My first response to him included a response to his word, “grappling“.
I’ll keep that in mind.
greenfuse:
From my own frame of mind, this part:
All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was “somehow” able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter “somehow” became living matter “somehow” became conscious matter “somehow” became self-conscious matter.
Then those here who actually believe that what they believe about all of this reflects, what, the ontological truth about the human condition itself?
Then those who are compelled in turn to insist on a teleological component as well. Usually in the form of one or another God.
Meanwhile, philosophers and scientists and theologians have been grappling with this profound mystery now for thousands of years.
In other words, from the perspective of some, not only is the universe essentially meaningless, but any meaning that we ourselves either acquire or dispense reflects but the only possible reality there could ever have been.
greenfuse:
Imagine then how ironic “the human condition” becomes if it turns out that we are only interacting in a wholly determined universe, or in a Sim world, or in one or another concoction of The Matrix.
greenfuse:
Is this communication actually conscious though? And what if it turns out that trees and other plants do have at least some semblance of awareness. What of, among other things, vegetarianism?
And, again, given The Gap and Rummy’s Rule, don’t we all go to the grave more or less oblivious as to where human interactions do fit into the cosmogenic whole? How can we grasp a definitive understanding of the human species when we don’t even know why anything exists at all? Let alone why it exists as it does and not some other way.
The irony or quandary or conundrum here [for me] is that all we really have to pin down the brain is the brain itself. And if human brains do in fact have intrinsic properties, how on Earth does one explain the terrible conflicts that every now and then catapult us into calamitous world wars.
greenfuse:
Here, it seems, we are all in over our heads. To the extent the brain itself is “in control” of what we do, how does it make sense to hold anyone responsible at all…for anything?
And to the extent that we do possess at least some measure of autonomy, millions of men and women around the globe are convinced that such things as meaning and morality revolve entirely around their own ontological assessment of the human condition.
greenfuse:
Here are some examples of intrinsic properties:
Mass
Shape
Atomic Structure
I don’t know what the connection is that rules out being assholes, say, if one/something has intrinsic properties.
That’s part of the quandary. If you are an asshole to another and they are an asshole to you, to what extent does this revolve around those things that are “beyond our control”?
greenfuse:
Which is why, over and again, I aways suggest that what is crucial in regard to both meaning and morality is not what we believe “in our head”, but the extent to which we are able to demonstrate to others that all rational human beings are, in fact, obligated to believe it in turn.
greenfuse:
Well, in being as “fractured and fragmented” as “I” am “here and now” in regard to both meaning and morality, I wouldn’t really know much about that of late.
How does this relate to what I wrote?
Sure, but my point was that we tend to be incredulous about other people’s ontologies and potential assumptions and not our own. Another way to look at this is: we can work out what someone assumes by seeing what they question and see as unproven and what we do not question. Our incredulity is selective, and if we look at what we question and what we do not, we can see our own assumptions, especially around ontology.
I talked about that issue, specifically.

And, again, given The Gap and Rummy’s Rule, don’t we all go to the grave more or less oblivious as to where human interactions do fit into the cosmogenic whole? How can we grasp a definitive understanding of the human species when we don’t even know why anything exists at all? Let alone why it exists as it does and not some other way.
I’m not sure what this has to do with consciousness in plants. It is now pretty much accepted in science that animals are conscious. That wasn’t the case in science in the 50s/60s. And there was enormous resistance until the evidence became pretty overwhelming that the better default position was to assume they were. Animists and and animal trainers and pet owners around the world would have giggled about how hard it was to convince the scientific community that their ontological default there was loopy. Sure, we may not find out all sorts of things, but then we have found out stuff and perhaps will find out more. It’s certainly worth looking at both.
But the point, again, is that we all have ontological assumptions, even those included in what one assumes we can and can’t know. We may not hold these assumptions with full certainty, but they show in how we react to the ontologies of others, some of whom may actually be on firmer ground.

Here, it seems, we are all in over our heads. To the extent the brain itself is “in control” of what we do, how does it make sense to hold anyone responsible at all…for anything?
And to the extent that we do possess at least some measure of autonomy, millions of men and women around the globe are convinced that such things as meaning and morality revolve entirely around their own ontological assessment of the human condition.
I still don’t see why you are surprised that despite brains having intrinsic properties, we are violent. What do those two things have to do with each other? Did you think that because brains have intrinsic properties (any in particular) we wouldn’t be violent? Why?

That’s part of the quandary. If you are an asshole to another and they are an asshole to you, to what extent does this revolve around those things that are “beyond our control”?
Like determinism? Again, I don’t see how this relates to brains having intrinsic properties (or extrinsic properties) somehow makes it surprising that we are violent.

