If the above is a fair summation, I find it to be an interesting and original argument.
From my perspective this is making a philosophical mountain out of a molehill that is words.
Yes, I certainly agree that Mary makes a choice.
Mary “chooses” to have the abortion. But she can only “choose” to have the abortion. Why? Because God “in His infinite wisdom” knows that she will “choose” the abortion. Why? Because it is already part and parcel of His divine plan. A plan rooted in His omniscience. I simply do not see how this circle can be broken if God is omniscient.
You can make this distinction between “must” and “will”, but if Mary will have the abortion because God [peacegirl’s “designer” here] knows that she will “in advance” then [from my frame of mind] she must “choose” abortion in order that she be in accordance with God’s design.
The only religionist argument that has ever made any sort of sense to me is that God’s omniscience is rooted not in what He knows in advance but in the fact that whatever we freely choose to do, God knows it.
But then what does that say about being omniscient. Either God knows everything or He does not. And if He doesn’t know in advance that Mary will choose an abortion then [from my way of thinking] He doesn’t really know everything at all. Instead, His knowledge becomes contingent on what we choose to do autonomously.
But, even in this respect, it does not obviate my point regarding dasein, conflicting goods and the dilemma rooted in them.
As for the Come Reason Ministries argument, consider:
I have a five year old son. If I were to leave a chocolate chip cookie on the table about a hour before dinner time and my son was to walk by and see it, I know that he would pick up the cookie and eat it. I did not force him to make that decision. In fact, I don’t even have to be in the room at all. I think I know my son well enough, though, to tell you that if I come back into the kitchen the cookie will be gone. His act was made completely free of my influence, but I knew what his actions would be.
How could the act be made completely free of his influence when he put the cookie on the table?
And suppose the boy had the stomach flu and left the cookie sitting on the table. Or suppose the boy had been struck by a car and killed because he chose to visit a friend an hour before dinner and was not even around to see the cookie?
Do these events unfold only as they must unfold or is there an element of genuine free choice involved?
And how can this be demonstrated sans the sort of empirical/experiential work that neuroscientists are pursuing? Can we really just “deduce” the truth here merely by insisting that the manner in which we define the words used in our arguments denote the objective meaning re the manner in which we string them together to form a largely abstract analysis?
I think this issue of God’s omniscience v. human free will should be split off to another thread, since it seems tangential to what peacegirl is talking about.
But, briefly, Mary has genuine free choice even if God knows what she will do, before she does it. This particular issue is a subset of a broader issue called the Problem of Future Contingents, most famously mooted in Aristotle’s Sea Battle Argument. The allegation that God’s foreknowledge of human acts precludes human freedom is sometimes called the the problem of epistemic determinism; but it is a subset of the Problem of Future Contingents, also called the problem of logical determinism.
Both problems are easily resolved by employing a possible worlds heuristic.
I don’t make that distinction. Whether the font is God or the immutable laws of matter, some argue that what we choose to think, feel and do is wholly determined. In other words, that any particular individual’s “free will” is just an illusion.
And I certainly agree that this may well be the case. What I note however is the gap between what we are now able to discern in order to think that this is true and all that would need to be discerned in order to be absolutely certain of it. And that would seem to involve an ontological understanding of existence/reality itself.
And it is only in grasping the ontological nature of existence that we can begin to speculate as to whether or not there is a teleological component as well.
As with peacegirl, you assert this to be true. But I don’t see how your points here are able to actually demonstrate that my points might not possibly be true instead.
Please focus more particularly on that, okay? And I would appreciate it if you would integrate the concepts you note above in the context of human interactions that come into conflict over value judgments.
That is what most interest me regarding determinism. If all that we choose is embedded in the ineluctable laws of matter unfolding only as matter must unfold, what does it even mean to speak of “moral responsibility” at all?
Peacegirl asserts that we do NOT have free will.
She may be right, and I await her response to my formalization of her particular argument. All I’m saying here is that some hypothetical omniscient agent’s foreknowledge of our acts, does not and cannot impugn our free will. We may lack free will for other reasons, such as those offered by peacegirl, but not for THIS reason (an omniscient agent’s foreknowledge of what we do). But, again, since this issue is tangential or even irrelevant to peacegirl’s argument, I think it would be best to take up this discussion in a separate thread.
I don’t know what you have read, but I explained that just because Mary can choose between options without external constraint does not mean she has free will. Her choices are contingent upon her heredity, environment, and all of her experiences up to the moment of choice. Out of necessity she is COMPELLED to choose that which gives her greater satisfaction, therefore her choice is NOT free. In other words, if it is impossible for her to choose B over A because it gives her less satisfaction under the conditions, she is NOT free to choose A.
As I explained, this is a separate topic, and NOT your argument. Which is why, if anyone wants to discuss it, I think it should be in a separate thread.
My point was simply that free will cannot be precluded in virtue of omniscience by itself. I explicitly stated that there may be other reasons that preclude free will – your argument may be one of them. So, again, this is a side discussion at best: tangential, as I noted, to your argument.
