Can Libertarian Free Will Be Rescued?

[chap9898]

I have yet to come across a coherent defense of libertarian free will, which I define as “the ability to have done otherwise.” Basically, I can conceive of only three possible ultimate sources of one’s actions: (1) that with which one is born, (2) one’s environment (from one’s birth to the time of the action), and (3) randomness (which may arise in the context of quantum indeterminacies). None of these three sources enables libertarian free will.

Is there anyone out there who can provide a sound argument in favor of the existence of libertarian free will?

I feel that this is an important issue because without libertarian free will, the concept of moral responsibility is rendered incoherent.

Thank you for your time.

[Only_Humean]

@chap9898

I feel that this is an important issue because without libertarian free will, the concept of moral responsibility is rendered incoherent.

I don’t believe this is the case. Of course, the concept of moral responsibility ascribed to the libertarian free will model is incoherent, but I don’t believe that that’s the only way to look at it.

[Dairdo]

@chap9898

I feel that this is an important issue because without libertarian free will, the concept of moral responsibility is rendered incoherent.

I agree. Free will is necessary to the concept of moral responsibility, as morality concerns itself with choice and action. In the absence of free will - of volitional action - there can be no choice in the most fundamental sense of the word. The possibility of free will is an axiom of Aristotelean logic on which all philosophies of liberty - including libertarians - are built.

I’m new to this debate in general - but if a rather well versed science nut of a friend is a good opponent, he asserts that we’ve seen nothing empirical in nature, yet, that supports the existence of free will - as you’ve defined it (the ability to have done otherwise) - as nature adheres to very specific, deterministic laws. Is this in any way reflective of your position? Given your three postulates, your definition of “coherent argument” appears to include only the empirically verifiable.

The arguments/discussions that I’ve seen and read on the subject concern themselves more with logical arguments and the lack of knowledge on what it is that makes human beings “conscious”.

I’ll post a few a quotes from different sources as a starting point.

The axiom of volition asserts that free will is possible. Again, this is undeniable and inescapable. He who denies it is claiming that he is a deterministic mechanism; by what means does he establish that he is not merely programmed to deny volition, or indeed to make any other statement? (Cf. Branden 1963.)

The first epistemic axiom is a corollary of Consciousness: Sense perception is necessarily valid and accurately relays sense data to the brain. To be conscious means to be conscious of something - to be conscious of nothing is a contradiction. This necessarily implies that there is some means of sensing reality. Note carefully the full meaning of the preceding sentence: there is some means of sensing reality, i.e. sensory organs - one cannot sense without something to sense with; there is some means of sensing reality - the sensory organs relay sense data to the consciousness, they do not create the sense data; there is some means of sensing reality - existent objects are being sensed - one cannot sense that which does not exist. All knowledge of the universe about one must come from the senses - there is no mystic source that somehow puts knowledge directly into the mind without any means of learning it.

The second epistemic axiom is also a corollary of Consciousness, but it is an axiom specific to the nature of human beings: Volition - Free Will - the capacity to choose. Humans are not born with the knowledge of how to survive in the world; that knowledge must be learned by applying a process of thought to observed sense data. This process is not automatic - it requires conscious effort. That conscious effort must be made by choice. This is self-evident to anyone through introspection or observation of others. One’s fundamental choice, the choice that underlies all choices, is the choice to focus or not - specifically, the choice to focus one’s mind on the data the senses provide about reality, or to ignore or evade that data and induce a mental fog.

Thoughts?

[xzc]

The axiom of volition asserts that free will is possible. Again, this is undeniable and inescapable. He who denies it is claiming that he is a deterministic mechanism; by what means does he establish that he is not merely programmed to deny volition, or indeed to make any other statement? (Cf. Branden 1963.)

If free will existed, it’s not like we would be able to choose anything we wanted. There are still some things that would be automatic. Your breathing, your reflexes, which things you find delicious to eat, what person you fall in love with, and among these I would include your ability to be convinced–to start believing in something. It seems true on the face of it that we can’t control when we’re convinced. If a bird flies into your room, could you get yourself to not start believing there’s a bird there, or does the info reported by your sense organs overwhelm your ability to choose, much like a knee-jerk reaction?

Besides, what’s to say we’re not determined to be truth-detecting mechanisms and as such determined to believe the truth of determinism?

[Silhouette]

I don’t know about a coherent defense of (libertarian) free will, but I can definitely think of a coherent criticism of it.

Evidently, one only ever chooses 1 choice (choosing ‘both’ is still choosing only 1 path). The ‘possibility’ of choosing otherwise is simply a recognition that the conditions seem to be similar to times when one has actually seen the other ‘possible’ choice being chosen - by themselves or by another. The fact that this ‘other’ choice was NOT chosen renders it absolutely intangible, and therefore more of a sentiment, based on a line of reasoning, towards not feeling trapped or forced.

This is not deterministic - I feel this to be more of a hindsight analysis that takes into account factors that one is not conscious of at all in making their decision: one does not consider the entire history and arrangement of all matter and energy in making their choice.
Nor is it free will, because one is never free to choose more than 1 choice - they are necessarily bound to only 1 choice, whether it is felt to be free according to sentiment - with or without using reason to ‘back it up’, or not.

It is simply ‘action’.
The act of choosing is not nullified here. But choice using reason is scientifically backed up to simply justify instinctual decisions after they’re made.

Applying this to Libertarianism, instinct is pulled to the forefront of choice, along with the feeling that one is not trapped or forced. Therefore, when one acts morally out of a feeling of responsibility - it follows that they are acting out of some kind of ‘moral instinct’.

This is not far-fetched at all, as the desire to do good by one’s allies is conducive towards mutual personal power through increased numbers. Therefore, the problem is diverted to when one does not see others as their allies.
Things like patriotism come in useful here, and responding to a nationwide threat or unifying cause - such as your business succeeding. Morality also often occurs out of pity, which goes some way to additionally supporting those who are not one’s allies. Exposure to the inequalities of the nation can be used to inspire this pity, to encourage charity towards those who lose out from not being a direct ally of the more common who benefit from numbers and the more strong who persist despite the high numbers of those who are not their allies.

Perhaps against this criticism, you may see a coherent defense of libertarian free will more clearly?

[TIMBER]

@chap9898

I have yet to come across a coherent defense of libertarian free will, which I define as “the ability to have done otherwise.”

I think that we can still do otherwise even in a deterministic universe. Its just that we can, but we won’t of our own will, even if predetermined. Its still up to us regardless. The only difference between Libertarian free will and this free will is that what we would choose is totally “indeterministic”, which I can only see as random.

Basically, I can conceive of only three possible ultimate sources of one’s actions: (1) that with which one is born, (2) one’s environment (from one’s birth to the time of the action), and (3) randomness (which may arise in the context of quantum indeterminacies). None of these three sources enables libertarian free will.

The only possible notion I can concieve of is taking up (3) and rewording the definition of “choice”, though I doubt many libertarians would find this appealing in the slightest, though that is the only way I can concieve something “indeterministic”.

I feel that this is an important issue because without libertarian free will, the concept of moral responsibility is rendered incoherent.

Not necessarily. Moral Responsibility is a totally separate issue from free will, unless one believes that libertarian free will is necessary. People define moral responsibility in different ways. I believe that one is responsible if they are the ones making the choice, whether they could’ve done otherwise or not (though I think they could). They are still applicable to blame or praise. Semi-compatibilists only hold that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism, though are silent on the case of free will.