Cartesian or Spinozist Belief? Do not the differences between Descartes’ and Spinoza’s conception of belief, make all the difference in the role of philosophy? While Cartesian systems imagine that propositions come to the mind neutrally, only to be freely decided upon as true or false, for Spinoza, to conceive of something is to believe it as true, ipso facto, however briefly. Does this not set even greater importance upon philosophy to dispel beliefs at the most speculative level, the level at which the core of assumptions would be addressed, for in this way, we are re-setting the default setting of perception itself, with a more productive realization. The mind being a believe-first mechanism, rather than a neutral data gatherer, would then be in benefit of a more effective default setting, a system of beliefs that more readily under stress, produces good results. Philosophy, rather than a complex of tools that a free will employs upon neutral propositions objectively considered, would aid in the the painting of the perceptual portrait itself, the way that the world conceptually appears, from the start, before reflection. In this way, philosophy joins the other arts, as the molders of appearance, the shifters of the world, and not just the rarified tool of “experts.â€
The mind cannot help but to suppose the validity of sensual input.
It then might question it, in reflection, which will be a general abstraction of what occurred, without the accompanying details and clarity.
Experiences “paint†future perceptions in how the rational mind habituates itself, through reflection, with sensual phenomena and attempts to control its emotional immediate reactions to them.
To “reset†our default settings would entail a rational control over our instinctive/emotional responses.
Wow. What a nice post. So you would agree with the essay? Would you agree that not only is “sensuous” input supposed valid, but also propositional input? By describing input as sensual are you not still in the Cartesian Mind-as-passive-substance model, where “stuff” comes in and is sorted by active rationality? Spinoza’s point is that “rational control” is simply a more adequate/active emotion, and not a different sort of Will?
As an instinctive answer (I’ve only read the opening couple of paragraphs of the essay, though I’ll keep on reading it) I’d say that I’m inclined to agree with Spinoza inasmuch as I don’t see the mind as taking propositions neutrally, though I’m unsure about the tendency to believe first, ask questions later.
For one thing all propositions occur in language (if I understand you correctly) and as such will inevitably carry all sorts of unintended and usually unpredictable connotations and implications.
Part of the essay’s point, I believe, is that Russell’s idea of “sense data” that enters into the Mind, which the Will then acts upon in one way or another, is still a Cartesian model of the Will, a model that in many ways we still retain in presupposition. What Spinoza does is collaspe the intermediary tier, the Will. What I would imagine is that, not only does “language” carry unintended associations, but also that perception carries unintended conceptual ordering, as true. What is at risk here is the very interesting question, Can one decide to believe?, a thorn in the side of many Freewill advocates. For Spinoza, to comprehend is to believe.
Yes, Russell would appear to be Cartesian in this regard, presupposing that the Will is somehow distinct from the capacity to comprehend.
On another point might we not say, to perpetuate the machine metaphor, that the various modules of the mind are themselves altered in the process of altering the information? That as they receive, process and pass on the information they themselves are dynamic, they never repeat the exact same process twice?
One might say that, but only to import Derrida where he does not seem to make a difference. Sure it is nice to tweak the model metaphysically, but then does not the model loose its explanatory value, i.e. its power (specific to a Cartesian vs. Spinozist difference)? Clearly the differences in the processes in each modality are index-able as the “Same” in reference to other processes. What such a thought might do though, is open up the entire production of meaning to the Pantheistic Becoming of the whole, which Spinoza does describe, such that the parts themselves are “willing” meaning in their own gradated sense, only to be combined with higher order “truths” in assemblage. So to say that no part produces an identical process twice would very much be in play, but such parts are indeed producing pragmatically the same processes, in reference to the ratios of the other parts of the “machine.” For me this is where Spinoza’s definition of a body as parts that remain in ratio of motion for a duration of time, gains much of its power. So I would ask, when speculating: not, Is it true?, but, If it is true, what would it mean? How do you see that?
Yes. Propositional input is sensual input.
This is why I see identity as being something that is discovered sensually, just like anything else, and why I see fear as preceding/underlying love.
I do not know if I am Cartisean or Spinozean, I do not think in that fashion and I rarely categorize myself in such ways.
I could call myself a liberal but then there are things in this political standpoint which I do not agree with, so what am I? In some ways I am also conservative.
The way I think of it is less academic and formal.
For me the mind forages for patterns - patterns which correspond to what mirrors its own understanding or its own structure or that might be genetically ingrained in the way our brains work.
Comprehension presupposes the recognition of a pattern which seems familiar, in that it resembles the ways in which the mind thinks or that it resembles an idea already accepted as truth. A mind cannot comprehend what is beyond its ability to find a simple pattern in.
The mind simplifies, much more complicated phenomena into general abstractions, which it can then study and judge, before it accepts or rejects as possible or valid.
