ding an sich

[iambiguous]

John Marmysz from, Laughing at Nothing: Humor as a Response to Nihilism:

In accordance with Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’, Nietzsche conceives of our phenomonal world as arising out of the relationship between our minds and the ‘Ding an Sich’, which for Nietzsche is ‘chaos’. By imposing order on chaos,
humans ‘falsify’ the ‘objective’ world, producing an unfaithful representation of the reality that surrounds them. This representation, in its static and comprehensible appearance, does not really correspond to the chaos that underlies it, but nevertheless what we call ‘knowledge’ is just the outcome of this imposition of structure on the world of disorder.

When we seek to encompass an intelligent understanding of reality it is not always true that we impose our own peculiar order on chaos. That always depends on what aspect of reality we are talking about. For instance, natural science describes the natural world as it is. It does not impose this order on it. It merely discloses an order that had prevailed long before a description of it was possible.

We can only become more or less knowledgable about how those relationships [between, say, matter and energy or time and space] “work”…how they work “in reality”. In other words, reality as it is and not how it is construed to be from the cosmologically infinitesimal persepective of a mere mortal negociating his or her cosmologically infinitesimal blink of and eye sojourn from dust to dust.

Instead, where the true impositions prevail is in our discussion of those relationships in which a particular order of ought can be imposed on a particular order of is.

And impositions are all they can ever be. It is only a matter of which means are chosen to effectuate which ends. But while the means can be calculated with more precision [they either work or they do not] the ends may well not be calcuable at all.

At least not with any degree of precision.

Take for example the conservative attempt to shut down the United States government in order to demonstrate the virtue that government is the problem and not the solution. Will they be successful? And how does the answer to that question differ from the answer to this one: Is it true that government is the problem?

[fuse]

iambiguous,

By imposing order on chaos, humans ‘falsify’ the ‘objective’ world, producing an unfaithful representation of the reality that surrounds them.

What would it mean to produce a faithful representation? Faithful to what?

For instance, natural science describes the natural world as it is. It does not impose this order on it. It merely discloses an order that had prevailed long before a description of it was possible.

I can agree with this. So a faithful representation of reality is faithful to the laws of natural science?

Back to this:
By imposing order on chaos, humans ‘falsify’ the ‘objective’ world

Well I certainly won’t be waiting for the permission of chaos to impose order on it. I would never say that the world ought to be one way or another, but there may still be a place for ought among men.

[JohnJones]

@iambiguous

John Marmysz from, Laughing at Nothing: Humor as a Response to Nihilism:

In accordance with Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’, Nietzsche conceives of our phenomonal world as arising out of the relationship between our minds and the ‘Ding an Sich’, which for Nietzsche is ‘chaos’. By imposing order on chaos,
humans ‘falsify’ the ‘objective’ world, producing an unfaithful representation of the reality that surrounds them. This representation, in its static and comprehensible appearance, does not really correspond to the chaos that underlies it, but nevertheless what we call ‘knowledge’ is just the outcome of this imposition of structure on the world of disorder.

When we seek to encompass an intelligent understanding of reality it is not always true that we impose our own peculiar order on chaos. That always depends on what aspect of reality we are talking about. For instance, natural science describes the natural world as it is. It does not impose this order on it. It merely discloses an order that had prevailed long before a description of it was possible.

We can only become more or less knowledgable about how those relationships [between, say, matter and energy or time and space] “work”…how they work “in reality”. In other words, reality as it is and not how it is construed to be from the cosmologically infinitesimal persepective of a mere mortal negociating his or her cosmologically infinitesimal blink of and eye sojourn from dust to dust.

Instead, where the true impositions prevail is in our discussion of those relationships in which a particular order of ought can be imposed on a particular order of is.

And impositions are all they can ever be. It is only a matter of which means are chosen to effectuate which ends. But while the means can be calculated with more precision [they either work or they do not] the ends may well not be calcuable at all.

At least not with any degree of precision.

Take for example the conservative attempt to shut down the United States government in order to demonstrate the virtue that government is the problem and not the solution. Will they be successful? And how does the answer to that question differ from the answer to this one: Is it true that government is the problem?

what about it?

[statiktech]

@iambiguous

When we seek to encompass an intelligent understanding of reality it is not always true that we impose our own peculiar order on chaos. That always depends on what aspect of reality we are talking about. For instance, natural science describes the natural world as it is. It does not impose this order on it. It merely discloses an order that had prevailed long before a description of it was possible.

