Conceptulization

[coberst]

Conceptulizing

Categorization, the first level of abstraction from Reality is our first level of conceptualization and thus of knowing. Seeing is a process that includes categorization, we see something as an interaction between the seer and what is seen. “Seeing typically involves categorization.”

Our categories are what we consider to be real in the world: tree, rock, animal…Our concepts are what we use to structure our reasoning about these categories. Concepts are neural structures that are the fundamental means by which we reason about categories.

Human categories, the stuff of experience, are reasoned about in many different ways. These differing ways of reasoning, these different conceptualizations, are called prototypes and represent the second level of conceptualization

Typical-case prototype conceptualization modes are “used in drawing inferences about category members in the absence of any special contextual information. Ideal-case prototypes allow us to evaluate category members relative to some conceptual standard…Social stereotypes are used to make snap judgments…Salient exemplars (well-known examples) are used for making probability judgments…Reasoning with prototypes is, indeed, so common that it is inconceivable that we could function for long without them.”

When we conceptualize categories in this fashion we often envision them using spatial metaphors. Spatial relation metaphors form the heart of our ability to perceive, conceive, and to move about in space. We unconsciously form spatial relation contexts for entities: ‘in’, ‘on’, ‘about’, ‘across from’ some other entity are common relationships that make it possible for us to function in our normal manner.

When we perceive a black cat and do not wish to cross its path our imagination conceives container shapes such that we do not penetrate the container space occupied by the cat at some time in its journey. We function in space and the container schema is a normal means we have for reasoning about action in space. Such imaginings are not conscious but most of our perception and conception is an automatic unconscious force for functioning in the world.

Our manner of using language to explain experience provides us with an insight into our cognitive structuring process. Perceptual cues are mapped onto cognitive spaces wherein a representation of the experience is structured onto our spatial-relation contour. There is no direct connection between perception and language.

The claim of cognitive science is “that the very properties of concepts are created as a result of the way the brain and the body are structured and the way they function in interpersonal relations and in the physical world.”

[Phil27of79]

How do we define anything, but by compareison. In fact our first learned behavior is by noting to different actions cause two different reactions from our neighbors. Untill the first cave man pointed at a rock, and grunted,… ever sence then people associated a grunt with a rock,… and the first language was created. This allowed the vocal chords to go through some restructering untill it allowed more obtuse vocal sounds. And our brains got bigger from the swelling of too much thought.

Yet what about the abstract to life? What about the fact I have felt the warmth of love from a human, but not from any animal. Is it because the brain of an elephant isn’t big enough. Or is it because we react to the soul witch gives us different desires then the animals,… all our different desires are represented in our arts.

[coberst]

“Cognitive linguists have argued that one concept (e.g. love) can be understood through several different metaphors (e.g., LOVE IS A JOURNEY, LOVE IS INSANITY, LOVE IS AN OPPONENT, LOVE IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY). Murphy warns that such multiple metaphors would result in inconsistency in the mental representation since some of them are inconsistent with one another. Gibbs replies that concepts are not fixed, static structures but rather temporary, dynamic representations that are created on the spot in working memory on the basis of generic and episodic information in long-term memory (which he calls “knowledge” as opposed to “concept”). He argues that this dynamic view of concepts allows us to conceptualize one experience in different ways at different times and to access different aspects of one piece of knowledge. For example, The LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor might be appropriate to create a particular conceptualization of love in certain situations, whereas LOVE IS AN OPPONENT might be suited for creating another concept of love in other situations. Gibbs argues that concepts are independent of each other as a temporary representation in working memory apart from source domain information in long-term memory, thereby accommodating multiple metaphors while avoiding the problem raised by Murphy.”

cogsci.ucsd.edu/~faucon/ray.html