Choice

[omar]

I believe that the freewill debate should be clarified.
My main objection is to epiphenomenalism, which the Stanford encyclopedia defines as “the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process.” The mind serves only for record keeping the actions upon which it had no effect.
The strength of the epiphenomenalist position is the premise that “anything that can causally contribute to a physical event must itself be a physical event. If a mental event is something other than a physical event, then for it to make any causal contribution of its own in the physical world would require a violation of physical law.”

As neurobiology proves, mental events are founded upon physical events. However the mental event is more than just the sum of it’s physical causes. The mind is a relation, an interaction between neurons, but there is no one perfect connection, but boundless sets of combinations. Our mind, the experience of what it feels like, is one of variety. Consciousness, to be more specific, presents hypotheses about the world and ourselves from which a choice emerges. Choice is predicated upon alternatives, and the business of consciousness is narrowing down to a choice the various paths of action. A neural connection is strengthen above other possible ones. This means that consciousness is not simply a useless echo of activity, but a cause in the strengthening of a physical interaction. In the absence of this virtual laboratory, much, though not all, behavioural activity would be impossible. The adaptive value of consciousness cannot be overstated. I am sure that consciousness can be understood as originating in basic neural events, but it cannot be reduced to only neural events. In doing so, one loses the object one sought to understand. You may have “explained” behavior and failed to understand oneself.

[anon]

Even “founded on” and “originating in” go too far, in my opinion.

Good post.

[Ben_JS]

@omar

The strength of the epiphenomenalist position is the premise that “anything that can causally contribute to a physical event must itself be a physical event. If a mental event is something other than a physical event, then for it to make any causal contribution of its own in the physical world would require a violation of physical law.”

The idea appears to be a mental placebo. What does differing belief in regards to the role of the mental actually result in for the holder of the differing beliefs?

Those who think the mental contributes, will still live as they live. Those who think the mental doesn’t contribute, will still live as they live.

Seems like either belief is irrelevant.

@omar

As neurobiology proves, mental events are founded upon physical events.

This cohers with epiphenomenalism.

@omar

However the mental event is more than just the sum of it’s physical causes. The mind is a relation, an interaction between neurons, but there is no one perfect connection, but boundless sets of combinations.

What is contained within the mental that can’t be attributed back to it’s parts?

Is not the mental a product of neuronal activity, as opposed to the activity itself?

@omar

Our mind, the experience of what it feels like, is one of variety. Consciousness, to be more specific, presents hypotheses about the world and ourselves from which a choice emerges. Choice is predicated upon alternatives, and the business of consciousness is narrowing down to a choice the various paths of action.

Does this not assume that consciousness is not a product of of the physical? Does the brain not hold memory, recieve input via the senses, react with the environment before consciousness emerges?

What makes you think that your experience of choice is not a byproduct of the physical, and not the cause?

@omar

A neural connection is strengthen above other possible ones. This means that consciousness is not simply a useless echo of activity, but a cause in the strengthening of a physical interaction.

How does this follow?

Could you please elaborate this point?

@omar

In the absence of this virtual laboratory, much, though not all, behavioural activity would be impossible. The adaptive value of consciousness cannot be overstated. I am sure that consciousness can be understood as originating in basic neural events, but it cannot be reduced to only neural events. In doing so, one loses the object one sought to understand. You may have “explained” behavior and failed to understand oneself.

Well, you haven’t explained how consciousness isn’t a product of the physical.

[omar]

Hello Joe,

— The idea appears to be a mental placebo. What does differing belief in regards to the role of the mental actually result in for the holder of the differing beliefs?

Those who think the mental contributes, will still live as they live. Those who think the mental doesn’t contribute, will still live as they live.

Seems like either belief is irrelevant.
O- The relevance is in moral questions. Psychologically, either belief may not alter a person’s behavior but it could affect our ideas about desert, praise and blame.

— What is contained within the mental that can’t be attributed back to it’s parts?
O- A few, but for example the randomness of focus and the variety of values. Don’t get me wrong, all this is caused by simple brain states, but each simple cause in the brain corresponds to a multiplicity of effects. Think of a switch that turns on a specific light array, the colors, the angles and height. Or in a car with different drive settings. You set the switch to “sport” and a series of changes occur. One visual input might trigger a variety of thoughts depending on focus, mood, and the construct from memory.

— Is not the mental a product of neuronal activity, as opposed to the activity itself?
O- Yes, the mental state rest upon a brain state. But that isn’t my beef. My disagreement is over the idea that the subsequent mental state serves no effect.

— Does this not assume that consciousness is not a product of of the physical? Does the brain not hold memory, recieve input via the senses, react with the environment before consciousness emerges?
O- And then what? The question is not about the origin but about the utility of such consciousness.

— What makes you think that your experience of choice is not a byproduct of the physical, and not the cause?
O- Think of depression. If depression is only a physical event then managing the chemical levels should eliminate depression without any reference to the world of perception. A happy pill would not be just a metaphor. But depression does not work like that and while drugs can positively affect the sufferer, psychologists still depend on discussions with the patient, their conscious activity, to remove the chemical imbalance itself is not enough to cure depression. Sure, the personality type that makes a person disposed towards depression is a physical factor, which in turn, and this is my point, disposes their conscious perception to be the cause of depression. Further, depression will have negative effects on a sick person, accelerating their demise while a hopeful outlook will improve the chances of recovery. In the medical field consciousness is not treated as nothing but an effect.

@omar

A neural connection is strengthen above other possible ones. This means that consciousness is not simply a useless echo of activity, but a cause in the strengthening of a physical interaction.

How does this follow?
O- If you accept that there is a variety of possible neural connections, and accept that consciousness affects the neural interactions, then it follows that conscious activity is effective, even if as a secondary cause.

— Well, you haven’t explained how consciousness isn’t a product of the physical.
O- Not a point on the debate. It is taken as a given. The epiphenomenalist does not puts in question the existence of conscious states as an effect of neural states, nor do I. They state however that conscious states have no physical effects while I believe they do.