I have tried to formalize your argument (see upthread) with premises and a conclusion. Are you satisfied with this formalization? If not, point out any changes, repairs or additions that need to be made, and we can go from there. Formalizing arguments like this is pretty standard in philosophical disucussions.
Yes, as long as there are people who insist that capitalism is the political economy/moral font of choice while others insist that socialism is far more likely to bring about a world without war, crime and poverty — there will be dueling dissatisfactions that precipitate blame and punishment.
Similarly, as long as there are people who insist that the birth of the unborn baby is the number one priority, while others insist that the number one priority must revolve around no woman being forced to give birth against her will, there will be accusations of blame and calls for punishment here as well.
And how Lessans makes any of this go away is not something that I have come to understand yet.
But that just brings me back around to pointing out that what people want is only what they can/must want. On the other hand, in the world of free will people imagine that what they want is something that they chose of their own volition to want.
And it is always embedded more or less in this:
I am able to think/choose as I do here because 1] I reflected on it 2] I tried to grasp the context to the best of my ability 3] I tried to weigh the pros and the cons to the best of my ability and then 4] I chose to think/act like this rather than like that.
I simply do not grasp how your own “wanting” here is any less an inherent component of the necessity built into the causal mechanism of the design.
As long as my “consent” is only what I must consent to in order to be in sync with a design that encompasses the totality of existence itself, what “in the world” does that really amount to?
Some don’t but some do. In some places around the globe, the latter two behaviors can put you in dire straits. Why? Because those in power insist that the “preconditions” of a just and virtuous society lies precisely in proscribing those behaviors.
And can you imagine being a meat eater and living in a political jurisdiction run by folks from organizations like PETA?
Always we are stuck here with conflicting goods. And nothing Lessans argues allows me to grasp how they would no longer plague us in the “new world”.
Name a single society where rewards and punishments are not a necessary component of either encouraging or discouraging behavior. Here the most crucial factor by far revolves around who has the power to enforce one set rather than another set of behaviors. And there is a reason it has always been this way. And that is because reasonable arguments can be made to rationalize both sides of the moral conflagrations that have plagued us as a species over the centuries.
We can and we do. Why? Because most of us do not believe that we are wholly compelled to do what we do. But basically what you are arguing is this: not only are we so compelled but even those who do not believe that we are, are compelled to believe that too. Again, there is no extricating ourselves from doing what per the design it is always necessary for us to do.
What intrigues me then is how you might succeed in convincing me that “someday”…that someday “everyone”…will grasp [through Lessans’ discovery] that it really is irrational to blame others for doing what they are compelled to do. Even if you are in turn compelled to be feel outraged and appalled that they do it.
So, what do the citizens do in reacting to those who do continue to blame and punish? Do they blame and punish them for that? If not then the miscreants can continue to wreak havoc knowing that they have no reason to abide by the “universal consciousness”. After all, no one will punish them for it.
And I would be curious to know what Lessans considers to be the most satisying and dissatisfying behaviors when, in the world today, what satisfies some dissatisfies others. And when has that ever not been the case?
One can either be or not be excited by it. But what one can not do in a determined world is to freely choose to either be or not to be excited about it. That’s when any enthusiasm I might feel about living in a wholly determined world more or less collapses. If “I” am only a spoke on the wheel compelled to go only where the wheel is compelled to take me, it doesn’t say much for my worth and value. At least that’s how it seems to me.
But am I not to be resigned in a determined world to see only the reasons that I must see before making the choice?
Suppose I want a promotion at work. But it becomes clear to me that someone else is going to get the job instead. I am now resigned to that fact. So, I decide on a new strategy to make sure I get the promotion the next time.
What part of this sequence of events was ever such that how I thought or felt about it would have changed what did [must] happen?
I still don’t see how this is any different from the robot. Not ultimately. A robot’s program might be such that it is compelled to do things that result in damaging itself. Think of the Terminator. It is programmed to kill Sarah O’Connor. Period. And it takes one hell of a beating in the process. But it does not have the capacity to sit back and think, “hey, wait a minute, why am I doing this? I think I’ll stop and do something else.”
But with flesh and blood human beings, we are able to question ourselves regarding what we do. We imagine we are free to choose alternate, more satisfying behaviors.
But in a determined world this would merely be part of our program. The Terminator could only get closer to Hal, a computer that is programmed to imagine its “self” more along the lines of flesh and blood human beings.
But there is still Hal’s program, just as there is still our design. Matter is matter is matter no matter how complex and sophisticated it becomes.
[u][b]It still must always stay within the confines of the immutable laws matter.[/u][/b]
Except that there will logically no longer be a need for justification. And what does “first blow” mean in a deterministic worldview, anyway?
That’s not my focus here however. Instead, my aim is to make the distinction between that which anyone might assert to be true simply because they believe that it is “in their head”; and then the extent to which they are able to demonstrate empirically/experientially that it is in fact true objectively for all of us.
