no, i’m saying that if a word has two opposing definitions then it would be a contranym. the definitions wouldn’t be contranyms, the word would be.
Anyway, your definition of Free Will is not at risk when we’re talking about another definition. That doesn’t make sense. If I can disprove the existence of the Christian god, for example, that doesn’t mean I’ve disproved the Islamic god. So your concern for your definition is unwarranted, we’re not talking about that one.
Free will is still not a contranym in this case though. The different definitions aren’t opposites.
I have no problem with math, and there was no problem with simple math to begin with. Whatever math is beyond me, I don’t use. Two dozen eggs costs twice as much as one dozen eggs, unless they’re on special - and computers are a godsend for when I need to do something a little more involved. No problem at all. But that doesn’t make me smarter than, say, David Hilbert, who apparently knew of at least 23 big problems. Not seeing a problem doesn’t mean there is no problem.
Seeing a problem doesn’t mean there’s a problem 
Sure. 2 + 2 = 22. No problem.
Now there’s a problem
I see.
Perhaps you do perhaps you don’t.
I see that you think problems exist only when you personally think they are problems.
Don’t you see that given the classic determinism versus free will debate, such a definition involves changing the definition of free will in order to make it a kind, or type, of determinism? It’s just sleight of hand, and solves nothing. I posted a helpful link for you, which included this clarification…
“In philosophical debates about the compatibility of free will and determinism, it is predeterminism back to the origin of the universe that philosophers mean by the more common term determinism”
…but you didn’t seem to notice.
Do you think problems exist that you don’t think are problems? (this is rhetorical, its illogical to think that)
Anyways, I understand this is an old debate. This “classical” definition was changed to create a debate, it was added. I already addressed the situation. There was slight of hand to create the problem. I don’t see Searle arguing any differently than I did nor did he use a different definition of free will than I did.
Changing or accepting a definition of free will that is illogical however, will never solve anything. My solution (as well as others) solves it just fine, actually. There is no debate to be had. Case closed.
No it’s not.
No, the classical definition (inherited from the Scholastics) was the one you dismiss as illogical/impossible. The compatibilists “solved” the problem by changing free will to mean unconstrained- as opposed to acausal choice.
You’ve spent a lot of posts saying there’s no debate, and don’t seem to have convinced anybody else that the case is closed. 
The fact is, there is a debate whether or not you’re not interested in entertaining it.
My view is that it’s a confusion about categories. There’s nothing non-physical at work, you’re just not describing physical, causal processes when you talk about making decisions. It’s a confusion of language more than concepts.
A superior form of justice would cure bad will and it would be seen as a disease.
Genes, experiences, education, etc. These could all be rewritten or done over until the will is better.
The Will is a form and a compound. It is not an essence and it has no essence.
Will only exists when worlds diverge. Will requires the world and the body.
Well, with my specific meaning of the my sentence it is illogical as the “problems” I’m referring to are identical, (not different issues). But that is just a minor quibble with nothing to do with this thread, if we’re going to argue inane semantical points may as well be related to free will as opposed to argumentative logic, as there seems to be enough pickings there.
Very well its an argument over religious doctrine nonetheless, free will initially was much vaguer. Thanks for pointing out that the Scholastics provided the version of free will that incompatibilists use, I’ll have to revise my argument. While that is a philosophical dilemma, commonly free will never meant that, the common person who utilize the term don’t ponder much on it. Certainly then free will in that sense was to support religious doctrine and crystallize it as a sacred gift from the creator. I don’t think this sense was utilized much, there is a history of the term preceding the philosophical discussion and it was non specific.
This one however:
free will
n
- (Philosophy)
a. the apparent human ability to make choices that are not externally determined
b. the doctrine that such human freedom of choice is not illusory Compare determinism
c. (as modifier) a free-will decision - the ability to make a choice without coercion he left of his own free will: I did not influence him
Still goes along with what I have stated as I have already discussed these points that Determinists state are the reason this type of free will does not exist.
Everything has an essence
WW3, are you really a determinist at all? Again…
Or put another way, whatever it is you chose, you could have not chosen otherwise.
