Bush, Iraq and Machiavellian principles

[Mastriani]

The victorious warrior, wins the war and goes to battle. The defeated warrior, goes to battle, and attempts to win the war.

Tsuntse

In full awareness that the Bush Administration’s invasion of Iraq was ill-conceived at its inception, we are in full status of occupying a former sovereignty. I would hope that no one in possession of rational thought would attempt to refute this claim. That at his whim, he decided in the fashion of the Princes of old, to create an expansion of powers and glory, unto himself, should also be objectively held. There is little evidence to the contrary, and what evidence there is to the contrary, is dubious, at best.

The task at hand is to reorganize the structure of the former sovereignty, into a working model of differing definition. The option of withdrawal does not, at this point, exist as a pragmatically realistic avenue. The task at hand must be completed, however much to the chagrin and/or displeasure of our populace. I will not belabor this point any further, it is of no necessity.

The questions at hand, from a pragmatic perspective, are:

Can we complete the task, and to a positive outcome?

If so, how is the new model to be effected, to the most positive outcome?

Here I will begin to make use of Niccolo Machiavelli’s most venerable dissertations on the principle requirements of just such situations.

The initial problem was incurred prior to any informal or formal declarations of war, or acts of war.

As a mere matter of technicality, and Machiavelli would be in agreement, Suddam Hussein, although a tyrannical Prince, was, for all pragmatic purposes, a correct leader for the sovereignty in question. If one should wonder why, there are a number of reasons. The first of which, is that the sovereignty in question has a populace that has, through the course of time, become accustomed to the institutions and actions of tyranny. Therefore, the customs, rituals and institutions were thus created under those habituations. The material of the society thus corrupted to conform to a standard of tyranny.

Although in the Machiavellian principle, the institutions of religion are necessary for helping to curb the dissidence, licentiousness, and idleness of a large populace, we encounter further errors. In order for religious institutions to be efficacious to these ends, they must be of good conduct, both in those who lead them, and their customs, rituals and habituations. Considering the number of warring sects, the divisive nature of the sects even falling under the same titles, and the constant power struggles and violence betwixt the ruling leaders of the sects, the institution is corrupted. It is therefore of no benefit to the sovereignty, nor to the populace of that sovereignty. Further, in that Suddam Hussein was a secularist tyrant, and our current President is of an antagonistic religious institution, neither avail the sovereignty of negating the corruptions present in the existing religious institutions.

The following is an excerpt from Dei Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, I.XVII:

And although this example of Rome is to be preferred to any other example, none the less on this proposition I want to refer to people known before our times. I say, therefore, that no incident (although grave and violent) can ever restore Milan or Naples to freedom, because those people are entirely corrupt. Which was seen after the death of Filippo Visconti, who, wanting to restore liberty to Milan, did not know how and could not maintain it. It was therefore a great good fortune for Rome that no sooner had these Kings become corrupt than they were driven out, and that before their corruption should pass into the vitals of that City; which corruption was the cause of the infinite tumults which took place in Rome (men having good intentions) (and which) did no harm, but rather benefited the Republic. And this conclusion can be drawn, that where the people is not corrupted, tumults and other troubles do no harm; but where corruption exists, well ordered laws are of no benefit, unless they are administered by one who, with extreme strength, will make them be observed until the people become good (cured); I do not know if this ever happened, or whether it be possible that it could happen; for it is seen (as I have said a little above) that a City coming to decadence because of the corruption of its people, if it ever happens that she is raised up again, it happens through the virtu of one man who is then living, and not by the virtu of the general public, that the good institutions are sustained: and as soon as such a one is dead, they will return to their pristine habits, as happened at Thebes, which by the virtu of Epaminondas, while he was alive, was able to maintain the form of a Republic and Empire, but after his death returned to its first disorders: the reason is this, that one man cannot live so long that the time will be enough to bring a City back to good habits which for a long time has had evil habits. And if one of very long life or two continuous successors of virtu do not restore it (the state), so one which lacks them (as was said above) is quickly ruined, unless it should be made to be restored through many dangers and much bloodshed. For such corruption and little inclination for a free society result from an inequality that exists in that City; and wanting to bring them to equality, it is necessary to use the most extraordinary means, which few know or want to use, as will be described in more detail in another place.

