Just as the idea of everyone having a dream about a urinating monkey confuses me.
But yes, I should go back to being a grouch and switching off certain faculties. Get back to being a robot - my bad, lol.
The words rational, irrational and integrate have DIFFERENT meanings outside maths.
SO this thread is just a confusion of terms.
S even if philosophy can âintegrate the irrational,â (WTF that is supposed to mean), you would need to know where and with what it is being integrated, and philosophy would not be using a method remotely similar to the one used by maths, so the answer is NO on several counts.
You are then saying that only does so in the same way as maths, which makes the question meaningless.
According to you the question is âCan philosophy integrate the irrational as philosophy can?â
Humans are both rational and irrational beings.
This is another reason why philosophy came into being in Ancient Greece.
Humans want to explore and know not only themselves, but also being. They also have a sense or reason for the logical, for the ethical and for the aesthetic, and there, where this sense or reason is not sufficient or not attainable, non-sense or non-reason dominates, and the more so, the less reason is able to react to it in such a way that it does not lose control.
Yes - and?
âHumans are both rational and irrational beings.â
I contest this sir. I claim that only statements can be rational or irrational, and humans are not statements.
Alright now check this out tho. Say joe did not succeed at his task and we say âhe acted irrationally.â what we mean is, he did or didnât do what he shouldnât or should have done to succeed at x. But this is post-hoc meaninglessness nonsense, because what joe thought he should of done (which is what he did), he thought was the rational thing to do. Note that what joe thinks is not what he is, and what he does - in the eyes of eternity - is neither rational nor irrational.
These concepts, rational and irrational, derive directly from the rules of a language, linguistic or mathematical, and have nothing to do with actual states in the world.
But back to joe. If we say joe thought he was acting rationally, and that he couldnât ever act irrationally on purpose, then the dichotomy disappears and all thatâs left is an analysis of his purposes and intentions in the form of his language.
When we say one is being irrational, we should mean they violate some custom or rule of reasoning. Faulty inference, incorrect deduction or mathematical answer/result for instance. But never that he acted irrationally while engaged in some task, only wrongly, after discovering the fact that he failed.
Rationality is bound up in intent-to-solve and not necessarily the steps taken in solving. One always believes they are calculating correctly when doing an equation or following steps, and one would never purposely do either of these wrongly.
Minor phenomenological nuance there with a neat little vitkenshteinian twist for ya.
encode-decode -
On this pi = irrational thing -
I was originally wrongly thinking that it was a geometric type of puzzle (which I can enjoy) but I found myself deep into merely numbers games (which I donât see any profit in - nor enjoyment). The basic question really is merely one of "Why is the number this particular type of number - purely a number type casting and naming issue). So I might keep thinking about it a little but Iâm not really interested in pursuing it any further.
I learned that those who proved that pi must be an irrational number did it through proving that it could not be a rational number (as they define ârationalâ). Lambert seems to have come closest to the âwhyâ question by addressing the tan(x) but (if you can decipher all the maths symbols) he eventually just declares that tan(x) must be irrational therefore pi is irrational. Exactly why tan(x) is irrational was a little too much for me - apparently (f_{1/2}(x/2)) is irrational - or maybe it was (f_{2/3}(x/2)) - either way it isnât anything of interest to me and probably has nothing to do with âintegrating the irrational in philosophyâ.
I just thought Iâd update you. 
So you are not just a liar and a troll after all - you lied.
But since I am going to agree with you - you might want to figure a way to back-peddle.
Although I will disagree with that - rationality is all about the steps taken to solve - the ârationingâ of the logic.
What? I did? Holy shit where?
In the Marxists thread just yesterday you stated that you are just a troll and donât discuss anything. A few days earlier (not going to look it up) you stated that you are âall in favor of any deceptionâ as long as you get what you want - but didnât want to discuss it.
Or maybe I have those backward.
Now wait a minute.
Say joe wants to achieve x and two ways to do so come to mind. Letâs add that joe was tricked by someone into believing that option b would work. When faced with deciding which option to take, he chooses b, and sets out on a course that will never work. But joe believes it will work, and each step during the process while on his course seems rational to joe.
We know that b is the irrational choice, but in doing b, and doing b properly, joe follows steps that rationally follow each other based on what joe was taught about how to do b.
Now all I need is a concrete example and we can take this dilemma out of the abstract.
âas long as you get what you wantâ
I wouldnât know if what I saw was what I wanted or vice-versa man. All this shit is theoretical so far cuz it ainât ever happened (well it happened for a new York minute when the Bolsheviks had power). Like what would a proletarian dictatorship look like today? Youâd have to put everyone on the same payroll and set up yuge networks of democratic committees and syndicates and stuff all over the world. Youâd have a perfectly horizontal government where a competent and informed body of citizens would communicate at warp speed with each other and render majority votes immediately for dealing with anything from hurricanes to hemorrhoids (jesus christ thatâs a hard word to spell. Spell check duddint even recognize it).
All that means is that Joe did not intend to do something irrational - it is the proces that is rational or not - not Joe.