I think I see where you’re going, but this isn’t entirely true. Science presupposes an observer, as Rafajafar mentioned in another thread. The order is imposed inasmuch as it is imposed on our perspectives. In other words, we have no measure for the world “as is”. Science doesn’t necessarily impose order, but it does serve to describe and interpret the world in our own terms.

We can only become more or less knowledgable about how those relationships [between, say, matter and energy or time and space] “work”…how they work “in reality”. In other words, reality as it is and not how it is construed to be from the cosmologically infinitesimal persepective of a mere mortal negociating his or her cosmologically infinitesimal blink of and eye sojourn from dust to dust.

How can we know reality as anything but an observer? You are proposing a perspective of pure objectivity, which is contradictory in itself.

Instead, where the true impositions prevail is in our discussion of those relationships in which a particular order of ought can be imposed on a particular order of is.

A dictionary is a list of these types of impositions.

And impositions are all they can ever be. It is only a matter of which means are chosen to effectuate which ends. But while the means can be calculated with more precision [they either work or they do not] the ends may well not be calcuable at all.

If the means are calculable, shouldn’t the ends be calculable per the means?

Take for example the conservative attempt to shut down the United States government in order to demonstrate the virtue that government is the problem and not the solution. Will they be successful? And how does the answer to that question differ from the answer to this one: Is it true that government is the problem?

Well, whether or not the government is a problem says nothing about the probability of success in demonstrating it. Especially if we hope to demonstrate it to the government.

[von_Rivers]

1. I would officially like to say, “ditto” to what fuse said.

2. I probably want to echo Double J’s sentiment too. Let’s not be heartbroken forelorn saps because we weren’t let into some noumenal realm. —There’s other fish in the sea, and so on.

3. Marmyz (whoever he is) is wrong. Dead wrong. For Nietzsche, the concept of an “in-itself” or “noumenal realm” is not merely an unknowable postulate—it is just an idea that does not make sense. It makes no f—ing sense. That’s his criticism of Kant. There is no world outside of all perspective (which is what a 'thing-in-itself is)—there is a world outside of our perspective; but it’s not a ‘thing-in-itself’ (aka “ding an sich”).

[JohnJones]

@Monooq

1. I would officially like to say, “ditto” to what fuse said.

2. I probably want to echo Double J’s sentiment too. Let’s not be heartbroken forelorn saps because we weren’t let into some noumenal realm. —There’s other fish in the sea, and so on.

3. Marmyz (whoever he is) is wrong. Dead wrong. For Nietzsche, the concept of an “in-itself” or “noumenal realm” is not merely an unknowable postulate—it is just an idea that does not make sense. It makes no f—ing sense. That’s his criticism of Kant. There is no world outside of all perspective (which is what a 'thing-in-itself is)—there is a world outside of our perspective; but it’s not a ‘thing-in-itself’ (aka “ding an sich”).

I didn’t read what he wrote. I didn’t need to. All it was was a big, expressionless face, a quote without a comment.

[von_Rivers]

@JohnJones

I didn’t read what he wrote. I didn’t need to. All it was was a big, expressionless face, a quote without a comment.

lol. Only the stuff in bold was a quote.

[iambiguous]

@fuse

What would it mean to produce a faithful representation? Faithful to what?

Well, consider the relationship between the natural world, the laws of physics, engineers and dams. Does an actual dam reflect the dam as it was imagined? Is this able to be demonstrated?

Now, consider the relationship between those who say the dam is a good thing [it enhances the prosperity of the local economy] or a bad thing [it destroys the beauty of the local environment]. Which point of view reflects the truth here? Is this able to be demonstrated?

@fuse

Well I certainly won’t be waiting for the permission of chaos to impose order on it. I would never say that the world ought to be one way or another, but there may still be a place for ought among men.

The place for ought resides in its necessity. Whenever men and women interact there will be a need to impose rules of behavior. This is as certain as the need for a dam to hold back water on a river.

But the rules that govern the construction of the dam revolve around either/or. Either the dam does what it was built to do or it does not.

But ought the dam to have been built at all? Here the thinking is very different.

[JohnJones]

@Monooq

@JohnJones

I didn’t read what he wrote. I didn’t need to. All it was was a big, expressionless face, a quote without a comment.

lol. Only the stuff in bold was a quote.

I couldn’t tell. There was no intro or anything. All that happened was that some big lummox in muddy boots came barging down my spotless hallway.

[iambiguous]

@JohnJones

what about it?

Right to the heart of it! It is almost as though Wittgenstein had not died at all!!

[Faust]

iam - why is the answer to “should this dam have been built?” not either “Yes, it should” or “No, it shouldn’t”?

