure, you can take what is known, modify it and come up with what you call your own thoughts; you can come up with thousands of modifications especially with more material to work with.
But there’s something else when it comes to listening and communicating. When you leave the sense of hearing alone, all that is there is the vibration of the sound – the words repeat themselves inside of you, as in an echo chamber. You might think the words you are hearing come from outside of you, but you can never hear one word from anyone else; you hear only your own translations, always. They are all your words you are hearing. All that the other person’s words can possibly be to you is a noise, a vibration picked up by the ear-drum and transferred to the nerves which run to the brain. You are translating those vibrations all the time, trying to understand, because you want to get something out of what you are hearing.
iam - Let’s say I’m buying and you’re selling. You want 100 and I’m offering 50. We disagree. That’s not a language thing, it’s a value thing. There’s only so many ways to say “I’m offering 50” but that isn’t a limitation of language - 50 is, well, 50. There’s a limit as to how high i will go.
The problem really is that this is poorly conceived. It really is.
You seem to believe that opinions cannot change, or that we cannot influence each other. Even when it comes to opinion.
Much that is not eternal truth is taught to us in school. Do you believe that his has had no effect on you?
Language is not limited here because it encompasses what can be shown empirically even if there was no language. Namely that you are offering half the pile when what I want is the whole thing. But suppose someone says I ought to want what you are offering. That, in other words, it is my moral duty to accept 50 instead of 100. How could that be accomplished without the use of language? And how would language accomplish it without an omniscient point of view regarding what is morally just?
50 is to 100 is not the same thing as I ought to accept fifty is to I ought not to accept 50.
I believe that explications about some things are more than just “opinions”. The explications involve material interactions that are applicable to all individuals. For example, someone cannot hold the opinion that unsafe sex has nothing to do with unwanted pregnancies. Someone can not hold the opinion that men become pregnant. Or, rather, they can hold these opinions but not demonstrate they are in fact true. With or without language.
But when the discussion shifts to the morality of aborting an unwanted pregnancy how else would this be approached other than through the use of arguments bursting at the seams with language? And how could a point of view here be anything other than the particular opinion of a particular dasein?
Primarily I want to challenge your reading of Heidegger.
Dasein does not think the moral opinions expressed are “nothing more than the particular opinion of a particular dasein.”
In everyday being-with-others, Dasein always thinks that it is right about some state of affairs, and thus that some others are wrong (this 2nd since modernity at the very least).
In everydayness Dasein always already posits its moral values in the realm of “what one ought to do” and values them (expresses them with language and non-linguistic discourse).
Dasein does not think of itself for the most part as “just another Dasein.” This is the paradox in Heidegger. When Dasein is most engrossed in its own subjectivity (when it says “I” the loudest) this is when Dasein is the most fallen into “das Man,” or the One (as in “one does this”). Knee-jerk relativism is a rare thing. When instead we posit an absolute moral value, this value is of the form “One (anyone at any time) ought to [or ought not to] do X.” This is because Dasein is always already one among others.
1st pole: Primordial being-with-others is best able to slip into conformity when we cover it up by dogmatically claiming moral truths about what is right and wrong.
2nd pole: Primordial being-with-others is best able to slip into solipsism when we cover it up by claiming that we have absolute freedom of thought and are not influenced by any of “the talk” (linguistic and non-linguistic) that gets passed around in everyday discourse.
But here is exactly where you are wrong, and where you contradict yourself. What we have here is a disagreement - exactly the case you keep talking about. All that is empirically known is that we want two different things. And it’s impossible without language. We cannot express our positions without language. And it can be expressed without reference to duty. But I am claiming that you ought to accept my offer.
The “language” of the social contract is a language of morality, and it can accommodate this scenario.
It’s an opinion if it’s not argued for. It’s a philosophical position if it is argued for. And it can be argued within the context of the social contract, which is all that morality ever is.
What you continually do is to set up the straw man that the only morality is an absolutist one, and that this means that the “language of all philosophy” therefore is inadequate to the task of moral argument.
From Heidegger I was drawn to the idea of each individual being “thrown” adventitiously into a particular world. This is crucial existentially because for 10 to 12 years we are all indoctrinated as children to view ourselves and the world around us from the vantage point of others. And this vantage point is always situated historically, culturally and experentially. And it always evolves over time. It is thus ever fortuitous, variable and dynamic.
Am I reading Heidegger’s take on Dasein as it should be read? I don’t know. I don’t care. I incorporate my understanding of his understanding of Dasein in the manner in which I view human interaction “out in the world”.
But what is more crucial [to me] is that being with Islamic jihadists in a Palestinian refugee camp and being with power brokers in an Israeli government function will have a profound impact on how you view both yourself and the world around you. Just as being with others in 3rd century China was no doubt very different from being with others in 21st century America. Just as being with others in an Amish farm community is different from being with others at the New York Stock Exchange.
