back to the beginning: the limitations of language

[iambiguous]

Do Languages Exist?
And how does language work anyway? Antony Tomlinson weighs the arguments.

An advantage of the public language view is that it accounts for the use of language to communicate. Jane follows a convention by uttering “It’s raining” only when she believes it is raining. Steve, hearing this, and aware of the convention, becomes conscious of Jane’s belief. In contrast, the idiolectal view sees each person’s idiolect as an independent and self-contained system. I use my language, and you use yours. How these mutually-independent systems could be used to communicate seems mysterious.

Ultimately, the mystery embedded in human language will always go back to 1] the extent to which we possess some measure of autonomy in grappling with it and 2] if we do possess a measure of free will, an understaning of the “human condition” going back to an understanding of Existence itself.

And, of course, the extent to which the language that the evolution of biological life on Earth has bestowed upon the human species is grappled with further given the distinction that I make between the either/or and the is/ought worlds.

All of the “technical” narratives here must sooner or later come around to that. In other words, in however human language is understood re Chomsky and others, why are there always considerably more limitations imposed on human communication when Chomsky shifts the discussion to capitalism or imperialism?

Now a new point of view: Donald Davidson

Malapropisms anyone?

“malapropism: the mistaken use of a word in place of a similar-sounding one, often with unintentionally amusing effect, as in, for example, “dance a flamingo ” (instead of flamenco ).”

…in his essay ‘A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs’ in Truth and Interpretation (ed. Ernest Lepore, 1986), Donald Davidson suggests that the idiolectal view best captures the way communication proceeds. Unfortunately I can only outline Davidson’s argument here, but at its core are cases of communication via malapropisms.

A malapropism is a (usually comic) misuse of language. For example, in the BBC WWII comedy, ’Allo ’Allo!, Crabtree, a British agent disguised as a French policeman, always greets characters by saying “Good moaning!” rather than “Good morning!” Despite this malapropism, we easily understand Crabtree; we recognise what he means largely thanks to contextual clues: for instance, it is morning and the first time we have met Crabtree today.

Malapropisms show that communication without a common convention is perfectly possible. The upshot of Davidson’s discussion is that we do not use conventions to communicate in normal cases of language use either. So when Jane says “It is raining,” it is not knowledge of convention that allows Steve to understand her. Rather, contextual clues (it is raining, Jane is pointing out of the window) allow Steve to recognise what Jane intends to communicate. So Davidson suggests that we each have our own separate idiolects, and whenever we communicate, we are in effect interpreting the other person’s idiolect by working out how they use expressions – even if their idiolect seems identical to our own.

Okay, Jane says “I’m getting an abortion”. Jim says, “if you do you’ll burn in Hell.”

What then of malapropisms and the use of conventions and contextual clues and idiolects in regard to pinning down the most precise communication?

After all, we do use the same language to discuss the weather as we do the morality of abortion. Here in America it is generally English. Yet with the morality of abortion the communication breakdowns are considerably more frequent…and consequential.

[iambiguous]

The Private Language Argument
Richard Floyd explains a notorious example of Wittgenstein’s public thought.

Wittgenstein is certainly a special case. He is perhaps the only philosopher who could have produced an argument for which there can be serious debate about whether or not it is in fact an argument.

We have this argument off and on here too. Someone will post a point or an opinion about something on one or another thread and then another who touts him or herself as considerably more skilled in grappling with philosophy as a disciplined set of skills, will insist that the point or the opinion is not actually a true argument.

This thing:

“In logic and philosophy, an argument is a series of statements (in a natural language), called the premises intended to determine the degree of truth of another statement, the conclusion”

Technically as it were.

Whereas I am far more interested on focusing in on whether the point or the opinion or the actual argument is able to be demonstrated as true objectively for all rational people. Even if technically it is not a true argument.

We say something about ourselves out in the world with others. Others either agree with what we say or they disagree. Okay, given a particular context with conflicting points of view, are we or are we not able to establish the optimal or the only rational point, opinion and/or argument that there is?

That is basically my point in regard to the use of language to communicate our viewpoints regarding “morality here and now/immortality there and then”. My main interest in philosophy: “how ought one to live?”

The passage which has earned this dubious honour is commonly known as the private language argument. If we are going to apply strict logical criteria and say that an argument must have premises which lead to a conclusion via rules of inference, we would have to say that the private language argument is not an argument, given that it lacks any clear structure and any obvious conclusion.