With this conception of determinism, there is no choice at all. It is not about some arcane religious debate. You don’t seem to understand the philosophical question. The question of how much power you have relative to your context is hardly a philosophical question at all, imo.
To be as clear as possible: my own “compatibilism” consists of denying both determinism as conceived above, and free will as conceived in the way that offends you. I think those conceptions of how reality works are incompatible, and each is mistaken in at least some significant way. But it’s easy to see problems with existing paradigms and much harder to express something more correct. If I have any sense at all of a more correct view, I can only express that view indirectly - which I tried to do to some extent in the OP here (and elsewhere).
And as an aside, Searle was describing a typical compatibilist position, not selling it. He says, “according to the definitions … that I am using, determinism and free will are not compatible”.
WW3, when I was looking up Searle just now, I found an academic paper describing his own position. The introduction to the paper serves as a good introduction to the free will versus determinism debate:
According to Searle, we have two convictions concerning the world and ourselves, that cannot be
reconciled1: First, we think of everything in nature as determined, which means that every event that
occurs has antecedently sufficient causes – it just had to occur, given a cause plus certain
conditions. To put it more bluntly: If we knew everything about the state of the world at t1, and had
complete knowledge of the laws of cause and effect, we would be able to predict the state of the
world at t2. As this determinism is hold to be true for nature, it is also to be hold to be true for us, for
we are natural beings. Following Searle’s biological naturalism2, our mind – including our will –
makes no exception.
This leads to the second conviction, which contradicts the implications of determinism in nature:
We consider ourselves to have a free will, based on the experience of not being compelled by our
reasons to arrive at a certain decision. Furthermore, our decision doesn’t force us to initiate the
action we decided for. At last, even while performing an action we decided for, we can stop that
action or complete it, which demands a permanent confirmation of our decision to act. Searle
denotes these three experiences as gaps in the course of acting and takes them as an indication for
gaps in the course of cause and effect, which usually determines nature. The gaps we find at the top
level, which includes our conscious process of decision-making and action, must be found likewise
at the lowest level, otherwise they are just an illusion: „If freedom is real, then the gap has to go all
the way down to the level of neurobiology.“3
One way to handle the problem of free will is to argue for compatibilism, which is the view that
determinism and human freedom do not logically exclude each other. All actions are as determined
by sufficient causes as every other event in the world. A free action, according to this view, is an
action which is caused not by external force but exclusively by internal causes, amongst which are
rational considerations, desires, aversions and some such.
For Searle, compatibilism doesn’t address the true problem of free will. The crucial question that
troubles him is rather an empirical one: “Is it the case that for every human action that ever occurred
in the past, is occurring now, or ever will occur, the action was caused by antecedently sufficient
conditions?”4 If the answer is positive, then human freedom is an illusion: we just have the strong
feeling to be free, but this impression is unjustified. If on the other hand the answer is negative, we
are truly free, as we are able not only to act on reasons and deliberations, but purely out of our own
will. Apparently, the compatibilist’s conception of freedom is much weaker than Searle’s, who is
dedicated to the stronger conception of freedom as free will, whereas the compatibilist clings to
freedom as free action. One might say that in the first case, I can want what I want, and in the
second case, I can do what I want, but what I want is determined.
source (pdf)
I wouldn’t say I’m a determinist or not but that is irrelevant to my argument anyways.
Yous ay whatever it is you choose you could not have chosen otherwise, which means there is no choice at all. That doesn’t make sense. Hindsight is 20/20. You chose. Given that you couldn’t have chosen differently (due to your genetic make up as well as the culmination of your experiences to that point of the choice) doesn’t mean you didn’t choose.
I disagree with Searle’s requirements for Free Will and his idea that compatibilism must stick to that definition.
Then your choice is completely impotent, which is no choice at all. “Illusion” is the word many determinists use. But you now say you don’t agree with determinism. I can’t figure out your position on this.
I don’t necessarily disagree with you when you get right down to it, but it seems to me you’re not actually addressing the problem at hand.