The place for ought resides in its necessity. Whenever men and women interact there will be a need to impose rules of behavior. This is as certain as the need for a dam to hold back water on a river.

if “ought” is necessary, than why do you say that philosophical language is inadequate to the task. What is adequate?

[fuse]

iambiguous,

I think you’ve switched focus. I was discussing what it would mean to faithfully represent reality. (How do you faithfully represent the thing-in-itself without recourse to the thing-as-it-is?) The ding an sich is reality and human conception is the representation of it. Now you are discussing of an example in which human conception (mental reality) (the imagined dam) is not the representation but is represented by physical reality (the actual dam). Two different subjects without any apparent connection.

I hope you don’t actually expect me to answer your question about whether the built dam is a good thing or a bad thing. There is not enough information for me to care.

Ought is the language of moral obligation. Don’t confuse moral obligation with logical necessity or being necessary for survival (unless you explicitly define morality along these lines).

[iambiguous]

@statiktech

Science presupposes an observer, as Rafajafar mentioned in another thread. The order is imposed inasmuch as it is imposed on our perspectives. In other words, we have no measure for the world “as is”. Science doesn’t necessarily impose order, but it does serve to describe and interpret the world in our own terms.

Our terms are just another way of saying the same thing. We can reconfigure the natural world into a computer but we can’t make it do what nature is not predisposed [by the laws of physics] to allow.

On the other hand, we can use a computer to engage in philosophical discourse or we can use it to engage in identity theft. Or to plot a murder.

All of these events can be described accurately. But how they are interpreted might be subject to many conflicting points of view.

@statiktech

How can we know reality as anything but an observer? You are proposing a perspective of pure objectivity, which is contradictory in itself.

I do not propose to resolve the solipsism antinomy. I may as well try to explain the etiology of existence itself. We all take our own individual leaps here. Mine is to a reality that clearly transcends dasien. A reality in other words that is more than just a point of view.

iambiguous wrote:

Instead, where the true impositions prevail is in our discussion of those relationships in which a particular order of ought can be imposed on a particular order of is.

@statiktech

A dictionary is a list of these types of impositions.

In what sense? Suppose, for example, you are a legislator intent on drafting a bill that will outlaw all abortions. How would a dictionary aid in determining whether this is something you ought to do?

@statiktech

If the means are calculable, shouldn’t the ends be calculable per the means?

Again, abortion. If you are a skilled physician and the end you wish to achieve is the sucessful aborting of a fetus how difficult would it be to calculate this? As opposed to an ethicist trying to calculate whether aborting a perfectly healthy fetus is something one ought or ought not to do?

@statiktech

Well, whether or not the government is a problem says nothing about the probability of success in demonstrating it. Especially if we hope to demonstrate it to the government.

Yes, but how does the conservative go about convincing the liberal that her demonstration is analogous to demonstrating the actual consequences of a government shut down?

The latter is merely a matter of noting empirically what happens when the government is throttled. The former is always a value judgment, its conclusion predicated on premises that can never be established empirically.

[iambiguous]

@JohnJones

I couldn’t tell. There was no intro or anything. All that happened was that some big lummox in muddy boots came barging down my spotless hallway.

That’s not true. It has been years since I last visited an ivory tower.

[Sean]

@iambiguous

@JohnJones

I couldn’t tell. There was no intro or anything. All that happened was that some big lummox in muddy boots came barging down my spotless hallway.

That’s not true. It has been years since I last visited an ivory tower.

Ouch, his grandchildren will feel that burn.

@fuse

I think you’ve switched focus. I was discussing what it would mean to faithfully represent reality. (How do you faithfully represent the thing-in-itself without recourse to the thing-as-it-is?) The ding an sich is reality and human conception is the representation of it. Now you are discussing of an example in which human conception (mental reality) (the imagined dam) is not the representation but is represented by physical reality (the actual dam). Two different subjects without any apparent connection.

Thing-in-itself and thing-as-it-is. This is where things can get confusing in 20th century continental philosophy.

Some of these posts have touched on Kant’s noumenal realm. Kant inspired a generation of philosophers to focus on the perceptual/conceptual apparatus of cognition. Looking at a “thing” as a “unity of apperception.”

Now, one way to criticize Kant is to say that there is no noumena, say no objective reality if you want. This is kind of a Nietzschian thing to do. It’s also a Phenomenologician’s thing to do.

You know that quote, “To the things themselves!”

“To the things themselves!” does not mean, “There is a noumenal realm.” In fact, it means the opposite. Post-Kantians like Heidegger are Post-Kantian precisely because they reject the noumenal realm, and if Heidegger says it, you can bet Nietzsche says it with less words.

