Greetings!
My name is Jeffrey Hunsaker, and I am an undergraduate major in Philosophy with the eventual goal of being a professor. A brief look at my interests should cover most of the bases of what I’m interested in—I hope my claims of hating postmodernism and postmodernists are not taken too seriously nor place me in violation of the rules of respecting other’s beliefs: I just find no validity in postmodernist thought.
I don’t wish for this discussion to be about postmodernism, though. I imagine I will fight that battle at some point on this site; however, I would rather start with a topic that is both more in my wheelhouse and not vehemently opposed to an entire school of thought.
With that being said, allow me to introduce the issue I wish to discuss:
Forgiveness in relation to Aristotelian Ethics
More specifically, what is forgiveness, and how does it fit into the Nichomachean Ethics?
It seems that forgiveness has to do with grudges, specifically the relinquishing of grudges without adequate compensation. Book IV, Chapter 5 of the Nichomachean Ethics deals with calmness, the mean concerning anger, positioned between the extremes of irascibility and an unnamed deficiency. I choose to call the deficiency of calmness “spinelessness.” I believe spinelessness is the best name for the deficiency of calmness because the spineless man is not angry in the right amount, in the right way, nor at the right time. I imagine a spineless man as one who finished all confrontations to his shampoo bottles in the shower. I digress. Aristotle claims that the calm person tends to err in the direction of the deficiency, for he is eager to pardon, not to enforce a penalty. While the virtue of calmness seems to be the immediate answer to my question, I think that it is ultimately unsatisfactory. Forgiveness and the virtue of forgivingness might be expressed as a mean with extremes that is substantially different from calmness, though it may be related. Of course, relations between virtues do not entomb them: friendliness and wit seem to be closely related, as do magnanimity, small honors, and truthfulness.
Allow me now to posit the virtue of forgivingness as a mean between extremes. Forgivingness is certainly a virtue like friendliness and wit in that it deals solely with social interactions: a man alone in the woods can no better forgive the sky for bringing rain than he can befriend it for not; he can, however, be courageous in his survival or temperate with his drinking. I believe it is in line with Aristotelian virtue to assert that a wrong ought to be made right. While certainly not as extreme as an eye for an eye, passive reaction to an attack or insult seems cowardly or dishonorable; however, is it virtuous for every wrong to be made right with reparations? It seems like some wrongs are so slight it may be impractical to seek reparations. Further, some wrongs committed are not voluntary but committed when intoxicated or unaware. Surely an accident made in good faith should not deserve the same treatment as a deliberate wrong committed.
Though there are certainly individuals who would be the victim of an accident or a minor slight and still press for reparations. Instead of picking and choosing their battles, they fight all of them, regardless of how petty, circumstantial, or self-defeating. I will call these people vindictive. They do not rest from getting their grudge settlement. Some may even seek out situations where they could gain a grudge to fight: these people are called opportunists. Not only do they lack virtue, but they seek out the opportunity to be wronged so they can gain, often seeking those who are acting involuntarily. They put themselves in situations where an accident may injure them or spend excessive time with heavy drinkers. These people are the worst of the vindictive. Then there are those who do not actively seek grudges but do not know how to put them down. These individuals are fractious and petulant, often throwing a fit over the slightest incident. They are better than the opportunists but still lacking in virtue. Both of these types of people are deficient in forgivingness.
Of course, there are those who have an excess of forgivingness. These people never fight a battle and allow anything to pass: I call them pacifists. Much like vindictive individuals, pacifists can be divided into two categories, one more heinous than the other. At the bottom is the meek man. When a wrong is committed against him that is deserving of reparations, he takes no actions out of fear or laziness. A man of this sort is no better than the concrete of the sidewalk, for you can tread on him with no contest. Better than the meek man is the stoic. The stoic will be passive when wronged out of principle. This sort of man is better than the meek man, for he is not lacking in spirit but misguided in mind.
That, of course, leaves us with the mean of forgivingness. The forgiving man will pick and choose his battles, not attacking over minor incursions or accidents, but making a stand when a legitimate wrong is committed.
What are your thoughts on this novel virtue? Am I drawing an arbitrary and unnecessary line that complicates calmness? Or is forgiveness entirely contrary to Aristotle’s idea of virtue?
I welcome your insights and questions! And I am excited to join this community of intellectual discourse.