In the modern sense, we can substitute Iraq for the former states of the Roman Empire. Due to the extended violence and corruption of a tyrannical Prince in Suddam Hussein, we have the furtherance of that situation in the corruption and weakness, both of character and action, of the current leader occupying Iraq. Even in the day of Machiavelli, the organization of the populace in vengeance against a new leadership, be it to instate a principality or a Republic, was well known, and required extraordinary means to hold control, let alone being able to reform both corrupted institutions and populace.

I.XVIII:

It was necessary, therefore, if Rome wanted to maintain herself free in her corruption, that she should have made new institutions, just as she had made new laws in the process of her existence, for other institutions and modes of living ought to be established in a bad people as well as in a good one, nor can the form be the same in a people entirely different. But because these institutions when they are suddenly discovered no longer to be good have to be changed either completely, or little by little as each (defect) is known, I say that both of these two courses are almost impossible. For in the case of wanting to change little by little a prudent man is required who sees this evil from a distance and at its beginning. It is easily probable that no one such as these springs up in a City: and even if one should spring up he is never able to persuade others of that which he intends; for men living in one manner, do not want to change, and the more so as they do not see the evil face to face, but being shown to them as (mere) conjecture.

Here is shown by Machiavelli the primary impediment to change with a corrupted populace. Although the populace may be in full awareness of the corruption in institutions, customs, rituals and general habituations, there is no sense of urgency to correct those errors. Further, as with Iraq, so set in the corruption, from the former tyranny, and with the forced emergence of sudden liberty, is the populace, that the errors, no matter how plain and obvious, are better accepted in conformity, than is the lesser known uncertainties of change. Not withstanding that also what one is given to, is what one is likely given to continuing, regardless of whether that be correct or incorrect.

Further, Machiavelli adds this, a major stopping point that appears to have not been considered by the current occupying leadership:

I.XVIII:

And I will presuppose a City very corrupt, where such difficulties come to rise very fast, as there are found there neither laws or institutions that should be enough to check a general corruption. For as good customs have need of laws for maintaining themselves, so the laws, to be observed, have need of good customs. In addition to this, the institutions and laws made in a Republic at its origin when men were good, are not afterward more suitable, when they (men) have become evil. And if laws vary according to circumstances and events in a City, its institutions rarely or never vary: which results in the fact that new laws are not enough, for the institutions that remain firm will corrupt it.

Due to the corruption instilled in the institutions by the tyranny of Suddam Hussein, and further his secularism, and that of his governors, officials and generals, in direct opposition of the religious institutions and customs, and their leadership; there is nothing left in the populace which creates a need of abiding laws. Neither, the authority of the former laws, or the laws of the current occupying leadership, which is again another matter of antagonism towards the habituations of the institutions, and of the populace; have any correctness with which to force the material of the society to change.

There is a great deal more to expound upon, but for now, I will leave this for discussion, should any arise.

[Mastriani]

To continue:

I.XXVI

Whoever becomes Prince either of a City or a State, and more so if his foundations are weak, and does not want to establish a civil system either in the form of a Kingdom or a Republic, (will find) the best remedy he has to hold that Principality is ((he being a new Prince)) to do everything anew in that State; such as in the City to make new Governors with new titles, with new authority, with new men, (and) make the poor rich, as David did when he became King, who piled good upon the needy, and dismissed the wealthy empty-handed. In addition to this he should build new Cities, destroy old ones, transfer the inhabitants from one place to another, and in sum, not to leave anything unchanged in that Province, (and) so that there should be no rank, nor order, nor status, nor riches, that he who obtains it does not recognize it as coming from him; he should take as his model Philip of Macedonia, father of Alexander, who, by these methods, from a petty King became Prince of Greece. And those who write of him tell how be transferred men from Province to Province, as the Mandrians (Shepherds) move their sheep. These methods are most cruel and hostile to every system of living, not only Christian, but human, and should be avoided by every man; and he should want rather to live as a private individual than as a King at the (expense of the) ruin of men. None the less, he who does not want to take up the first path of good, must, if he wants to maintain himself, follow the latter path of evil. But men take up certain middle paths which are most harmful, for they do not know how to be entirely good or entirely bad, as the following chapter will show by example.