Right and wrong from what perspective?..from who’s perspective?
In terms of any one particular “sense of identity”, where does “we” end and “I” begin? where does nature end and nurture begin? where does the past end and the future begin?
What I aim to disclose is the sheer complexity of these ever changing relationships. And, in turn, I aim to focus minds on what can easily become an inexplicable and inexpressible disjunction between “a man”, “a woman” and “humankind”. What can be known about this wholly [or as wholly as we are ever likely to grasp] and what can only be a point of view?
I’m not sure what you mean here. I am a “moral relativist” because I believe moral values are 1] always situated out in a world that is ever changing and 2] can only be viewed from the perspective of each man or woman embedded in a particuar world at a particular time.
How that relates to your “poles” is unclear to me.
Sure you do, but no one outside of Philosophy believes this! You probably don’t even believe this most of the time, until you put on your thinking cap.
You’re just doing bad phenomenology. You’re using logic and rationality to come to those two conclusions, but that is not what people usually do.
That’s the whole point of situating morality “out there in the real world” like you keep saying. We CAN be moral relativists, but I think if you observe people in their everyday lives, hardly anybody actually is a moral relativist most of the time.
Language is not limited here because it encompasses what can be shown empirically even if there was no language. Namely that you are offering half the pile when what I want is the whole thing. But suppose someone says I ought to want what you are offering. That, in other words, it is my moral duty to accept 50 instead of 100. How could that be accomplished without the use of language? And how would language accomplish it without an omniscient point of view regarding what is morally just?
What I am intertested in understanding are the existential variables embedded in the life we have lived that predispose us to want one thing rather than another. And to ask: Is there a way, using the tools of philosophy, to establish what we should want instead? And such explorations are conducted using language—a biological tool we use to communicate a more or less precise understanding of the relationship between “in my head” and “out in the world”.
Now, there are some folks who insist that, using the tools of philosophy, we can grasp these relationships using words like “duty” “obligation” “categorical imperative” “transcending” “metaphysical” “realism” “idealism” “kingdom of ends” “deduction”, “a priori knowledge” etc. etc. etc…
These are the folks I wish to engage. Perhaps they can persuade me to see these relationships in a way I have not been able to grasp before. Perhaps they can even deconstruct nihilism for me. There are new folks coming into ILP all the time, right?
What I stress however is the obvious: That “social contracts” [and the language used to concoct them] are ever situated out in a particular world. Is there a way to concoct one that transcends this?
iambiguous wrote:
But when the discussion shifts to the morality of aborting an unwanted pregnancy how else would this be approached other than through the use of arguments bursting at the seams with language? And how could a point of view here be anything other than the particular opinion of a particular dasein?
The argument eventually becomes the opinion. It then becomes a matter of establishing how philosophically sophisticated the argument is. Does the argument contain knowledge we can establish as transcending mere points of view? Is it applicable to all individuals in all situations for all time to come? The key words here amidst moral conflicts and social contracts are “context” and “perspective”.
Well, if you wish to call it a “straw man” argument I prefer the one that revolves around those who embrace one or another rendition of moral objectivism and those who embrace one or another rendition of “situational ethics”.
The phrase “want one thing rather than another” can mean many things. It can mean “Do I want coffee or tea?” or “Do I want to kidnap children or watch Say Yes to the Dress?” I will assume you are talking about wants that are commonly addressed by morality or social philosophy. And since you have a rather “meta” view of morality, I’ll talk about social theory as inclusive of morality, but no necessarily restricted to it. As soon as you say “should”, it’s fair game for philosophy. And what you want to know is whether philosophy is up to the task. Yet you continually say on one hand that you are taking to task rationalists (more or less, by your list) and also any philosophy (when you say “the tools of philosophy”. And this is the main point of contention between us. You talk as if rationalists are the only philosophers. And you ignore philosophy that is not rationalist. Only you know why.
Did you mean “never” for “ever”? You ask for a method that is “out in the world”, don’t you? Why would you want to “transcend” this?
Why is it desirable to have a view that is universal and eternal? Slavery was considered okay for centuries. Should that continue just because it was once so? Morality should serve the group, and not the the other way 'round.
I honestly don’t know what you want. You seem to want a morality that is eternal, universal and also pertinent to actual living people. You can’t have that.
Fortunately, we have more choices than that.
What I don’t understand is why you aren’t trying to find a solution to your problem. You’re just caught in a negative feedback loop. How is this worthwhile? I don’t think you’re going to get any Kantians to bite. And still i wonder, besides the religious, who “out in the world” are you actually arguing against? Which actual, real people do you oppose? I have brought up Rawls, who has a Kantian flavor, and Gauthier, who follows Rawls to refute him. Rand is not really a philosopher, she’s just a political novelist.
As for deconstructing nihilism, that’s like leveling a salt flat.
