wax on and wax off…
if you look at his argument you might think he is a solipisist…
iep.utm.edu/s/solipsis.htm
peernet.lbpc.ca/Philosophy/Solip … ds_000.htm
"For the foundations of solipsism lie at the heart of the view that the individual gets his own psychological concepts (thinking, willing, perceiving, etc.) from ‘his own cases’, i.e. by abstraction from ‘inner experience’. And this view, or some variant of it, has been held by a great many, if not indeed the majority of, philosophers, since Descartes elevated the egocentric search for apodeictic certainty to the status of the primary goal of critical epistemology. In this sense, then, it is at least contestable that solipsism is implicit in many philosophies of knowledge and mind since Descartes, and that any theory of knowledge which adopts the Cartesian egocentric approach as its basic frame of reference is inherently solipsistic.
The second reason why the problem of solipsism merits close examination is that it is based upon three widely entertained philosophical presuppositions, which are themselves of fundamental and wide-ranging importance. These are:
(a) That what I know most certainly are the contents of my own mind - my thoughts, experiences, affective states, etc.;
(b) That there is no conceptual or logically necessary link between the mental and the physical, between, say, the occurrence of certain conscious experiences or mental states and the ‘possession’ and behavioural dispositions of a body of a particular kind; and
(c) That the experiences of a given person are necessarily private to that person.
These presuppositions are of unmistakable Cartesian provenance, and are, of course, very widely accepted by philosophers and non-philosophers alike. In tackling the problem of solipsism, then, one finds oneself immediately grappling with fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind - however spurious the problem of solipsism per se may strike one, there can be no questioning the importance of these latter issues. Indeed, one of the merits of the entire enterprise may well be the extent to which it reveals a direct connection between apparently unexceptionable and certainly widely-held common sense beliefs and the acceptance of solipsistic conclusions. If this connection does indeed exist, and we wish to avoid those solipsistic conclusions, we shall have no option but to revise, or at least to critically review, the beliefs from which they derive logical sustenance. "
-Imp