Exactly? Jane makes a few points about something she believes is true about the rights of animals. Is it more important to explore the extent to which her assessment is a reasonable or a virtuous frame of mind, or to establish whether it is expressed as a true argument. How many discussions about animal rights are technically sufficient enough to be qualified as genuine philosophy? Does that matter when the discussions revolve mainly around conflicting goods?

Maybe? Depends on the context? Though my point is that in regard to discussions revolving around conflicting goods such as animal rights, neither “private language” nor technically correct philosophical arguments are going to be sufficient enough to establish a definitive conclusion about the rights of animals.

On the other hand, I am no more able to establish this. Yes, there may well be be a more or less sufficiently rigorous argument that does establish the natural/political rights of animals “out there” in the world somewhere. But all I can note is that I am not myself “here and now” privy to it.

[iambiguous]

The Private Language Argument
Richard Floyd explains a notorious example of Wittgenstein’s public thought.

The private language argument appears as part of Wittgenstein’s posthumous epic Philosophical Investigations, part one of which consists of 693 numbered remarks, which were arranged by Wittgenstein himself, and few of which are more than a page in length. Part two was assembled after his death and is more loosely structured, with fourteen sections of various lengths. Wittgenstein first raises the idea of a private language in remark 243 of part one. He says:

“But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences – his feeling, moods, and the rest – for his private use? – Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? – But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.”

On the other hand, what would be the point of it? That would depend on the individual or individuals involved. They would do this because, well, for whatever reason they found it useful or necessary or beneficial. But: it would only become controversial if, in pursuing this, it began to have an adverse impact on others who were not privy to their own private meaning of words.

The same thing with all the rest of us who come to act out [through our behaviors] our own “private language”. In the sense that how we come to understand the meaning of words existentially is derived from our own individual experiences. But it only becomes a problem in contexts in which one’s own private meaning is not in sync with others in situations in which we have to concur on the meaning in order to avoid conflict.

This may be different from Wittgenstein’s own understanding of it, but my point is still basically, “so what”?

Private, individual understandings of any particular language only generate, say, ominous news headlines when they come to revolve by and large around moral and political and religious exchanges that fail to overlap.

Only in regard to this a private language is understood by me to be more in sync with dasein and conflicting goods.

[Meno2 (Meno_)]

Iambiguous says:

“Only in regard to this a private language is understood by me to be more in sync with dasein and conflicting goods.”

That is a prerogitive that appears as intentionally variable, as does the bedfellows: determinancy and absolute freedom: im afraid to this antimony we are condemned

[iambiguous]

@Meno_

Iambiguous says:

“Only in regard to this a private language is understood by me to be more in sync with dasein and conflicting goods.”

That is a prerogitive that appears as intentionally variable, as does the bedfellows: determinancy and absolute freedom: im afraid to this antimony we are condemned

This may well be the most unintelligible thing that you have ever posted!

Unless of course I’m wrong.

I know. Let’s discuss what you think you mean by it given, oh, I don’t know, a particular context?

[Meno2 (Meno_)]

@iambiguous

@Meno_

Iambiguous says:

“Only in regard to this a private language is understood by me to be more in sync with dasein and conflicting goods.”

That is a prerogitive that appears as intentionally variable, as does the bedfellows: determinancy and absolute freedom: im afraid to this antimony we are condemned

This may well be the most unintelligible thing that you have ever posted!

Unless of course I’m wrong.

I know. Let’s discuss what you think you mean by it given, oh, I don’t know, a particular context?

Ok. Particular context.
First of all, what is particular about any context which can differentiate it from another?
In today’s thought, that is based on phenomenally. distinguished similarity, and what are the features of any context which set it apart from another, OR, conversely, can form durable objective syntax which hold meaning other then cliches and the kind?

And if the two kinds are balanced in an either/or propositional value judgement , how does this judgement fare to extend it’s syntax and value?

[Berkley_Babes]

Is the sound of the word “water” coming from my mouth the same as the liquid flowing in a river, no, so there are limitations.

More and more, I’m becoming convinced language and mental talk is only to serve the concept of the other, that others exist. Whether they do exist is another debate, but language is the start of that illusion.

If I was the only person to ever exist, I wonder if language would ever develop.

[Dan1 (Dan~)]

Language is a set of names.
Experience is everything.
Names come later and can only exist through experience.