Which is why, over and again, I aways suggest that what is crucial in regard to both meaning and morality is not what we believe “in our head”, but the extent to which we are able to demonstrate to others that all rational human beings are, in fact, obligated to believe it in turn.
Obligated?
If we go back to what I orginally reacted to: you were incredulous about panpsychism. Here below…

I’m sorry, but it always boggles my mind how others are able to think up things like this.
Then you made the good point that your own assumptions may well be as outlandish. My whole point was that we tend not to even notice that our ontological positions have unproven assumptions, that is when they have these. So, it was great that you realized your own assumptions might well be as outlandish as Goffs. But it seems that you still see other positions as more in need of justification than your own. In other words if we read that post, there was this great pause, where you focused for a moment on your own position’s potential lack of justification. But the overall message is Goff is ungrounded.

Well, in being as “fractured and fragmented” as “I” am “here and now” in regard to both meaning and morality, I wouldn’t really know much about that of late.
And again, that is my point: you can see what your ontological assumptions are by what you are incredulous about and expect more justification for and what you are not incredulous about. It may seem like it is all up in the air for you, but once one looks at where the incredulity is aimed and where it is not, we can see where our assumptions are. You may well have mixed reactions to all sorts of things and lack certainty about many things, but you also have certainties and assumptions.

Ship of Thebes
Anyway.
I was skimming this article:
“A Hungarian version of the story features ‘Lajos Kossuth’s pocket knife’, having its blade and handle continuously replaced but still being referred to as the very knife of the famous statesman. As a proverbial expression it is used for objects or solutions being repeatedly renewed and gradually replaced to an extent that it has no original parts.”
Source: Ship of Theseus – Philosophical Thought
What this tells you is that teleology is more fundamental than material, and that the entire universe is the original material, so really the parts were not materially replaced, but the parts had teleology in them that remained even if the universe’s material shifted.
That is why when you change the shape or configuration of a protein, it denatures. It has teleology in it.
Essence.
…with the caveat that essence without material demonstration is empty.
So perhaps there is a sort of mutual fundamental thing going on.
But it includes the actual use …which is a third thing.
So let’s apply this to the brain. If you don’t use it for its intended purpose it is as good as a hat rack.
Philosophy cannot tell you anything your mother hasn’t always told you.
Or it tells (is interpreted by some) that persistance is an illusion. I liked your perspective and the jump to proteins.
Whoever those “some” are… They aren’t advertising executives. For example.

Or perhaps what ‘intrinsic properties’ means.
Are you familiar with this?

Yes, your mass could change over time, but that’s not the issue,
If I remain (person=person) while the value of my mass changes, my mass is not intrinsic to my I (me). My existence does not necessitate that the value of my mass persists unchanged. If that were the case, I could not have developed into adulthood from a zygote.
Or as the Very Reverend Horton Who says, “A person is a person no matter the mass of their…”’(checks the Book of Seuss) “…bank account.”
Oh, never mind. This was about something else.

If I remain (person=person) while the value of my mass changes, my mass is not intrinsic to my I (me).
You are using intrinsic in a difference sense than it is used in the phrase ‘intrinsic properties’ in philosophy. Your mass isn’t relational. If someone says mass is intrinsic, you are taking this to mean that if you weigh 60 kilos and then 55kilos, you are not longer you. But the phrase isn’t used about identity, it’s used about whether the property is dependend on relations or is a kind of internal property, not dependent on relations. Weight is dependent on relations because it depend on the gravity involved, thus masses of nearby objects. YOu have less weight on the top of Everest. But your mass is the same. It does not change due to changes in relations. One can think of identity related to instrinsic or extrinsic properties. This isn’t an identity issue, the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties.
I think you are thinking of essential properties or identity conditions.
For example, instead of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties you are think of essential properties vs. accidental or non-essential properties.
- Essential properties are those that an object must have in order to be what it is. For example, some might argue that being a human is an essential property of you—if you weren’t human, you wouldn’t be you.
- Accidental properties are those that can change without affecting the object’s identity. For example, the color of your hair is likely accidental—you would still be you if you dyed your hair.
Intrinsic vs extrinsic has to do with whether the property is dependant on relations with other things to exist. Essential vs. Non-essential has to do with whether the property is necessary for identity. The former distinction has to do with whether it is a dynamic relation property or one that relations do not affect - in the moment. The latter has to do with identity and/or category of the thing with those properties.
If being biologically human were essential to being a person, you might have a point.
Or mass, for that matter (mas o meno).