To then accept it or reject it requires an analysis where it is deconstructed and compared to pre-existing ideas. Our logic is a standard based on ideas that retain a predictable consistency over a period of time to make them undeniable.
So Spinoza denied the existence of Will and claimed that it was but another form of emotion?
For me Will is more the control over emotions and their focus towards particular directions.
Reason is the arbitrator over emotional reaction. This control is called the Will.
Are not the senses the way the mind connects to an environment?
I would agree with Kant that there are a priori concepts in the mind which are synthesized with sensual input to create understanding, but from whence come these a priori concepts and are they the only way reality can be conceptualized?
Well, the obvious answer, at least to me, would be that there is not “a mind” to “enter into,” under the spatial metaphor that you seem to be operating within. The mind would not be a place into which things go.
The concept of holism, where we are all one is a logical hypothesis, but one must consider why differentiation had to occur and why the illusion of individuality was necessary for understanding.
Well, what you described before seemed pretty much a Cartesian model of the mind. In fact the dominant model of the mind, and something that has permeated our commonsense and language – so I’m not saying its necessarily wrong. But Spinoza offers a different view of the mind, and the article discusses some of these differences.
I do consider myself an advocate of holism, at least in the coherentist sense.
This still does not answer my question.
What Spinoza thought of the mind is his business, I’m asking you.
You, as in the person using the pseudonym, Dunamis, to tell me what he thinks the mind is.
Now, we can continue talking through mediating minds, about what we believe or we can talk directly to each other.
quite honestly, I think Spinoza’s ideas are very productive, particularly in the way that they are able to open up the knots caused in commonsense, Cartesian notions. But the subject really is too vast for me to discuss in this thread, which is dedicated to two different conceptions of “believing”. I’m really not interested in that question, in the broadness of your posing. I posed this narrow question, because that is the nature of my interest right now. The mind is many things. To state “the mind is…” in the wide, definitive sense, is nearly meaningless, outside a whole system of beliefs and suppositions.
Forgive my ignorance but what has Spinoza to say regarding computational theories of mind? Particularly, how might his philosophy relate to say, Jerry Fodor? Does it?
It is a broad question with multiple parameters.
Yet, it seems the central point of this thread’s focus, as I see it.
To consider belief as a mental phenomenon, one must first establish a definition of the mind within which belief takes hold.
I do not believe in the mind, as a universal concept (God), but as a tool for individual survival.
The mind is a product of the brain and its only function is to give focus to an individual’s energies by ordering (knowing/understanding) the reality/circumstances within which it finds itself.
For me the universe is not a friendly place of harmonious unity. Its unity is un-harmonious. To act and to think is to show a weakness, it is to seek the unity and harmony you lack.
Harmony would not need to act or to think. It would already be in balance and perfect.
Time is a consequence of instability, where no substance and no absolute and no stability and no one and no being is actual, but only the potential of it.
We are striving for Being and harmony because there is none in us and around us.
Space is but a manifestation of Time - Dimensions but how a primordial unity is being torn apart by entropy.
Even the number one is a hypothetical time/space point with no definite meaning. There is no 1, no more than there is a here or a now or a self or a being.
All of mathematics are based on a hypothetical generalization that is non-existent.
A belief, therefore, is a hypothetical generalization of a plausible possibility.
Even science is based on faith.
These generalizations of absolutes are how the mind interprets the incomprehensible and makes its search for understanding more efficient. It generalizes what is far too complicated (chaotic) into particular laws and rules and concepts and categories and logic and establishes order – whether real or imagined.
Sure. And Spinoza defines the mind as the idea of the body. I am a non-Realist, so I don’t really define things by what the “really are,” but think about definitions in terms of what they do, and what they imply. I am partial to Spinoza’s monism, and his idea of the mind. I am almost partial to the pragmatic idea that the “mind” is only the attribution of beliefs to sufficiently complex systems, as a method of prediction. I can also see relevance in biological models the call the mind an organism’s ability to represent itself to itself, but do not think the “mind” is reducible to such. In my heart, I do not believe that there is a “mind” in the narrow sense that it is usually taken, but rather see “mind” in many phenomena of an infinite gradation. So for me to ask, “what is mind” moves into some rather expansive questions, some of which involve big thoughts like, “what is it to know?” and “what is it to be?”, a bit unnecessary in this thread.
You are right though, the definition or conception of the mind is central to this Cartesian/Spinozist divide, but by narrowing the question, such as the article does, it keeps one from falling into the infinite abyss of questions of dualism, implicit and explicit, that tend not to go anywhere. I think that the Cartesian concept of the “mind” as a separate will that, apart from the body, judges, is simply misguided and limited. It has its uses, but I prefer to think of the mind in a different, broader sense; and Spinoza’s thought that to comprehend is to believe, is a step in that direction.