Here we see yet again, what ails the Iraqi nation. Having removed Suddam, and without prudence in so doing, because there was no obvious planning or study towards either reaffirming an existing infrastructure, or likely better, doing away completely with whatever infrastructure remained, and instating martial law until a new one had been established, we are caught in continuous tumult, discord, misconduct and international quagmire of loathing and discontent.

That the institutions of the state of Iraq are corrupted, is obvious, not from a perspective of prejudice is this stated, but from a pragmatic one. The fullness of the institutions of the state of Iraq is lead by highly divisive and separatist factions, (priests, clerics, Imams), and there is no social or cultural institutions towards order or cohesion. There is no need to belabor this point, a society continually separated, and promoted to segregation by institutional leaders, stands little chance of rectifying the ills apparent. Further, when those institutions are lead by individuals of poor quality, whose ends are validated through observation, as self-serving and directly to the detriment of the state, through further corruption, tumults of violence, unrest and opposition to the occupation standing; it is very clear the path that needs to be taken.

The problem is further aggravated by the occupational leader, (properly, the Machiavellian Prince), whose own leadership, although alleged to be predicated upon the institution of Christianity, could only be viewed as partaken of for corrupted ends. It should be reiterated that the institutions of the occupational leader are directly antagonistic towards the institutions of the occupied state. In unison, these two properties almost certainly guarantee the failure of any restructuring to a positive end.

I.XXVII

When Pope Julius II in the year one thousand five hundred and five (1505) went to Bologna to drive the house of Bentivogli out of that State, of which they had held the Principate (of that State) for a hundred years, he wanted also to remove Giovanpagolo Baglioni from Perugia, of which he was Tyrant, (and) to be the one who planned to eliminate all the Tyrants who were occupying the lands of the Church. And having arrived at Perugia with this purpose and decision known to everyone, he did not wait to enter in that City with his army that was protecting him, but entered unarmed, notwithstanding that Giovanpagolo was inside with large forces that he had gathered for defense. And thus, brought by that fury which governed all his actions, with only his simple guard he placed himself in the hands of the enemy, whom he then carried off with him, leaving a governor in that City who should administer it for the Church. The temerity of the Pope and the cowardice of Giovanpagolo were noted by the prudent men who were with the Pope, nor could they understand whence it happened that he (Baglioni) did not with his perpetual fame attack his enemy at once and enrich himself with booty, there being with the Pope all the Cardinals with their valuables. Nor could it be believed that he abstained either from goodness or that his conscience restrained him; for no regard of piety could enter in the heart of a riotous man, who had kept his sister, and had put to death his cousins and nephews in order that he could reign there: but it is concluded that men do not know how to be entirely bad or perfectly good, and that when an evil has some greatness in it or is generous in any part, they do not know how to attempt it. Thus Giovanpagolo, who did not mind being publicly (called) incestuous and a parricide, did not know how, or to say more correctly, did not dare ((even having a justifiable opportunity)) to make an enterprise where everyone would have admired his courage and which would have left an eternal memory of himself, being the first who would have shown the Prelates how little esteemed are they who live and reign as they do, and would have done an act, the greatness of which would have overcome every infamy and every danger that could have resulted from it.

This section of the Discourses is dedicated to the most fundamental exposition of the Machiavellian principles of virtuous leadership, pragmatically. There are, and always have been, times in any state, Republic or otherwise, that called for the most extreme of measures. Here though, it is plainly described the downfall of the human mind in leadership, as not predicating action upon efficiency and positive consequence to the state in question. Likely, this is another of those passages from Machiavelli, so poorly understood, to have caused him and his works to be greatly maligned, and abrogated from education. In the manner of Machiavelli, “good” and “bad” are not value judgments of morality, in the sense of individual material, rather that which is viewed by the society as such. In the pragmatic brilliance of Machiavelli, he shows repeatedly that leadership entails venturing to decisions, which from the perspective of the private citizen, or society as a whole, would be perceived as “bad” or “evil”, but in the interest of the state, can come to positive end.

