Critical theory: ideology and ontology?

Critical theory is the academic expression of postmodern thought. It’s the choosing of a filtered lens in which to view any concept, idea, movie, scientific discipline, song, tv show, milkshake, or what have you.

As far as I understand it, it’s a bit of a free-for-all. First, you choose a ‘grand narrative’ du jour and then you can jump in head first. You can examine the intricacies of the Golden Girls through a Marxist ideology, or challenge the rational science born of the Enlightenment if you please.

I suppose the concept of studying varying structures through disparate, oblique ideologies can bear fruit. But it seems like a lot of critical theorists are really just trading criticisms in the form of ideology “A” vs. ideology “B” though. And I’m not real sure that’s productive.

Anyway, my question is then, what’s the difference between critical theorists’ ideological assumptions and ontological assumptions?

Are the words ideology and ontology synonymous in the context of critical theory, or is one always contained within the other?

"Anyway, my question is then, what’s the difference between critical theorists’ ideological assumptions and ontological assumptions? "

My familiarity with critical theory is principally through its application to critical legal studies, but with that in mind:

There are two ways that ‘ideology’ can be used in this context, in a ‘critical’ and a ‘neutral sense’. ‘Critical’ ideology always implies unjust domination of one group over another. Hence, A Crit theorist will never subscribe to any ‘ideology’ in that sense. However, if one use’s it in a ‘neutral’ sense, to mean the ‘ideas’ of the crit theorists (as I assume you were), then they must subsribe to an ideology.

I think your conjecture is correct; ontological assumptions and ideological assumptions are synonymous. CT are social constructivists so there can be no reality beyond one’s particular ideology.

For example; liberal property rights are supposed to stem from a realist metaphysic. That metaphysic itself (according to CT) acts ideologically to supress a particular class. The realist metaphysic therefore only exists because of an assumed epistemological individualism. The subject-object distinction, which CT rejects as an ideology, is a precondition of metaphysical realism.

To CT one’ s socially constructed ideology is one’s ontology.

Maybe that was a bit abstruse…

Pearlsbeforewine wrote:

No! It definitely made sense. Thanks for the clarification!