Determinism

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
61

I’ve been shamed by Oughtist’s calm and patient responses :slight_smile:

Can I try and offer a summary of what I took from the first two chapters of the book? You can then comment on what I’ve missed or misunderstood, and everyone has an overview with which to understand your position.

Chapter 1
1.1 The universe is deterministic
1.2 Therefore, man’s will cannot be said to be free:

  • 1.2.1 Any choice made is the result of previous actions and conditions and natural laws; whatever man chooses is his greatest satisfaction at the time, determined by these.
    1.3 Knowing 1.2, it is not reasonable to blame
    (So far, so Spinoza :slight_smile: )

Chapter 2
2.1 Blame is a natural human reaction, arising from a need for morality to overcome human problems

  • 2.1.1 Hurting others is a response to being hurt
    2.2 Morality is a human construction:
  • 2.2.1 If we remove morality, we remove moral justification for retaliation
  • 2.2.2 If we accept complete responsibility for our actions and absolve all others of blame, we will lose the will to hurt others:
    [size=85](and this bit following is, I assume, the discovery)[/size]
    • 2.2.2.1 Having a “choice” between hurting and not hurting someone, knowing one is not compelled to hurt and knowing that no-one will blame one or inflict retribution for it, one cannot gain satisfaction from hurting.
    • 2.2.2.2 Hurting will therefore never be chosen.
      2.3 The illusion of free will allows us to lie and cheat and then shift the blame:
  • 2.3.1 If there is no free will, hence no blame, there can be no self-justification
  • 2.3.2 Without self-justification, there is no desire to hurt or cheat others (see 2.1.1)
    2.4 To abolish hurting and war, each person must know that she is completely responsible for her actions, and know that no-one is responsible at all for their actions (p. 83)

How is that? I even split it into a semi-Spinozan structure :slight_smile:

You require of people that they explain the discovery to you in order to see if they truly understand, yet you admit you can’t do it yourself? Is that fair?

Not a personal attack, but if one can’t explain something clearly, and if ones attempts to defend or explain it lead to confusion, it’s generally a good sign of muddy thinking and incomplete understanding.

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Determinism holds that the ‘internal’ world is as determinate as the ‘external’ world; moreover, that there is no absolute distinction between the two (hence the quotation marks).

Wait, are you not now in ‘philosophical circles’??

If “our own desire” (or “what we do of our own desire”) is beyond control, that desire is no ‘free will’). You should, as its editor, scratch the word “free”. Also, “what we do of our own desire because we want to do it” is double. What we do of our own desire is what we want to do. There is no causal relationship (“because”) between a thing and itself; unless—it be a self-cause! Is that what he’s trying to say? That the will is free because it’s a self-cause? But if so, is not the concept “self-cause” absurd? Is it not—illogical? Nay, I think you also ought to scratch “because we want to do it”. Sadly, nothing remains of his ‘two-sided equation’ then (whose two sides, as I’ve pointed out ad nauseam, are mutually exclusive—contradictory—absurd).

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This.

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[quote=“Only_Humean”]
I’ve been shamed by Oughtist’s calm and patient responses :slight_smile:

Can I try and offer a summary of what I took from the first two chapters of the book? You can then comment on what I’ve missed or misunderstood, and everyone has an overview with which to understand your position.

1.1 Yes, the universe is deterministic, but you haven’t explained why, so people are starting with a premise they aren’t sure about.
1.2 The two first statements are lacking in the proof.
1.2.1 Yes, based on our environment and heredity, we move in the direction of greater satisfaction.
1.2 The author is not saying it isn’t reasonable to blame. It is reasonable until we take this concept further to see where it leads.

2.1 Blame and punishment are the basis of our civilization. There has been no way other than threats of punishment to deter people from hurting others.
2.1.1 Hurting others is a ‘natural’ response to being hurt, but it isn’t the only justification people have for hurting others.
2.2 Morality is a human construction. This does not mean there is not a place for the moral code in our society. That is why the Ten Commandments was written. This does not mean we don’t have a conscience, which is not a human construction.
2.2.1 If we remove all judgment (only under the changed conditions), our internal moral compass goes up, not down.
2.2.2 It isn’t a matter of accepting responsibility. We cannot help but own what is our responsibility when we are not being blamed. I think you are confused here.
2.2.2.1 That’s accurate.
2.2.2.2 That’s accurate.
2.3 Not the illusion of free will. It’s the fact that blame and punishment allow our conscience to be clear by our ability to pay a price for hurting others.
2.3.1 If you know in advance that no one is going to ever blame you for anything, and by not hurting someone does not make you a loser (which would then not be a first blow but a retaliatory blow), the desire to strike a first blow is not justified.
2.3.2 Without the ability to justify what one is about to do, there can be no satisfaction in striking this first blow.
2.4 You are missing the most important point. This is not a matter of anyone knowing they are responsible for their actions. They can’t help but be responsible for their actions when they cannot make excuses. How can you excuse your actions when no one is blaming you? When a person knows IN ADVANCE that he will never be blamed again for anything at all (by the entire world regardless of the hurt that might be inflicted on others), there is no way satisfaction can be gotten under these changed conditions. Until the global economic situation can prevent people from being hurt by falling below a basic standard of living, this principle will have no effect at all because the first blow to them has already been struck.