[encode_decode]

Perhaps most of the limitations of language come from the obvious poor usage of language . . .

[encode_decode]

@Dan~

Language is a set of names.
Experience is everything.
Names come later and can only exist through experience.

What is experience without some sort of mental representation of what has happened? The entirety of language is in fact not just a set of names. It is also true to say that any mental representation is formed after any event has taken place - experience is a mental representation - catch my drift?

[iambiguous]

The Private Language Argument
Richard Floyd explains a notorious example of Wittgenstein’s public thought.

What Does Wittgenstein Say?

First, let’s look at Wittgenstein’s direct discussion of the concept of a private language. Having been introduced at §243, private language does not appear again until §256, where Wittgenstein questions what it means to associate a word/sign with a sensation. How does this association take place? How does the association of a name with a sensation lead to that name actually meaning the sensation?

First, of course, we have to agree on the meaning of “sensations”:

“Sensations are often ascribed particular properties: of being conscious and inner, of being more immediate than perception, and of being atomic. In epistemology sensations have been taken as infallible foundations of knowledge, in psychology as elementary constituents of perceptual experience.” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Got that?

Then, assuming that we can all agree on the appropriate definition, there’s the part where we connect that to any particular sensation that we experience in regard to a particular word that we either hear or use given a particular set of circumstances.

That part of course is nowhere to be seen in this article. Let alone how a distinction might be made between the language that we share begetting sensations that can be communicated back and forth intelligibly and a “private language” begetting private sensations that cannot.

This addresses an issue which has been simmering since Wittgenstein first defined a private language by saying “the individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.” Does this mean that the entire vocabulary of the language must consist of words referring to the speaker’s private sensations? How then could such a language have any grammatical structure? There are other problems too. In §257 Wittgenstein claims that the private definition of words lacks the “stage-setting” necessary for language to be meaningful:

“When one says ‘He gave a name to his sensation’ one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when we speak of someone’s having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word pain; it shews the post where the new word is stationed.”

On the other hand, I may well be misunderstanding the point he is making here. Still, aside from the purely personal reasons that someone might feel motivates them to create and then to sustain a “private language”, this choice either will or will not spill over into their interactions with others. And that either will or will not cause conflicts.

And it is focusing in on social, political and economic conflicts in the is/ought world that is the main interest of me. What then of a “private language”?

[iambiguous]

The Private Language Argument
Richard Floyd explains a notorious example of Wittgenstein’s public thought.

Why does Wittgenstein put forward the concept of a private language and attempt to destroy it immediately? What service would I have done to biology if I were to propose a theory known as ‘Gigantic Toad Theory’, suggesting that some enormous toad existed at some point in prehistory – only to respond myself that there is absolutely no evidence for such an idea and that the entire theory appears to be unfounded nonsense?

Yep. That’s basically my own reaction to a private definition and a private meaning for words used in a private language. Sure, if, for whatever personal reason, you choose to do this, either keep it to yourself or attempt to communicate it to others who accept your own subjective codes.

Only if and when this communication has practical implications for those not able to decode the exchange would it become more problematic.

My point instead is that in regard to communication that revolves around conflicting goods, a kind of “private language” can lead to all manner of dire consequences. Your definition and your meaning of freedom and justice revolve around women being able to abort their unborn babies/clumps of cells, while for others they revolve around the unborn being brought into this world.

There are many possible interpretations of Wittgenstein’s motives, and I should be clear about the fact that my interpretation is not the correct one, just one of many possibilities.

One possibility is that he wished to either defend or attack behaviourism.

This behaviorism?

“…the theory that human and animal behavior can be explained in terms of conditioning, without appeal to thoughts or feelings, and that psychological disorders are best treated by altering behavior patterns…”

Of course here language would seem to revolve around an amoral approach to human interactions. Being in a position of power to mold and manipulate – condition – human behaviors to serve your own wants and needs. Or the wants and the needs of “society”. In that sense what you defend or attack can be seen as largely beside the point.

And language becomes “private” more in terms of “one of us” vs. “one of them”.

[iambiguous]

Question of the Month
How Does Language Work?
The following answers to the question of linguistic meaning each win a random book.

The human vocal tract can make a wide range of sounds, which allows us to move beyond the grunts and shrieks of our primate cousins, at least some of the time. As many as fifty regions in the human brain are involved in language, controlling the complex movements needed to produce speech, translating vibrations in the air into neural activity in the brain to hear, and manipulating the symbols that make up the thoughts and ideas of our minds to reason. These adaptations of the individual are all necessary for full language use, but language isn’t much use to a solitary individual, and would never have arisen were we not a social species.

