Descartes, Spinoza, Heidegger and Derrida

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Descartes, for me, is a great thinker. His meditation tries to penetrate the essence of reality with mind as the central of investigation. Even his method of idea, which almost the same as Plato’s idea through mimesis, has revealed that such archetype must be exist. And therefore, external beings, other than mind is also proved has to be existed.

Spinoza, trough his demonstration, refer to axiom and definition, also proved that God necessarily exist. And by substance, which in itself and conceived through itself and whose conception doesn’t need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed, he prove that Substance is indivisible, it is one and the cause of itself, that none should involve with which. Thus other cannot negate its existence.

Heidegger, through his ‘destruction’ method, destruct Cartesian and Spinoza’s and other modern philosophy method by questioning Being. If Descartes say ‘cogito ergo sum’, than Heidegger answer it by the question of Being itself. The question of Being has been forgotten for a long time, which is now once again has been questioned again.

Here, I see Heidegger is a bridge and transition to Derrida’s deconstruction.

Finally, Derrida through deconstruction method questioning the authority of logos. Which is the truth itself is inter-textual. The arche is shifted dynamically to always unknown and mystery of telos. The differance, which is the ‘ghost’, is always exist, and perhaps, it is the only one that exist, which destroy logosentrisism and metaphysics.

These four philosophers are my favorites. Nevertheless, I am now a little bit on Derrida side. So, I expect a critiques from you people to prove that Descartes or Spinoza could have argument to defeat Derrida’s elucidation in Deconstruction. In other words, I expect comments from ‘pro Descartes and Spinoza etc’, since I am myself a ‘pro Derrida , thx…

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spinoza likely would have found fault with deconstruction, as derrida takes the idea and applies it not just to textual analysis, and not just to “written language”, but also to spoken language, to the entire history of thought itself. the extent that spoken or “thought” language is signifying, is the same extent that such language must necessarily lend itself to problems of interpretation via differance.

however, spinoza’s sub specie aeternitatis, as the idea that we CAN know the true (eternal) nature of an entity as A) its causal necessity, B) its existence as seen from beyond perception, i.e. from a multitude of perspectives, indicates that spinoza did contend that “absolute” knowledge was indeed possible-- absolute in the sense that such knowledge was objective and/or independent of contextual limitation (although spinoza certainly did not make this specific claim back then, it does follow from his concept of the essential revelatory nature of adequate ideas).

according to spinoza, “It is of the nature of Reason to regard things as necessary and not as contingent. And Reason perceives this necessity of things truly, i.e., as it is in itself.” while this seems to sort of slide by deconstruction (which speaks more of completeness or absolute conceptual understanding from one individual to another), spinoza’s assertion that “reason” operates via process of necessity mounts a logical attack on deconstruction… if deconstruction presupposes the impossibility of self-knowledge (internal ideas) via the impossibility of signified interpretation (ALL language, i.e. thought) then any assertation of necessity rests on unsteady grounds, being supported by a fog which could be dismantled at any moment. for deconstruction, necessity must always be contingency, even with regard to the originator of an idea (such origination presupposing a prior signifying contextual relation).

i would guess that, were spinoza confronted with derrida’s philosophy today, he would perhaps reassert that God, in his perfection, represents the ultimate or complete transition of meaning from one to another (the principle of god could perhaps be substituted for God itself, a principle of perfection (“Nature” to spinoza)), or that likely, because such an essential nature MUST exist for spinoza, that deconstruction only gets at random experience rather than adequate ideas themselves… this could also be argued from the perspective that: if necessity is ultimately a logical non-contradiction, and all spinozan ‘random experiences’ tend toward subjectivity, then necessity would be meaningless to random experience, mere contingency, and this indicates how spinoza’s epistemology would likely treat the limitations of deconstruction itself-- as existing only with regard to “non-adequte” or sufficient ideas only.

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i was unable to find any references to derrida writing extensively on spinoza; for some reason i thought that he credited spinozan philosophy for some of his inspiration, but apparently i was mistaken on this point. of course, it would be hard to make this claim, considering that deconstruction seems to be the antithesis of spinoza’s epistemology.