I was alluding, to your mention of Aristotle’s to Bergson as teleologically proceeding as an immanence, toward goals, as they , as understood , it transcendentally, and logistically Plato, Timaeus)
Within the flow between the two versions, giving rise to the intuition.
Ishthus, ‘feeling’ has been associated with vitalism, and after sourcing some documents, does come up, truthfully, and the subject is of great interest to me, for various reasons, with admittedly little practice, that certainly precludes dishonesty.
I am by no means a professional , but at any rate, everything related up to now has been done in good faith; but sortily, the source that brings ‘feeling into the equation is not readily available,
So without trying to sound like an idiot, I make the claim to search and research this topic, from the point of view as a due replacement for Darwin’s brute evolutionary theory, and vitalism fits the bill here.
The other thing dealing with the ill defined ‘mystery’ mystique’, ‘participation mystique’ that needs to point to some disambiguating, leads to the kind of analogy with classical - psychological dynamics involving denial and projection. As studies with primitive societies’ apparent development of ‘magic’ transfuses with later formed social psychological symbols, (Jung) over personal -tin man- if I may use that analytically oriented descriptions.
Incidentally, there should not be any allusion but to me being the tin man needing a heart, of perhaps , that may garner a feeing (. here I go again) of anything but positive about everyone here, with really no exceptions.
I don’t wanna look like anything other then a naive realist.
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3. The method of intuition
As we already noted, Bergson’s thought must be seen as an attempt to overcome Kant. In Bergson’s eyes, Kant’s philosophy is scandalous, since it eliminates the possibility of absolute knowledge and mires metaphysics in antinomies. Bergson’s own method of intuition is supposed to restore the possibility of absolute knowledge – here one should see a kinship between Bergsonian intuition and what Kant calls intellectual intuition – and metaphysics. To do this, intuition in Bergson’s sense must place us above the divisions of the different schools of philosophy like rationalism and empiricism or idealism and realism. Philosophy, for Bergson, does not consist in choosing between concepts and in taking sides (The Creative Mind, p. 175–76). These antinomies of concepts and positions, according to him, result from the normal or habitual way our intelligence works. Here we find Bergson’s connection to American pragmatism. The normal way our intelligence works is guided by needs and thus the knowledge it gathers is not disinterested; it is relative knowledge. And how it gathers knowledge is through what Bergson calls “analysis,” that is, the dividing of things according to perspectives taken. Comprehensive analytic knowledge then consists in reconstruction or re-composition of a thing by means of synthesizing the perspectives. This synthesis, while helping us satisfy needs, never gives us the thing itself; it only gives us a general concept of things. Thus, intuition reverses the normal working of intelligence, which is interested and analytic (synthesis being only a development of analysis). In the fourth chapter to Matter and Memory, Bergson calls this reversal of habitual intelligence “the turn of experience” where experience becomes concerned with utility, where it becomes human experience (Matter and Memory, pp.184–85). This placement of oneself up above the turn is not easy; above all else, Bergson appreciates effort.
Intuition therefore is a kind of experience, and indeed Bergson himself calls his thought “the true empiricism” (The Creative Mind, p. 175). What sort of experience? In the opening pages of “Introduction to Metaphysics,” he calls intuition sympathy (The Creative Mind, p. 159). As we have seen from our discussion of multiplicity in Time and Free Will, sympathy consists in putting ourselves in the place of others. Bergsonian intuition then consists in entering into the thing, rather than going around it from the outside. This “entering into,” for Bergson, gives us absolute knowledge. In a moment, we are going to have to qualify this “absoluteness.” In any case, for Bergson, intuition is entering into ourselves – he says we seize ourselves from within – but this self-sympathy develops heterogeneously into others. In other words, when one sympathizes with oneself, one installs oneself within duration and then feels a “certain well defined tension, whose very determinateness seems like a choice between an infinity of possible durations” (The Creative Mind, p. 185). In order to help us understand intuition, which is always an intuition of duration.
Citing lost, probably Brittania