to be cont…

65

OK, for clarity (and thank you)

This is a summary of the propositions - for the I arguments of proofs I would of course refer the reader to the book. Regarding the reasonableness statement - I changed it from rationality as you seemed to equate rational thought with natural thought. All I’m saying is that once we accept 1.2, blaming is rationally impossible. He says this explicitly on p. 46.

Agreed on the first two sentences. Where is evidence of this last sentence to be found in the text, please?

Poorly worded, maybe? How about:
2.2.2 If we accept we will not be blamed for any actions, nor will we blame others, we will lose the will to hurt others:

OK, I must admit I’m stuck here - I went back to p. 83 and it wasn’t the page I was thinking of. I’ll have to reread and get back to you on that, sorry.

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No problem. This is difficult to grasp, but I hope you don’t give up.

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You have not given me a chance to explain anything. Your summary is, in your mind, without flaws. That is exactly why I never broke the discovery down in bits and pieces as you have. This will give people the opportunity to attack without truly understanding what is being expressed. :frowning:

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I presume you’re talking to me… it’s a LOT easier to follow these things if you can work out the quote system :slight_smile:

Of course I believed my summary was without flaws - why would I intentionally put something flawed out? However, I was asking for your comments and corrections; I allowed for the fact that other people might know more than me, have insights I don’t have. However, this comment:

was directed at your earlier comment to Oughtist and my earlier comments about your approach here; namely that you have the tendency to simply dismiss any criticism as borne of ignorance, demanding that people clearly explain what they have understood of the book. Then you go on to say that you can’t do this - and yet we have to take you on your word that you really do understand it.

The whole point of breaking it down is to clarify the arguments. The first two chapters are 80 pages, a great deal of which is irrelevant to the argument. If we can clarify the points that are being made, people don’t need to wade through the rest (of which you know my stylistic opinion) to understand what is being expressed. The anecdotes and repetition of points are pure flourish and add nothing to the argument; what is to be understood can be condensed into a line of reasoning.

Also, use of the word “attack” is telling. Criticism of a text is not criticism of you; if it’s inaccurate, you can point out why it is bad criticism, if it’s accurate, you can adjust your knowledge and opinions. You can improve from it. All criticism is a favour.

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I wanted to add to this post. It is true that the internal world is as determinate as the external world. The only reason he is making a distinction is to indicate that nothing in the external world can make us do anything we don’t want to do, but this does not make our will free. In other words, you can lead a horse to water but you can’t make him drink.

I am extending this to the general population of philosophers, not just this forum.

The reason he says ‘of your own free will’ is because nothing can make you do what you don’t want to do, which is what the conventional definition of determinism implies. In other words, you can’t say something external to you made you do something because nothing has that power. Let me repeat: It is fine to say “I did it of my own free will” if you mean that YOU YOURSELF MADE THE CHOICE TO DO SOMETHING. No one else did, YOU DID, based on your particular set of circumstances. It was important for him to show that even though we are influenced by external conditions, nothing external can cause us to do anything unless we want to do it, for over this we have mathematical control. This is an extremely important point in order to understand the two-sided equation.

He writes: Nothing causes man to
build cities, develop scientific achievements, write books, compose
music, go to war, argue and fight, commit terrible crimes, pray to
God, for these things are mankind already at a particular stage of
his development, just as children were sacrificed at an earlier stage.
These activities or motions are the natural entelechy of man who is
always developing, correcting his mistakes, and moving in the
direction of greater satisfaction by choosing the best alternative at
each particular moment in time. Looking back in hindsight allows
man to evaluate his progress and make corrections where necessary
since he is always learning from previous experience, but this does
not change the direction he is compelled to go. The fact that will is
not free demonstrates that man has been unconsciously developing
at a mathematical rate and during every moment of his progress
was doing what he had to do because he had no free choice. But this
does not mean that he was caused to do anything against his will, for
the word cause, like choice and past, is very misleading as it implies
that something other than man himself is responsible for his actions.

