Wells, here is the crux of the argument in a nutshell. it depends on the meaning of cognition. Since You refer to the literal development through evolutionary changes, Yiu are being reductive. However, such logic invariably fails on that level, which the positivists are unwilling to admit. Cognition may entail a lot more facets than simply functional derivatives, they may have others. function is an idea thought up after the fact, mutation may just happen to be a haphazard mix. Which happen to coincide with some environmental changes. the environment may have changed on account of finding greener pastures. This so leans on the nature/nurture argument in defense of morphological changes. This debate had serious consequences that’s described in a Viennese biologist’s biography, about a frog which supposed to have evolved some anatomical parts on account of changes in environment. Utility, or function may had to do with the loss of the tail, with which we were equipped with in our early development. Why do some fish fly, why do some turtles stay on land while others need to be submerged in water? utility is not completely a sufficient explanation, it may be more a haphazard event of chance. Our positivist literal understanding of utility and function are hence, not results of reductive developments, but implied facts based on study of changes of morphology, with subsequent description. Positivism has developed as a consequence of legitimizing a uniform understanding, of support, which can not be literally described.
I am being linguistically functional … not pondering on the meaning of life or meaning of consciousness or the origins of such things.
Things (especially nouns) are defined by their characteristics and by their function. This is how language works. If we cannot do this then our language fails us.
Consciousness becomes aware of things and it functions to create internalised maps of its environment. Its environment includes things perceived by the senses, its concept of self, emotions, feelings, thoughts, memories, and even its own maps. When a new object(or changed object) appears to consciousness it compares its awareness to the existing maps and changes its behaviour/feelings/emotions and/or updates the map. If a thing does not do this then it cannot be called conscious.
granted linguistics has a function to present objects to consciousness, but the triad goes like this:
Linguistics>objects>consciousness, and here is the clincher, beneath the level of linguistics, then, there is no presentation. What of the contention, that it is like this:
Consciousness>objects<linguistics? this would devolve the object below the level of selective awareness? Here, a functional linguistics would become inadequate to explain it. The language would still explain the function of presentation by way of symbolic transference to meaning, but that’s all. It cannot go above or beneath the transference.
The object would and the objective would becom flat lined, one dimensional, and reductive.
Within an inductive language, a production of meaning would no find its place, or function, except if replaced by probable meaning and utility. the presentation would not guarantee an intended interpretation. Therefore function would become uncertain. You would not even need to delve into questions relating to ‘reality’.
They must be considered as one way containing two ways:
1,1) Linguistics => objects => consciousness,
1,2) Consciousness => objects => linguistics.
Both ways (1,1, and 1,2) of the one way (1) are necessary - for example: for language development and language acquisition, and also for consciousness development and consciousness acquisition.
Yep.
Is someone suggesting that language causes consciousness? 
No, not really. The question is, the function of language in determining reality. this was Wells’s proposition. And this simply can not be done, because of the very opposite fact, the limitations of the function of language to describe anything but the interpreted meaning upon the presentation of reality through language. This presentation will have no correlation between the objective of the presentation and the resulting object presented. ‘Object’ is used not necessarily in the material sense.
???
It was?
That isn’t what I got out of it. 
When you say “reality”, you are talking about objective existence, right?
That is not at all what I was suggesting.
Simply suggesting that language defines things in terms of its characteristics and its function. We define consciousness through language and so consciousness must have characteristics and a function. If consciousness did not have a function and did not have characteristics then we would not be talking about it (even if it still existed as a so called objective reality). It would be impossible to talk about it - but we may be able to experience it but that experience could not be communicated.
I agree with James in that consciousness itself creates a map of reality to the extent that it even creates a map of what it perceives itself to be. Since we are writing about consciousness then part of that map is created through, and with, written language. A different type of map would form if we were talking about it through oral language and a different map would form if we were contemplating consciousness through meditation. Either way, a map (generic image) is still formed.
So, in defining consciousness … as James suggests … it is remote re-cognition. Or taking in sense perceptions and comparing these sense perceptions to maps and then adjusting behaviours and/or maps in such a manner that benefits consciousness’ perception of self (which is also a map). Even the notion of self is remote to consciousness and must involve re-cognition.
Well, at least that is what I assume James is talking about… I probably have it all wrong.