Something is. This is perhaps the most basic statement we can ever make, acknowledging the basic existence of… something. This statement seems to ultimately ground every other possible statement. Taken at its widest possible meaning, ‘something is’ includes all of this is, is exhaustive, in other words. Or, it is NOT the case that ‘something is’ which is outside the purview of the exhaustive is itself.
So, why do we feel the need to derive the existence of this “exhaustive is”? We all seem to feel this need, it seems a very naturally human need to try and feel like we understand the why and how of the is. Understanding the is’s hows is certainly not a fruitless task since this immediately launches us from exhaustivity into particularity of the experiential. However once we try to understand the why of the is it becomes hopeless. If is is exhaustive, then deriving it can make no sense at all, can have no meaning. At first we see how rejecting all external derivations of is is necessary, and we are lead into a sort of “derivation of the necessity of the is”. The is is necessary, it is because it… is. But of course this definition tells us nothing we already didn’t know: the is is; there is an is; something is.
The claim that the is “could not have been otherwise” is perhaps the only way in which we can meaningfully address the question of the why of the is. This attempt seems insufficient, and it also seems unfounded, since the mere fact of a thing’s existence does not imply a “could not have been otherwise” unless we subscribe to an unwavering sort of “determinism”. Therefore we see that determinism (or its little sibling, empirical science) is implicitly the only way to cultivate a ground upon which addressing the question of the why of the is becomes even remotely possibly meaningful at all. This might go a long way to explaining the attraction to the empirical position: less thoughtful people utilize religious images to generate the ground from which the question of the why of the is may appear to be meaningfully posed; more thoughtful people (who question themselves and their premises with the intention of eradicating inconsistencies) move from religion into science as the means of generating this same ground.
But is anything even accomplished, does it even make sense to attempt to approach the question of the why of the is in the first place? All this postulating seems firstly in the service of psychological need for certainty, a need to enclose the sum of all experientiality. We experience the question of the why of the is in the mere formulation of this question, and this question is indeed very basic and occurs to most everyone at some point; this question itself is the historical basis for all philosophy.
So man feels a need to approach what appears before him. Does this need, which itself appears as psychological in nature, sufficiently justify man’s seemingly endless attempts to develop a ground from which approaching the question of the why of the is can (seem to) be meaningfully undertaken? Is there any continued utility to us to remain trapped within the gaze of this question, trapped under the weight of the history of philosophy itself? Perhaps understanding that we don’t have to understand the why of the is is the only way for philosophy to mature and grow beyond its self-imposed limitations and become… something else, something more? Something new, more useful, more potent, more responsible and far-reaching?