The current leader of the occupation in Iraq, is not composed of the material to do what is necessary, as he is fearful of the perception of “bad” or “evil”, because in his own nation, the society is divided, divisive, and the institutions corrupted. What is required of him though, is not concerned with those issues, regarding the state of Iraq. Definitive decisions often require what cannot be tolerated by a populace, even though to the condition of the state, they are ameliorating in end effect. The current leader seeks the middle ground, and as repeatedly shown by Machiavelli, this is the path to certain ruin.

Being that the material of the individual, the society and the institutions is corrupted beyond rectification or correction, and the former infrastructure not completely removed or destroyed, and inconsideration of the occupational leaders effete and corrupted material, the most extreme measures are called for, if “victory” is to be actually achieved. As prescribed by Machiavelli, enough military power must be brought in to completely isolate the state and its society. Any and all previous infrastructure components and institutions will have to be nullified, and any leadership of those, executed without prejudice or bias. That the social material itself is corrupted from the former tyrant, for a space of no less than one year, likely longer, all liberties must be removed. To balance this, an equivalent to the Roman plebian tribunate should be created out of the Iraqi citizenry, to ensure that no abuses befall the populace, and that there is means of magistracy and appeal as there is certain to be need for such. Their stay in this official capacity should be limited to a definite term, without possibility of reassignment. Although this tribunate could be involved in the creation of legislation for guiding the occupation, they should not be permitted to create further legislation once the initial laws are set. This removes any ability by the tribunate to create a power institution in opposition to the occupation.

In the course of such, through heavy hand and virtuous leadership, dissention, either from internal agents or external agents, would be eliminated. By the removal and execution of all leadership of formerly created and corrupted institutions, new institutions with proper structure and leadership could be slowly established. In all manner of pragmatic reality, curing the ills of a corrupted populace, is never certain. But as humans are constantly in want and desire, creating new institutions of good material, reforming the infrastructure with the sole purpose of edifying, or rewarding the populace, for proper conduct, would certainly aid this end.

In conclusion, the current leader of the occupation, being of weak character and corrupted material, is incapable of enacting the “wholly bad”
decisions required to turn Iraq into a proper Republic with free suffrage and liberties. Now five years since deposing the former tyrant, the state remains in oblivion and chaos, and no formulated course of action appears to be in use, toward the end of reestablishing the state, in formal fashion. Although the current leadership is ineffective and disruptive, that is not an endorsement of withdrawal, which is essentially an impossibility at this time, or any time going forward.

Whether it be 500 years ago, or 500 years forward, the pragmatics of Niccolo Machiavelli, should not, and as with the current state of Iraq, cannot be ignored. Leadership requires, demands, of the leader the ability to do the most unwanted of all tasks. It is neither the fault of leader or of the title, but rather it is of the nature of the human mind and want of power that the responsibility rests. That the words of Machiavelli are as pertinent today as they were in his day, is its own testament to the unchanging nature of the human desire and ease of corruptibility.

Considering therefore what is easy and what is difficult to persuade a People to, this distinction can be made: either that which you have to persuade them to represents at first sight a gain or a loss, or truly it appears a courageous or cowardly proceeding: and if, in the things that are placed in front of the people, there is seen a gain even though it is concealed under a loss, and if it appears courageous even though it is hidden beneath the ruin of the Republic, it will always be easy to persuade the multitude to it: and thus it will always be difficult to persuade them of those proceedings where either some usefulness or loss is apparent, even though the welfare and benefit (of the Republic) were hidden under it. This that I have said is confirmed by infinite examples, Roman and foreign, modern and ancient.

Niccolo Machiavelli