I will be turning in this paper tomorrow morning.
I would greatly appreciate any minor inconsistencies, contradictions of mine, or errors to be brought to my attention if they are indeed present.
While I appreciate it, major overhauls to my thesis are not needed since it is in fact due tomorrow and time does not allow for such renovations to take place.
Thank you in advance to all those who might happen upon this and feel inclined to add something.
In Plato's Gorgias, Socrates will state that paying just penalty for one's wrong doings will ultimately be in one's own best interests. He concludes from this the understanding that since it is beneficial to pay a just penalty, one should wish that his enemies never pay just penalty for their wrong doings, going on to recommend one should do what is in their power to prevent their enemies from being judged justly. By carefully examining good and evil as Socrates speaks of them leading to this argument and its premises, it becomes clear that if intentionally acting to prevent one's enemies from being brought to justice is in and of itself one of the greatest evils, then in no way is it recommendable by Socrates as the best course of action.
Socrates claims to Polus that the doer of injustice ought to pay just penalty for their actions, for it is in their own best interests to do so. He begins by establishing that an object's shape and color are beautiful on account of pleasure or benefit, or a combination of the two, which is derived from them, 'beautiful' being the goodness or fineness that object posses to us the beholder. He then links this idea of 'fine' to all the sciences, stating that their degree of fineness be judged by their creation of pleasure or benefit, or of both. He is simply drawing a correlation here between truly just things and goodness, which seems universally agreeable in this context. Polus accepts that fine things must then be either beneficial, or pleasant, or both, such as in the case of justice. Second, Socrates establishes that when an agent commits an action upon another, there is necessarily a patient of this specific action. That is to say, if one acts upon someone, those acted upon receive that action. Third, he establishes that when one acts in a specific manner, those whom which this action effects are effected thusly. That is to say, if one attacks violently, it follows that those effected are in turn attacked violently, emphasizing the passive condition of the effected, "...concerning all things: that which suffers suffers such a thing as what the does does" (Gorgias 476c,d, 64). Polus agrees to all of this.
Next, Socrates connects the initial premise, just things are fine things based on their apparent benefit or pleasure or both, with the newly understood passive condition of the effected, concluding that to be punished justly is to suffer justly. In the context of the first premise, to be punished justly is to suffer fine things, for justice is surely fine based on its apparent benefit. From this, Socrates claims to be punished justly is to be benefited, for it is to suffer fine things. This benefit comes from the sole's betterment, being released from a great evil. Socrates then draws from other human conditions to further illustrate his point, saying injustice is a poverty of the sole as it relates to one's health, a sickness as it relates to one's constitution.
When prompted by Socrates, Polus will agree that of the three examples, injustice of the sole is the most shameful. He does so based on their previous agreement, the most shameful thing being that which provides the greatest pain, or harm, or both. (Gorgias 477c, 65) Questioning Polus, he inquires if it is on a basis of pain that injustice is worse than poverty or sickness, if it is most shameful. Polus does not believe so. Socrates then concludes it must be on the other basis, of great harm or evil, that injustice of the sole be most shameful. Socrates goes on to analogize between those who cure the sickness being doctors in the case of health, and those who cure injustice being judges in the case of one's sole. He continues the metaphor, saying one is happiest when not afflicted with the pain and harm of poverty and sickness. Like its counterparts, one is also happiest when not afflicted with the harm and evil of injustice in one's sole, that this is what is best. Socrates then considers if one were afflicted with one of these things, a lesser degree of happiness could still be achieved through that thing's removal from one's being. It is then of the greatest good one's sole be cured of injustice. for this is most beneficial. Socrates goes on, saying the tyrant must live worst of all, if they live in a state of perpetual injustice, never being cured of their sickness by a judge and thus living without happiness. It follows then that it is of the greatest evils to commit injustice, second only to not paying just penalty for one's wrong doings, as both will lead to the most shameful form of unhappiness (Gorgias 479d, 68). It would then be best, according to this newly defined concept, that one seek out just punishment for their wrong doings, for doing so cures their sole of the greatest evils, while simultaneously providing the greatest good.
