Counter-example to Goldman's Causality of Knowledge

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
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Goldman states that for S to know P, the fact that p has to be causally connected to S’s believing that P. I am attempting to prove that the conditions necessary to form a belief that constitues a part of a causal connection allow for the development of false beliefs, thus making causal connections insufficient for knowledge.

For example, goldman states that:

P= A specific volcano erupted
Q= There are rocks of lava near this volcano
S’s (the man) belief of Q comes from his perception of the lava rocks (seeing, touching, etc) - I have no problem with this assertion

Goldman goes on to state that S’s belief of Q, combined with S’s belief of how these rocks are formed based on experience/testimony/etc (r) leads to his belief that P, and that his belief of P in this case is sufficient to prove that S knows that P. Goldman does state that if there was something that occurred which invalidated this chain of causal connections then S would not know that P.

The part I have the problem with is the validity of S’s belief of how these rocks are formed (r). What if his belief of how these rocks are formed is incorrect, even though all empirical data has served to prove his belief of r?

An example I came up with:

P= A flood occurred
Q= There are materials buried under a layer of sediment

S believes that Q because he is doing research on floods and found these materials buried under the sediment. Also, in every other flood that he has researched, lets say there are one hundred, there have been materials buried under layers of sediment. Also, his professor, a credible and reliable source, told him that there are always materials buried under a layer of sediment after a flood. From this data, S infers that there are always materials buried under a layer of sediment after a flood (r). S’s inference of r in this case is correct based on Goldman’s requirements for causal connections. However, it is not truly correct because there has been one flood that occured that has not buried materials under sediment, but this fact is unknown to S. According to Goldman, S’s belief of Q, combined with his belief that r, is enough to qualify knowledge that there was a flood (p).

This is all causally connected, but i feel that (r) in this case is not an acceptable inference/belief. It must follow that S believes P based on inference partially from the belief (r) which isn’t true, thus S does not know P.

I am essentially arguing that the necessary conditions for a belief, namely (r), as outlined by Goldman, can be satisfied without the belief being true. Therefore, I think that a belief (s’s belief that P) inferred from a true belief (S’s belief that Q), and a false belief (S’s belief that R) does not constitute a legitimate belief, and does not constitute knowledge as a consequence.

Let me know what you think…

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wvuphilmaj7 You do not know what you are saying

But how do you know something is INaccurate until proven otherwise. In an experiment, if a rat touches a cheese and gets an electric shock, what makes the rat think next time it touches the cheese it WON"T get an electric shock.

Knowledge is accumulated evidence, and is true/valid until proven otherwise.

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no need to be harsh, i did not claim to know what im talking about, i was just looking for some insight… ive taken one philosophy class prior to this theory of knowledge class i’m in now. I am just not ready to accept goldman’s theory because i’m more on the side of the skeptic and would like to prove that perceptions/experience are not enough to constitute knowledge. How can (r) be an “acceptable” belief if current evidence, unknown to S but known to some, contradicts (r) as derived from his inferences? It seems that the 100 experiences and the professor’s testimony would be enough to fulfill Goldman’s requirements for the belief but it doesn’t account for the possibility that there may be evidence that is unknown to S but known to others who just havent spoken to S yet. Sure, i’m willing to say S knows that P to the best of his knowledge thus far, but to say that S knows that P without any qualifier just doesnt seem right to me.

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And i don’t think you can say that knowledge is accumulated experience, how does the mouse know that it WILL shock him? He can only believe/infer/assume that it will if hes only basing it on previous experiences.

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You do not know the unknown - see Donald Rumsfield for more info.

From you are wrong, hope that helps.

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i would like a better argument against adopting a false belief than simply “you can’t know the unknown.” of course we can’t know the unknown but doesn’t the possibility of the unknown deny knowledge?

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there is no premise that states that these rocks (r) specifically came from this volcano (p)…

these rocks (r) could have appeared from this (p) or any volcano…

more importantly: could these rocks have been created outside of a volcano?

-Imp

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HI guys,

Sorry to interrupt! But we can (and do get to) know the unknown - it’s called discovery. What is unknown to-day might will, for all we can tell, be known tomorrow. However, what we cannot (ever) know is the unknowable.

Cheers

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w, I’m with you on this and it’s something I’m just recently coming to terms with myself on causality.

There are 3 major fallacies that come to mind being:
Circular cause and consequence- “Which came first, the chicken or the egg?”
Fallacy of the single cause- Causal oversimplification is a specific kind of false dilemma where conjoint possibilities are ignored. In other words, the possible causes are assumed to be “A or B or C” when “A and B and C” or “A and B and not C” (etc.) are not taken into consideration.
Post hoc ergo propter hoc, Latin for “after this, therefore because (on account) of this”- a logical fallacy (of the questionable cause variety) which states, “Since that event followed this one, that event must have been caused by this one.”

And how can these be fallacies and not legitimate questions of the supposed absoluteness of causality? There can be no way of knowing exactly what causes what or what effects are due to the cause.

It still depends on speculation, and it’s just pointless to say there is cause and effect instead of plain ‘events’.

Causes can be effects, and if one is connected to the other how is it time and our perception of past and future is any authority on them.

Is our prospect of time and quantum mechanics the law or…the trend for today?

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Hi wvuphilmaj7,

One difficulty with Goldman’s analysis is that he fails to note the distinction between (a) basing one’s belief on evidential propositions, and (b) being caused to believe by evidential facts.

On understanding (a), it is conceivable that one could believe that lava rocks are formed by volcanic eruption when it is not the case that they (always) are. An evidential proposition is that lava rocks are formed by volcanic eruption, and it is reasonable to base a belief that they always are formed in this way from this single, evidential proposition. The belief, in this instance, is evidentially justified, yet false, and cannot, therefore, be declared as knowledge.

On understanding (b), that lava rocks are formed by volcanic eruptions is not a basis for a belief, but the cause of it. The mountain’s erupting at some time is the beginning of a causal chain of inference that leads to the belief that it took place, and a link in that chain is the evidential fact that lava rocks, observed, are formed by volcanic action, and are observed in an appropriate location.

Goldman also demands more of causal inference than it normally attributed to it. The observation that men eventually die causes the belief that all men are mortal. But, significantly, the inference that Socrates is mortal given this evidential proposition, and that Socrates is a man, is logical, not causal.

Regards,

R

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thank you echo and remark for your replies, you’ve given me some excellent food for thought.

Remark, I like the idea that Goldman doesn’t distinguish between a and b. I like the idea of using causal connections to form beliefs, but i am of the persuasion that a belief is all this could ever be, and not called knowledge.

Echo, I like the fact that you brought speculation up in your response. I agree with your thought that there is no way of knowing that B was caused by A. Just because it can hold true in a certain case doesn’t mean it is a belief that you can base knowledge upon. All it can do is lead to another belief and no matter how many times it is proven true, it still is not KNOWN.