Clearly then the starting point in regard to any discussions of human language are the biological imperatives necessary to create the sounds we call words. It’s like trying to imagine the “human condition” had there not been the mutations that led to opposable thumbs. Some things are [on a fundamental level] our genes all the way down. At least to begin with.

So, sans any particular birth defects, we all come into the world with the capacity to make those sounds that become words that are able to communicate the sort of information and knowledge that accounts for the existence of human history.

What’s left then, after accepting this, is focusing in on all the reasons why, if this is the case, there are in the historical record so many instances of our “failure to communicate”. Precipitating any number of conflicts up to and including world wars.

Sounds alone, of course, are not enough to create meaning, since a non-English speaker won’t understand the word ‘cat’ although they hear the sound. Language works by attaching a symbol e.g. ‘cat’ to the idea of a cat, which itself is produced by the reality to which it refers (i.e., a cat). When language doesn’t work, we can sometimes revert to pointing – say, at a cat. But this also requires shared intentionality, ie, a common recognition that the pointing is about something. This perhaps tells us something about the origins of language, and how language works at a very basic level. The small bands of hunter-gatherers who first developed language would have first pointed to animals and objects in their environment. But given that making physical movements in the line of sight of a predator is dangerous, it’s far better to represent that action with a sound that can be whispered, like “Lion!”

Jon Wainwright

Again, if you keep all of this philosophical “analysis” anchored to the either/or world – cats and lions – you can manage to communicate with a minimal amount of dysfunction. After all, these points will certainly seem reasonable to most of us. But if the discussion shifts to contexts that members of, say, Peta are more inclined to pursue – how ought human beings treat other animals? – you can whisper or shout your points all day long and the communication can continue to break down.

Why?

That’s my own interest in language here.

[iambiguous]

Question of the Month
How Does Language Work?
The following answers to the question of linguistic meaning each win a random book.

Ivan Trengrove, Victor Harbor, South Australia

Fish swim, birds fly, and people talk.

Talking however is only really useful to a species that has many different things to talk about. A species that thinks on a level far, far beyond fish and birds. Or even chimpanzees. While most species of animals are able to communicate with sounds, they don’t invent philosophies to to talk about on the internet.

How do we display this talent for language? As Noam Chomsky argued, for language to work, there must be an innate biological linguistic capacity. We are born with a ‘universal grammar’ in our brains, which is the initial condition through which the grammars of specific languages arise, and which allows us to learn particular languages.

No doubt about it. Biological imperatives are the starting blocks. We only communicate as we do here because whatever is behind the biological evolution of life itself, has culminated in the human species here on planet Earth. But, again, biology is behind all species of animals. With our own however the communication becomes considerably more…problematic?

For example:

This is the prime mover for all language. There are many other essential components in how language works: phonetics, morphology, etymology, pragmatics, graphology, lexicography and semiotics, to name but a few.

But a few indeed. And that’s because it’s not only the technical aspect of language communication that explodes in complexity among our own species…but the actual subjects that we can talk about as well. The part where social, political and economic memes come into play. Anthropology, ethnography, sociology, psychology, political science, philosophy, ethics and on and on.

In other words, the part where communication begins to break down and distinctions can be made between objective truths and subjective opinions.

[iambiguous]

Question of the Month
How Does Language Work?
The following answers to the question of linguistic meaning each win a random book.
Philosophy Now Magazine

Madeleine Maggs, Basingstoke, Hampshire

We could take the word ‘fork’, for example, and learn to say it and spell it in a variety of foreign languages. We could even make up our own word. However, regardless of the variety of identifying signs we could use, our understanding of the word remains. We quickly realise that simply ‘identifying and naming’ is not how language works. How then, when learning a language, is it that we understand what the words mean?

Or we could take the word “freedom”. Or “justice”.

My point of course is that we can discuss them as we do “fork”. But a fork is an actual thing. Something invented for a specific purpose. Whereas “freedom” and “justice” are less objective things than attempts to encompass our subjective reaction to particular sets of circumstances which trigger behaviors which trigger consequences that some will embrace and others will not. Some will insist that their freedom to own guns outweighs the wishes of those who wish to be free to live in a community where guns are not allowed to be owned.