Socrates will then turn to the opposite example, saying if ever one must do evil to another, like that of an enemy, one must guard themselves from suffering injustice at that enemy's hands. He continues, saying one should see to it by any means, acting or speaking, that that tyrant, his enemy, not be brought to a judgment and pay just penalty. He concludes that if such an enemy does go to trail, one should contrive and scheme to have their charges dismissed, so as to prevent their just punishment. In this instance rhetoric should be used against the accusers and judge of one's enemies to institute false opinion of that enemies wrong doings. Socrates' motivation for this thinking is rooted in his understanding that by preventing just punishment, he is not allowing his enemies to be cured of their sole's sickness, therefore preventing their benefit.
To prove the contradiction in this final conclusion, we will first look to some of Socrates' understandings of good and evil that have been exemplified beforehand. Early in the dialogue, while discussing a rhetorician's relation to justice, Socrates tells Gorgias that he is the type of man that finds pleasure in being refuted by truth. He believes a false opinion's refutation is an alleviation of injustice from the bearer’s sole, "For I think that nothing is so great and evil for a human being as false opinion about the things that our argument now happens to be about." (Gorgias 458a,b, 40). Clearly Socrates believes false opinions of the mind are very unjust things, going far enough to call them the 'greatest evil' as they relate to understanding. If it is shown that the greatest evil the mind should be concerned with is baring false opinion, it follows that a false opinion's refutation within the mind is one of, if not the, greatest good. From this, we develop an understanding of true and false opinion as they relate to justice and injustice of the mind. Socrates emphasizes the value or pursuing justice, and thus, right opinion of the mind, in his penalty argument when he says "Happiest, therefore, is he who does not have badness in his sole, since this came to light as the greatest evils" (Gorgias 478d, 67).
Later on Socrates and Gorgias discuss whether or not tyrants truly wield power. While trying to convince Gorgias of the differences between ‘wish’ and ‘want’, Socrates will show an example of a tyrant acting wrongfully murderous, and how this individual is wretched for the injustice they have committed. So wretched, in fact, that they are pitiable by Socrates. He goes on to say such the tyrant is more wretched and thus more pitiable then those who are killed unjustly, for those who are killed unjustly have committed no wrong doing, “In this way, that doing injustice happens to be the greatest of evils” (Gorgias 469b, 53). From this, we draw a meaning of evil as it relates to our actions, that an unjust action is the most evil action. In his endeavors to disprove rhetoric, Socrates goes on to say that the pursuit of justice in one’s actions is of the greatest good, similarly to his belief that the pursuit of just opinion in one’s mind is of the greatest good. Combining these meanings, it becomes clear that in Socrates’ opinion, to relieve the mind of one’s self or others of false opinion is most just, and therefore, of the greatest good, where as to institute false opinion is of the greatest evils. This is clearly what Socrates sees fit to do in life, and can explain his pursuits of philosophy, in that they are purely beneficial to himself and those he makes right opinion of.
If the above is true, how can his aforementioned conclusion be correct? How can Socrates recommend we institute false opinion in the mind of the judge when he judges our enemy? While it may at first seem beneficial to institute a life of misery and disempowerment upon those who would do us harm and pain, doing so would require we ourselves commit one of the greatest evils, intentionally pursing unjust action by instituting false belief in the mind of the judge, or in other words, intentionally instituting the greatest evil as it relates to the mind. In doing so, we would bring injustice and thus unhappiness to our very own sole, for it is best that we pursue justice in both our mind’s opinion and our actions, and worst that we intentionally pursue the institution of false belief in our own our the minds of others. Socrates cannot then recommend we act in such a manor towards our enemies’ judges, for doing so would disregard the understandings of good and evil we have used in coming to such a conclusion. By his own understandings, doing so would be most evil and harmful for us, thus unbeneficial, and would incur both great shame and injustice upon our soles.