“To the things themselves!” means looking at the phenomena rather than at the perceptual apparatus by which we experience phenomena. This approach does not fit into the subjective/objective dichotomy, because the idea with the phenomenologists is not to sever human consciousness/intentionality/dasein from the world. Phenomena is phenomena as disclosed.

@Iambiguous

The place for ought resides in its necessity. Whenever men and women interact there will be a need to impose rules of behavior. This is as certain as the need for a dam to hold back water on a river.

Gender normativity and dams. This is dicey. Heidegger of The Question Concerning Technology would distinguish between the dam that is necessary for humans to truly disclose a river and a fertile landscape to live in and care for and a dam which “enframes” the landscape as standing-reserve “energy resource.” Let’s leave that there.

Gender normativity. When we explain gender norms as “genetically predetermined” or “an unavoidable result of human civilization” I think we are encouraging an “enframing” notion of cultural norms. Cultural norms/rules are a set of technologies that allow the culture to survive. When we explain these things as unavoidable processes or explain economic systems as “sex sells just because that’s the way the free market makes it,” perhaps we are giving up our birthright of a culture that discloses fertile creative humanity in exchange for extreme consumption and standing-reserve identity for branding.

Basically, just because there is a real material world out there doesn’t mean that culture is locked into a market-determined or genetically-determined cultural landscape.

[iambiguous]

@Monooq

Let’s not be heartbroken forelorn saps because we weren’t let into some noumenal realm. —There’s other fish in the sea, and so on.

What noumenal realm? And how does bringing philosophy down to earth make one a forlorn sap? My points always revolve around living in the world philosophically as dasein. What knowledge transcends dasein and what knowledge can only be embodied in our existential interactions with other daseins?

And, of course, what knowledge reflects a constantly shifting amalgam of denoting and connoting whatever reality may or may not be?

@Monooq

For Nietzsche, the concept of an “in-itself” or “noumenal realm” is not merely an unknowable postulate—it is just an idea that does not make sense. It makes no f—ing sense. That’s his criticism of Kant. There is no world outside of all perspective (which is what a 'thing-in-itself is)—there is a world outside of our perspective; but it’s not a ‘thing-in-itself’ (aka “ding an sich”).

In this respect, Nietzsche’s concepts [as with Kant’s] are really no different from our own: He aims for the bullseye and hopes to at least hit the wall.

[iambiguous]

@Faust

iam - why is the answer to “should this dam have been built?” not either “Yes, it should” or “No, it shouldn’t”?

The place for ought resides in its necessity. Whenever men and women interact there will be a need to impose rules of behavior. This is as certain as the need for a dam to hold back water on a river.

if “ought” is necessary, than why do you say that philosophical language is inadequate to the task. What is adequate?

Yes, the answer is either. We share that assumption. But others insist the answer is either/or. And it may well be. I am always looking to be proven wrong. In other words, I take philosophy seriously. I merely insist the words philosophers choose must eventually be situated out in the world.

Still, with philosophy there does not seem to be the equivalent of Isaac Newton or Albert Einstein. The closest we come to these paradigm shifts are the Aristotles, the Kants and the Nietzsches.

Thus: It is the limitation of philosophical language I pursue. On the other hand, to call philosophy inadequate is to suggest it is somehow deficient. That it somehow fails us. But it can’t be more than the sum of its parts. Of its tools. We have to know when leaps are all we have at our disposal.

In this sense, “moderation, negociation and compromise”, “democracy”, “the rule of law” etc. are the most reasonable assumptions to make once we reach the limits of what we can know for certain in our interactions with others.

There is no “ding an sich” in contemplating the “human condition”. Unless, of course, there is. But how can we know this other than through endlessly discussing it? Order and chaos are everywhere. What does that mean?

[statiktech]

@iambiguous

Our terms are just another way of saying the same thing. We can reconfigure the natural world into a computer but we can’t make it do what nature is not predisposed [by the laws of physics] to allow.

I don’t understand. You mean like make raccoons disappear and turn rocks into liquid? The laws of physics are not inherent in nature, they are inherent in how we experience nature.

On the other hand, we can use a computer to engage in philosophical discourse or we can use it to engage in identity theft. Or to plot a murder.

…no porn?

All of these events can be described accurately. But how they are interpreted might be subject to many conflicting points of view.

They are described by points of view, then interpreted [or vice versa]. The accuracy is not in describing the ‘thing-in-itself’, but the ‘thing’ as it is experienced in relation to us.

I do not propose to resolve the solipsism antinomy. I may as well try to explain the etiology of existence itself. We all take our own individual leaps here. Mine is to a reality that clearly transcends dasien. A reality in other words that is more than just a point of view.