What constitutes justice here?

There is a big difference between saying that legally the Indianapolis gunman was free to purchase a gun and that morally he ought to have been free to purchase a gun.

Wittgenstein advocated the idea that an account of the meaning of a word cannot be given without looking at the part the word plays in our lives and speech behaviour.

And then in differentiating those parts that we all share in common such that particular words have the same meaning “for all practical purposes” and the parts that are rooted more in the arguments that I make about the subjective/subjunctive “I”.

Thus the part where “my language” is able to be or not to be effectively intertwined in “your language” given a situation that we both share.

I just go considerably further out on the limb when I speak of my own moral and political value judgments as being “fractured and fragmented”.

[iambiguous]

Question of the Month
How Does Language Work?
The following answers to the question of linguistic meaning each win a random book.
Philosophy Now Magazine

J.I. Hans Bakker, semioticsigns.com, Canada

The basic answer is that language works if the people engaged are members of the same interpretive community or network. But it is useful to ask: When does language not work?

It seems rather simple for some. Two or more people are trying to communicate something, anything…given their interactions out in this or that world. Interactions that in particular revolve around the “for all practical purposes” necessity to subsist.

So, language works if they are successful in communicating their wants and needs. Language does not work if they are not successful. Then back to the distinction that I make in regard to communication in the is/ought world.

Thus, philosophically…

Two people using the same language can misunderstand one another. Indeed, Person A and Person B may not even grasp the fact they do not fully understand one another. But if it becomes obvious to them, then A may think that B is using words (such as ‘God’) incorrectly. A may say that B is making a ‘semantic’ mistake. A neo-pragmatist linguist influenced by C.S. Peirce might correct A, and say that B is making a ‘pragmatic’ mistake. The linguist will argue that every sign requires both an interpretive community (the interpretant) and an operational definition of the meaning and applicability of that sign (the representant). Hence, there is a triadic (three-way) relationship between a sign, its semantics (its commonly understood meaning) and its pragmatics (the ways in which people use the sign). This triad can then constitute a dialectical progression, where what was once the interpretant may become the representant, and so forth.

These intellectual contraptions can become nothing short of, well, unintelligible. All of the technical aspects derived from logic and epistemology that allow us to explore human communication in ways that may or may not be relevant to actual human interactions. And I don’t pretend to be able to make the proper distinction. All I can do is to ask those who think that they can to bring their conclusions to the arguments I make in my signature threads in regard to “morality here and now”.

[iambiguous]

Question of the Month
How Does Language Work?
The following answers to the question of linguistic meaning each win a random book.
Philosophy Now Magazine

Colin Brookes, Woodhouse Eaves, Leicestershire

Language works by virtue of the relationships between it, us, our minds, and the world.

I would merely come back to the distinction here between the language that we use in our existential, intersubjective interactions that involve conflicting moral and political value judgments, and the language that we use that seems to convey essential, objective truths in the either/or world.

The philosophies of the later Wittgenstein and of John Searle underpin this idea. We invest language with meaning by using the various representational functions of words strung together through the application of grammar, punctuation and syntax. As for the meaning of ‘representation’, it is helpful to borrow from the vocabulary of semiotics, the science of signs. Ferdinand de Saussure, a founder of semiotics, points out that a signifier, say the word ‘horse’, when used, brings to mind the concept ‘horse’ – the signified. The horse itself, the thing that can kick you, is the referent.

Unfortunately, this distinction does not appear to be the primary concern here. Instead, it seems to treat language as though, technically, philosophers – postmodern or otherwise – first need to grasp it within the confines of logic and epistemology. And I certainly don’t dispute the importance of this. I merely ask those who come to particular conclusions here to take those conclusions out into the world that we live in from day to day and note how those conclusions are applicable to the distinction that I make.

The separation of signifier, signified and referent may be misleading. This is brought out where referents are absent. Take abstract words such as, ‘contrary’ and ‘mitigation’. There is nothing to point to – but more importantly, we cannot grasp their meaning without the word.

How about this: In using the word “contrary” and “mitigation” you include a context in which it becomes far, far clearer why those words were used. John believes sport hunting is a good thing. On the contrary, says Jim, it is a bad thing. Then an in depth discussion regarding their reasons why.

John has been convicted of a crime. At the penalty phase witnesses are called to present mitigating circumstances to lessen his sentence. But others are called to present aggravating circumstances in order to lengthen it instead. How hard here is it to distinguish signifiers, signifieds and referents?