If being biologically human were essential to being a person, you might have a point.
It’s not me having a point; it’s me describing what the terms mean. After one’s spouse dies on could argue that one is no longer the same person. Even though we are dealing with an extrinsic, relation based set of properties. You’re interpreting intrinsic in a way that it is not used in philosophy. Both intrinsic and extrinsic properties can be essential to identity. But non-essential characteristics are not essential to identity. You are conflating intrinsic with essential (to identity).

After one’s spouse dies on could argue that one is no longer the same person.
A person does not ever change into a different person with a different identity. That doesn’t make sense.

developed into adulthood from a zygote
Granted. Some adults are still emotional zygotes.
I’m not arguing that position. I am trying to show that intrinsic properties does not mean what you seem to think it means. I pointed out that one can consider extrinsic properties to be tied to identity, which is why I brought that up. To try to make clear that the term intrinsic does not mean essential to identity.

Or it tells (is interpreted by some) that persistance is an illusion.
So… some… would say there is nothing intrinsic? …essential?
I’m trying. Don’t give up.
Does the Cosmos Have a Purpose?
Raymond Tallis argues intently against universal intention.
These unresolved issues [above] do not inhibit Goff from building on panpsychism and embracing its central thesis in Why?. With consciousness, he claims, comes purpose
Okay, back to the acting profession? We watch something on TV or we watch a film at the theatre. Or we see a live performance up on the stage. The purpose of the plot and the dialogue however can have little or nothing to do with the actors themselves. Instead, they are often predicated entirely on the director’s assessment of the world around us. A director, say, who also wrote the script. Or it might go back to the author of a book or a screenplay. What’s crucial, however [for me], is how we can dupe ourselves into confusing the role [and the politics] that a particular actor is playing with the actor him or herself. Only some determinists among us take it further out on the metaphysical limb. How? By arguing that even the director, the screenwriter and/or the author him/herself are no less entirely scripted by Nature itself…the creator of everything?
Only the universe creating everything would seem to be all that much more problematic. As opposed to one or another God and religion. In other words, how would one go about attributing a teleology to, say, the brute facticity of the Big Bang.
The laws of nature have goals built into them, and those goals can be universal because consciousness is also universal: “fine-tuning and rational matter fit together like a key fits the lock it was made for”.
Sheer speculation? Of course, up to a point, it has to be given how much more we need to discover about human consciousness itself.
Nobel-Prize-winning physicist Steven Weinberg’s notorious assertion that “the more we comprehend the universe, the more meaningless it seems” is here turned on its head. Courtesy of physics, the totality of things is seen to be radiant and that consciousness is imbued with consciousness.
And yet we can imagine all sorts of amazing discoveries that will be made over the centuries to come. On the other hand, how many of us will still be around? So, many will go to the grave convinced that what they think they understand about the universe “here and now” really, really is The Way It Is.
Here and in Heaven?
Some philosopher might argue that nothing is intrinsic. If a philosopher claimed that nothing is an intrinsic property, they would be arguing that all properties are extrinsic.
Intrinsic properties are characteristics that something has “in itself,” independent of anything else. For example, the mass of a rock could be considered an intrinsic property because it doesn’t depend on anything outside the rock itself.
Extrinsic properties, on the other hand, depend on the relationship of the object to something else. For example, “being next to a tree” is an extrinsic property, because it requires the existence of both the rock and the tree.
If a philosopher argues that nothing is intrinsic, they are suggesting that every property is somehow dependent on external factors or relations. This would imply that all properties we attribute to objects are relative to the surrounding environment or context. The object, in isolation, has no independent or self-contained characteristics.
This perspective could lead to a view of reality, where nothing exists with properties independent of the system or context it’s in. How would such a philosopher handle the mass issue: Well, there are some ideas in modern physics that mass depends on fields, so maybe it isn’t merely in and of itself. That argument would be above my paygrade.

things that directly parallel cognitve based behavior: communication, sharing water with damaged fellow trees, taking defensive measures (often after being communicated with by other trees, in the face of threats…there are stuidies indicating that trees remember things. That experiences affect future tree behavior. There’s also adaptive growth.
Since we lack a test for consciousness
How does your end sentence match the prior part of the quote? Is cognitive-based behavior not a test for consciousness? Are competency tests to give consent or stand trial not tests for consciousness?
Consider design/intelligence inference in “archaeology, forensic science, intellectual property law, insurance claims investigation, cryptography, random number generation, and the search for extra terrestrial intelligence (SETI)” - Douglas Groothuis

I think, in general, that one needs to see if one’s own ontology has been justified before assuming others have to justify theirs as if we have already done that with our own.
Yes. As Jesus would say, “Who is the neighbor?” (aka turn the Turing test inward)