Transcends how? ‘Reality’ is what, if not a point of view?

In what sense? Suppose, for example, you are a legislator intent on drafting a bill that will outlaw all abortions. How would a dictionary aid in determining whether this is something you ought to do?

In the sense that we observe something and say it ought to be used in a particular way. A “bat” and “stick” aren’t all too different, for instance. In the same sense, “abortion” and “murder” can be construed the same. Or, on the other hand, “abortion” implies a type of “freedom”.

Again, abortion. If you are a skilled physician and the end you wish to achieve is the sucessful aborting of a fetus how difficult would it be to calculate this? As opposed to an ethicist trying to calculate whether aborting a perfectly healthy fetus is something one ought or ought not to do?

Depends on the physician or ethicist. I see where you’re going, but even the ‘objectivity’ of the abortion is arbitrary in practice. Two skilled physicians may have a different conception of a “successful abortion”.

Yes, but how does the conservative go about convincing the liberal that her demonstration is analogous to demonstrating the actual consequences of a government shut down?

Lying, I suppose.

The latter is merely a matter of noting empirically what happens when the government is throttled. The former is always a value judgment, its conclusion predicated on premises that can never be established empirically.

Well a demonstration is hypothetical. The premises could be established, but then it wouldn’t be a “demonstration”.

[Faust]

Yes, the answer is either. We share that assumption. But others insist the answer is either/or.

You mistook what I was asking. I was asking why it’s not either/or.

Still, with philosophy there does not seem to be the equivalent of Isaac Newton or Albert Einstein. The closest we come to these paradigm shifts are the Aristotles, the Kants and the Nietzsches.

I would name Hume and Nietzsche, but why are they only “close”? A paradigm shift is a paradigm shift.

In this sense, “moderation, negociation and compromise”, “democracy”, “the rule of law” etc. are the most reasonable assumptions to make once we reach the limits of what we can know for certain in our interactions with others.

So, you’re saying that we need politics. Has anyone ever questioned that?

Order and chaos are everywhere. What does that mean?

That’s where philosophers come in - the very philosophers you ignore in favor of the fools and idiots you have evidently been reading. You can only pretend to have gotten to the end of philosophy if you haven’t even really started.

[iambiguous]

@fuse

iambiguous,

I think you’ve switched focus. I was discussing what it would mean to faithfully represent reality. (How do you faithfully represent the thing-in-itself without recourse to the thing-as-it-is?) The ding an sich is reality and human conception is the representation of it. Now you are discussing of an example in which human conception (mental reality) (the imagined dam) is not the representation but is represented by physical reality (the actual dam). Two different subjects without any apparent connection.

If you read my posts long enough you know I generally shift the focus of practically every exchange to better understanding the relationship between dasein [identity], value judgments, political economy and the limitations of philosophical language “out in the world”.

What knowledge of this can be examined and then exhibited sylogistically as either/or and what can only be a ceaseless clash of existential narratives: You think one thing but I think you ought to think something else instead.

Now, in constructing a dam, it is either built as the engineers said it must be built or it is not. And how the engineers said it must be built is either in accordance with nature or it is not. Nature always has the final say because it is ordered by the laws of physics.

But whether it ought to be built at all comes down to deciding whether economic prosperity ought to take precedence over a pristine environment. But here there is no equivalent of “the laws of nature”.

I merely point this out and suggest this has profound implications for human interaction.

But I don’t think you understand this at all. You say:

@fuse

I hope you don’t actually expect me to answer your question about whether the built dam is a good thing or a bad thing. There is not enough information for me to care.

If you understood my point you would grasp why I am suggesting there is no “right answer” to the question of whether the dam ought to be built—even though there is a right answer regarding how it must be built to function as a dam.

Prosperity is a good thing. A beautiful environment is a good thing. And all the new information in the world isn’t going to change that. At best both sides can come up with a way to achieve some of both. Maybe move the dam to a different location, for example.

On the other hand, suppose those who wanted to build the dam had convincing arguments that, were the dam not built, it would mean the destruction of the local economy rather than just a greater prosperity? Would that then cancel out the objections of the environmentalists? Sure, probably some. But not likely all. Context is crucial. But there is still no way to derive the perfect argument to back one side over the other.

You could even have a set of arguments that showed how, were the dam not built, a changing climate could result in the loss of life. But that is not an objective argument for why it must be built.

@fuse

Ought is the language of moral obligation. Don’t confuse moral obligation with logical necessity or being necessary for survival (unless you explicitly define morality along these lines).

I never confuse them. Why? Because they are two very, very different ways of thinking about human interaction.