Try thinking of the meaning of ‘contested’ without bringing the word itself to mind. With such abstractions, meanings and the words standing for them fuse. So in an important sense, language use is virtually inseparable from what we intend to convey – signifiers co-exist with their signifieds and their referents. This is apparent when we try to learn a word: we use the word fluently when meaning and word appear no longer separate, but rather to coalesce.

You tell me what the philosophical significance of this is given a particular contested context. Either the meaning and word are communicated together effectively or they are not.

Or, sure, I’m missing the point altogether such that unless I grasp the technical meaning here, I may well completely misconstrue important aspects of human interaction.

[iambiguous]

Question of the Month
How Does Language Work?
The following answers to the question of linguistic meaning each win a random book.
Philosophy Now Magazine

Frank S. Robinson, Albany, NY

In addressing the question, I want to extend it to How does language work in the human mind? Outside that context, language is fairly straightforward: it’s portraying information via symbols called words, and combining them in structures via grammatical rules. Any system doing these things is a language. A computer does this, producing linguistic output: but it cannot understand it the way a human mind does (thus the Turing test for distinguishing between the two). That difference is the key to this difficult question.

In fact, the difference may well be so vast there really is no answer that any language on Earth will ever be able to encompass. And even then only presuming that both the question and the answer are not embedded ineffably in a wholly determined universe.

The difficulty is elucidated by our wondering what it might be like to think without language, and sometimes struggling to put thoughts into words. What, exactly, is the thing (thought, perception, idea, feeling) that precedes its own linguistic expression?

Well, without language every communication would seem to revolve around “show me”. If you wished to convey to a neighbor that a storm had blown down a tree in your backyard and you didn’t want to have to take him down the block to your yard to show him, we would need to invent something like hand gestures or finger movements or facial expressions that would then become the abstract shortcuts that words convey for us now.

A computer represents information by encoding it using a binary system of ones and zeroes. Our brains must do something roughly analogous using neurons, although we haven’t yet cracked the code. And there are important differences between brains and computers. Neurons don’t only function like a computer’s simple one/zero logic gates: many respond only to specific stimuli or sensory inputs. But the biggest difference (and why computers fail the Turing test) is that computers lack a self – which could be called a meta-program to make sense of linguistic output.

Unless of course human brains [and the language we use here to discuss them] are just nature’s own equivalent of ones and zeros. But what always interest me about this “self” [and whatever language any particular one of them chooses to use] is the part where unlike computers that, correctly programmed, are in sync with what is objectively true in the either/or world, there does not appear to be a way to program our own brains so as to be correct in regard to the words used in arguments revolving around, say, this: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem

Especially once the language used is not part of a thought experiment but involves an actual situation in which the lives of flesh and blood human beings are at stake. Or think Kant and that knock on the door. Tell the truth or not?

[Meno2 (Meno_)]

very simply, objective criteria follow a calculus of spatial varience that concurrently changes the supposed lowest platformal foundation.

The language changes very imperceptively, as the idea of reception and projection allow, namely on the persistent dialectical ground.

The resulting image template like a lens, adjusts for a reasonable circle of light through the expanding and contracting pupil., that translates automatic mechanical varience to axiomatically adjusted meaning.

That does not differentiate between the functional and the thougought experiment as testing it’self.

Every linguistic usage then, is based on very delicate micro experiments. They contain calculated functional, yet imperceptible tests for missing elemental foundations.

That is why calculation always rests on continuous retests between various minima-maximal; and seemingly static , primitive, overgeneralized concepts with the degrees relating to the mist complex variences.

[iambiguous]

@Meno_

very simply, objective criteria follow a calculus of spatial varience that concurrently changes the supposed lowest platformal foundation.

The language changes very imperceptively, as the idea of reception and projection allow, namely on the persistent dialectical ground.

The resulting image template like a lens, adjusts for a reasonable circle of light through the expanding and contracting pupil., that translates automatic mechanical varience to axiomatically adjusted meaning.

That does not differentiate between the functional and the though as testing it’self.

Every linguistic usage then, is based on very delicate micro experiments. They contain calculated functional, yet imperceptible tests for missing elemental foundations.

That is why calculation always rests on continuous retests between various minima-maximal; and seemingly static , primitive, overgeneralized concepts with the degrees relating to the mist complex variences.

Exactly!!!