Due to prior comments you have made I suspect you are too over-concerned about âwhoâs guiltyâ rather than âwhat is a dumb thing to doâ. But whichever -
Joe did two irrational actions - two separate actions that led him to failure -
- He believed the wrong source of information (like believing MSM on issues) = irrational process
- He carried out an irrational process toward his failure = irrational process.
In neither case is Joe irrational - merely misled into performing irrational actions.
Example -
- Joe is convinced that voting for OâBiden is a good thing so he decides to vote for the criminal.
- Joe then votes for the criminal and even helps a little with the fraud - because it is such a good thing.
Believing MSM was his first mistake.
Doing what they wanted was his second.
Wouldnât an optimised mind always seek to turn the irrational into the rational⌠for the sake of clarity/sanity?
I would say that it does or should⌠regarding all aspects of thinking and thought.
Statements can be false, contradictory, ineffective and so on. One might use the word âirrationalâ to mean any of those.
Decisions can be irrational in case they are not the best decision that was available to the decision maker at the time. Thatâs a different thing. Thatâs irrationality proper.
And those who make irrational (i.e. bad) decisions are known as irrational people. So people can be irrational too.
In every case, rational/irrational is a description of something that is out there.
More commonly it refers to something not being logical, in other words not able to be reasoned upon. No solid basis - at one with the aether, lol.
This in the case of irrational.
I donât know about optimized but a mind does seek to make the irrational rational.
Sanity as opposed to clarity more soâŚ
I would say that it should.
Else a mind has no form. Function is only what the mind seeks.
Just the most âevidentâ propositions of elementary arithmetic - for example 2 x 2 = 4 - have become, viewed from an analytical point of view, problems whose solution has only been achieved by derivations from set theory and in many details not at all - which would certainly have appeared to Plato and his time as madness and proof of a complete lack of mathematical talent.
And even if only since ca. 1800 the idea of multidimensional spaces - the word would have been better replaced by a new one - became the extended basis of analytic thinking, the first step to it was done at the moment when the powers, actually the logarithms, were detached from their original relation to sensually realizable surfaces and bodies and - using irrational and complex exponents - were introduced into the field of the functional as relation values of a quite general kind. Whoever can follow here at all, will also understand that already with the step from the notion of a^3 as a natural maximum to a^n the unconditionality of a space of three dimensions is cancelled.
Once the spatial element of the point had lost the still optical character of a coordinate section in a vividly imaginable system and had been defined as a group of three independent numbers, there was no longer any inner obstacle to replace the number 3 by the general n. The concept of dimension is reversed: no longer dimension numbers designate optical properties of a point with respect to its position in a system, but dimensions of unlimited number represent completely abstract properties of a number group. A reversal of the dimension concept occurs: no longer do dimension numbers denote optical properties of a point with respect to its position in a system, but dimensions of unlimited number represent completely abstract properties of a number group. This number group - of n independent ordered elements - is the image of the point; it is called a point. An equation logically developed from it is called a plane, is the image of a plane. The epitome of all points of n dimensions is called a n-dimensional space. (From the point of view of set theory, a well-ordered set of points, without regard to the number of dimensions, is called a body, a set of n-1 dimensions is called a surface in relation to it. The âboundaryâ (wall, edge) of a point set represents a point set of lesser power). In these transcendental spatial worlds, which are no longer in any relation to any kind of sensuousness, the relations to be found by the analysis dominate, which are in constant agreement with the results of experimental physics.
Only in this sphere of number thinking, which is still accessible only to a very small circle of people, even formations like the systems of hypercomplex numbers (for example the quaternions of vector calculus) and at first quite incomprehensible signs like infinite^n get the character of something real.
In the sharpest contrast to the older mathematics, set theory no longer understands the singular quantities, but the epitome of morphologically somehow similar quantities, for example the totality of all square numbers or all differential equations of a certain type, as a new unit, as a new number of higher order and subjects it to new, formerly completely unknown considerations concerning its power, order, equivalence, countability. The âsetâ of rational numbers is countable, that of real numbers is not. The set of the complex numbers is two-dimensional; from this follows the notion of the n-dimensional set, which also classifies the geometric domains into the set theory. One characterizes the finite (countable, limited) sets with respect to their power as âcardinal numbersâ, with respect to their order as âordinal numbersâ and establishes the laws and modes of calculation of them. Thus, a last extension of the function theory, which had gradually incorporated the entire mathematics into its formal language, is in the process of realization, according to which it proceeds with respect to the character of the functions according to principles of the group theory, with respect to the value of the variables according to set-theoretical principles.
The unnoticed goal towards which all this strives and which every genuine natural scientist in particular feels as an urge within himself, is the working out of a pure, numerical transcendence, the perfect and complete overcoming of the sight and its replacement by a pictorial language incomprehensible and inconceivable to the layman.
Having reached the goal, the immense, more and more non-sensual (nonsensical), more and more translucent fabric, which spins around the entire science, finally reveals itself: it is nothing else than the inner structure of the word-bound understanding, which believed to overcome the appearance of the eye, to detach âthe truthâ from it.