The most severe tortures, even the threat of death, cannot compel
or cause him to do what he makes up his mind not to do. Since this
observation is mathematically undeniable, the expression ‘free will’
which has come to signify this aspect — that nothing can compel man
to do what he doesn’t want to do — is absolutely true in this context
because it symbolizes what the perception of this relation cannot
deny, and here lies in part the unconscious source of all the
dogmatism and confusion since MAN IS NOT CAUSED OR
COMPELLED TO DO TO ANOTHER WHAT HE MAKES UP
HIS MIND NOT TO DO — but that does not make his will free.
In other words, if someone was to say — “I didn’t really want
to hurt that person but couldn’t help myself under the
circumstances,” which demonstrates that though he believes in
freedom of the will he admits he was not free to act otherwise, that
he was forced by his environment to do what he really didn’t want
to do; or should he make any effort to shift his responsibility for this
hurt to heredity, God, his parents, the fact that his will is not free,
or something else as the cause, he is obviously lying to others and
being dishonest with himself because absolutely nothing is forcing
him, against his will, to do what he doesn’t want to do, for over this,
as was just shown, he has mathematical control.”

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Hi PG,

Glad to see the discussion is beginning to gain more of a dialectic flavor!

One question from me:

In terms of his saying nothing in the “external” world can make me do something I don’t want to do, what of the following situations:

  1. I’m stepping on stones across a creek, one of which is slimy, such that I fall in the creek.

  2. I’m a tight end running into the end zone, focusing on the ball being thrown to me, when the sun suddenly shines in my eyes and I close them.

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I don’t mind criticism if it is meant to help and it is not mean-spirited. But when people try to criticize what they don’t fully understand, it’s difficult to accept.

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Yes, and it is logical, of course. Then again, that is precisely the department in which peacegirl is lacking.

But the fact that you can’t excuse your actions when no one is blaming you has nothing to do with the existence or nonexistence of responsibility. To be responsible for one’s actions is not the same as to not be able to excuse one’s actions. As you and any other person capable of rational thought must see, responsibility was already thrown out of the window in chapter 1 (see my first remark in this post).

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That is called “analysis”. Unless one accepts the ‘discovery’ without thinking about it—swallows it whole, so to say, without tasting it—(as you seem to do), one has to analyse it. One cannot digest it if one does not first chew on it.

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These two situations are obviously not within your control. The external world acted upon you and now you have to make a choice. You quickly survey the situation to determine what your next step should be. In the first example, should you call someone (if you have a cell phone), try to get up on your own and continue doing what you were doing, or go home and change your clothes. Whatever you choose, it is not of your own free will because you are moving in the direction of greater satisfaction. Does that make sense?

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You’re welcome.

You’re right, he does. But once again, you must understand that he is trying to get you to see that if man’s will is not free; if he is making choices that are truly beyond his control, how can we blame him for what he does? The dilemma here is that philosophers who turned against determinism couldn’t get beyond this impasse because how can we not blame those who hurt us? This author is trying to get the reader to be patient at this point before seeing where this corollary ultimately leads.

It’s implicit, not explicit. Conscience goes up under the changed conditions, not because of a moral code, but because of the recognition that what one is about to do (something that would be considered wrong), is a first blow.

This has nothing to do with accepting whether or not we will be blamed. If we know that we are not going to be blamed for what we do, this becomes a condition of the environment that we must accept. In other words, if it becomes a condition of the environment that there will be no more blame by anyone anywhere (please don’t jump to premature conclusions as to how this transition will take place), we must assume responsibility for what we do since there is no way we can shift it to someone or something else.

No problem.

It has everything to do with responsibility. In this world, we can do all kinds of things to satisfy our desires, knowing that we can pay a price, if caught. But when there is no price that can paid because we are not being blamed, our conscience cannot find the necessary justification to do what we are about to do. The responsibility for our actions cannot be lessened, mitigated, or shifted, which changes the direction we must go for satisfaction.

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That it is not correct remains to be seen; your assertion that it is not correct is just that, an assertion. But let me suppose that according to Mr. Lessans, it is not correct. What is the correct definition, then, according to him? Is the ‘internal’ world absolutely distinct from the ‘external’ world? And is it not determinate? If so, the will (or the mind, as Da5id suggested on the other forum) may be free; but if it is, one can rightly be praised and blamed. It’s either the one or the other: there is responsibility, or there is no responsibility. Unless the law of non-contradiction does not apply, in which case—

I was talking about this forum in general, and this discussion in particular.