I readily acknowledge that what I believe [here and now] regarding free will is derived largely from a gut, visceral, intuitive “sense” that the choices I make revolve around this:
I am able to think/choose as I do here because 1] I reflected on it 2] I tried to grasp the context to the best of my ability 3] I tried to weigh the pros and the cons to the best of my ability and then 4] I chose to think/act like this rather than like that.
But I can’t prove that this is the case. I can only point out that philosophers and scientists and religionists have been stuggling now for centuries to untangle all of the conflicting and convoluted threads intertwined in “dualism”.
But how is that not just you [once again] asserting it to be true? Where are the points that deconstruct my points regarding God’s omniscience, Mary’s abortion and free will? Or the points I raised regarding the Come Reason Ministries argument pertaining to the child and the cookie?
I will be the first to admit that this may well be the way in which “serious philosophers” go about the business of bringing logic and rational thought to bear on a “big question” like determinism. Questions which philosophers broach in order that they might attain wisdom. Or, as Marcus Tullius Cicero once suggested, "philosophy, rightly defined, is simply the love of wisdom.”
But to what extent is the wisdom we derive from logic and rational thought of limited value with respect to answering questions this big? Back again to the gap between what we think we know and all that will need to be known in order to resolve it once and for all.
Or, in focusing the beam more on the relationships that most interest me, with respect to the behaviors we choose that come into conflict with others because there is, in turn, a conflict regarding value judgments? Value judgments predicated on conflicting goods derived in large part from subjective points of view?
Most of your quick overview is okay but there are gaps. The reason a person will find greater satisfaction in not striking a first blow (there are three forms) is because he needs some kind of justification to hurt others if there is no provocation. Knowing he will be blamed and punished allows his conscience to be eased because he can come up with excuses or rationalize his behavior, which allows him to act on his desire. Knowing that he will NOT be blamed by anyone anywhere prevents him from being able to shift his responsibility to someone or something else as the cause of his behavior. When he is not being blamed, how is it possible for him to come up with excuses when he knows he is already excused?
I missed this. That is true but there are two other justifications aside from the knowledge one will be blamed or punished that would allow this hurt to others. The second justification would be if not to hurt others would cause one to be a loser. For example, if a person does not have enough money to support his family, he may steal or do any number of things in order to survive, even if others are hurt as a result. In this case, the principles of no blame cannot work. The third justification is if he has already been hurt. Then he would be justified to retaliate. When these three justifications are removed, a person cannot gain satisfaction in hurting others because it would be a first blow, which his conscience would not allow.
I am still waiting for someone to actually read the book in its entirety. I compiled 7 of his books. Some of the examples are mine, but the rest is his writing. I feel like I’m not doing this work justice. You have gotten the basics. I would think that the book would interest you.
I already explained this to you, in some detail. I did not “assert” anything. I offered a logical demonstration that omniscience, by itself, does not impugn free will. Please re-read what I wrote.
That’s fine, then. Let’s work on the gaps.
Show me what they are, and we’ll formalize your argument.
OK, I missed your post beginning with “I missed this.” 
So, fine. Let’s take the formalization of the argument I offered, and add any premises from the above that you think are needed.
Work with me here; I’m trying to help you. 
Peacegirl,
As it happens, I have read much of the book. I would like to work with you on formalizing the argument about free will and determinism.
I can tell you now, however, that the stuff on light and sight is pure nonsense. If you want the book to be taken seriously, you should remove all that stuff.
I think I understand why the author wrote what he did about light and sight. His intuition is correct. We are not simply passive receptors of reality. Our brains construct reality, and our constructions may be false. I think that is substantially what he is trying to say.
But what he said about light and sight is demonstrably false. It does not even make sense.
Remove that stuff, and focus on his discussion of free will and determinism.
I would never do that. And who are you to state with such dogmatism that he was wrong? You really don’t know that. Our brains do not construct objective reality. We may have perceptions about what we see that are unique to us based on our experiences, but we all see the same thing. If I see a dog, you don’t see a cat, if we’re looking at the same object unless you have something wrong with your eyes or your brain. I have no desire to discuss his second discovery right now. I’m wondering where you were introduced to the book. You sound very similar to someone I already had a discussion with regarding necessity and contingency. Just because our choices are contingent on antecedent events does not make them not necessary. It is also true that nothing (not God, not a designer, not an omniscient being, not one’s heredity or environment) can take away one’s free will (and in this context the term “free will” only means one’s ability to choose which Lessans clarifies in Chapter One. He uses the phrase, “I did of my own free will” all the time, which only means I did it because I wanted to, nobody forced me to do it). This though does not mean we actually have freedom of the will, and if you had read this book carefully you would have understood this. I cannot formalize these concepts in a way that reduces them to nothing more than a shell of his explanation, just because people don’t want to take the time to read the text in full.
Let us then just agree to disagree about this.