Philosophy is indeed about what is true.

“Of our own desire” is just another way of saying “of our own will”. “Desire” and “will” are roughly synonymous; not “desire” and “free will”. If determinism means the unfreedom of the will (as I take it you said was what Mr. Lessans meant, on that other forum), then determinism and freedom of the will are mutually exclusive. The crux of the problem is the discrepancy between determinism and free will, or between responsibility and its absence. In our earlier discussion (in 2007), you seemed to suggest that events are only determinate afterwards, not before (to leave during out of the question for now). This, in my view, is what you have to clarify. And as I, and probably some others here, too, are eager to clear this up, we will be receptive and try to help you. All of us together should at least be able to determine what Mr. Lessans is basically saying; whether we agree with it, or cannot possibly disagree, we will only know when we understand it.

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Yes, and please excuse my oversimplification… just want to start at ground level and work up.

So, the “external” can control the execution of one’s choices: I want to stay dry, but I get wet; I want to catch, but I fail.

We’re limiting ourselves to situations where we are in control (and bracketing out vagueries of mental illness). Ok. So, insofar as I am in control of the execution of my choices, I will choose what most satisfies me. Indeed, I would be crazy not to. I have no choice but to satisfy myself. There is, in fact, so far as I’m not crazy, no choice. Choice is an illusion.

Knowing what will most satisfy me, of course, is the pivotal issue. I must either learn what that is on my own, or be told what it is. Insofar as I learn on my own, I must attempt a broad array of choices, even if some seem illusory in terms of providing me with satisfaction. I must sastisfy my desire to learn what most satisfies me. Alternatively, insofar as I rely on being told what will most satisfy me, I must decide nonetheless to accept the particular authority, implying that I must choose which authority to heed. Thus I find myself in a hermeneutic related to that of simply learning on my own. I must again confront the fact that I need to test out the illusion’s diversity, as there are a plurality of authorities.

Insofar, nonetheless, as I gain some ground, either by learning on my own directly, or learning indirectly through heeding an authority, I then must confront the reality that many of the others around me (whom, it seems, though they are external to me, are to be distinguished from “external reality”, as I have the apperception that each other I meet is to be included in an inter-internal reality) have learned otherwise, or at least have not yet learned. So, either I must contest their learning, or I must teach them, and become an authority myself. To contest them, I must know what they have learned. To teach them, I must be able to express what it is I have learned.

Sometimes, in this process, it is like I am crossing a stream and find myself suddenly soaking wet. Sometimes I feel I have thrown a perfect pass, and the other mysteriously fumbles it. In any case, it seems there remains an externality that I cannot account for in terms of my relation both to myself and to others. There is no one to blame for this, it is simply how it is. At least, that is, if I do not represent myself as an authority who has nothing of fundamental value to learn from others, or as a learner, who would prefer only to learn that which is most immediately satisfying to my impressions. Alas, though, the water I constantly seem to fall in becomes murkier and murkier, and I am blinded by the sun each time I surface. Damn reality!!

Does such relate at all to the problematic of the Text? :slight_smile:

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Yes - to point 1.3 :slight_smile: I’m looking at the argument, not the rhetorical presentation.

So for clarity, it is assumed that everybody has a conscience and that this conscience doesn’t rely on morality to guide it? This seems a vital assumption of the argument.

Got it! It was page 79.

So to rephrase -
2.4 To abolish hurting and war, each person must know that she is completely responsible for her actions, and know that no-one is to be blamed for their actions (p. 79)

Can you tell me - is it also the case that no-one should be held responsible for their actions? Is this equivalent to saying no-one should be blamed?

(as an aside, the ‘two-sided equation’ actually isn’t an equation at all, and all equations are at least two-sided, but let’s not nitpick :stuck_out_tongue: )

I did not say this, it was Sauwelios. Please try and get the hang of the quotation scheme here, or no-one will be able to keep track of who’s saying what and where we should be looking for our replies!

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Yes, she is almost as disastrous with quotation as she is with reason.

But we are not going to do it because we can relieve our conscience of it, but because it will satisfy at least one of our desires at least partly and temporarily.

In survival situations, people sometimes revert to cannibalism. Such a person does so in order to satisfy his hunger. No matter if he will be blamed for his act of cannibalism or not, nor if he ought to be blamed for it or not, he will still want to satisfy his hunger! If there is no other food source, he will still revert to cannibalism!

I contend that, according to Mr. Lessans, the reason that responsibility cannot be lessened etc. is that there is no responsibility to be lessened etc.; the absence of responsibility is the reason that nobody will praise or blame us for our actions!