Hi,
I’m trying to do a website. The purpose of this website will be to show that the mind is special, that it is not just physical, and that the mind or self might well survive the death of our bodies. I’m also trying to express my ideas in as simple a manner as possible so that intelligent people who have never done any philosophy will still be able to understand it. I’m just wondering how successful I am being in that endeavour. If people would like to read the beginning of it, and make some comments on how easy it is to understand, whether they agree with it, the grammar etc, then I would appreciate it.
The first part is an “argument” that the self is a product of the brain through a consideration of mind/brain correlations. I then attempt to show that we most certainly are not compelled to accept this conclusion, and indeed reasons can be induced to doubt this. I paste in below.
Preliminary
Are we machines? More precisely do we, as human beings, differ in any substantive manner from any other physical object in the Universe? In other words is it possible we could, effectively, just be very sophisticated robots? Many of us might balk at such a suggestion. It should be stressed though that merely from the fact that we might find this notion to be disturbing, if not repugnant, this does not in itself ensure the falsity of this thesis. We need to weigh in the balance all the reasons for supposing the mind has its source in the brain - and that therefore we are essentially biological machines, as well as all the reasons for supposing it is not. In this, the “Are we Machines” part of my website, I want to spell out the reasons why a lot of people, particularly educated people, do indeed believe that we human beings are not qualitatively different from any other physical thing . I then intend to try and show that, ultimately, such a stance cannot be maintained.
To achieve this task I will, in section 1, briefly spell out the main reasons for supporting this thesis; namely in terms of the correlations between mind states and states of the brain. I will then attempt to show that such correlations do not compel us to embrace the man is a machine thesis. Having achieved this I will then, in subsequent sections, go further and attempt to show that, in fact, we have overwhelming reasons to reject this thesis. This will primarily involve getting to grips with a philosophical position regarding reality called philosophical materialism and examining the various reasons which appear to pose a difficulty for this philosophical position.
Are we just biological machines?
- General considerations which favour this hypothesis
One very persuasive criterion by which we might judge that we are essentially machines is to ask ourselves whether our behaviour, in common with the behaviour of all other objects in the Universe, simply follows physical laws. By physical laws we simply mean regularities that we observe in nature. Thus, possibly the most obvious example we could point to here, is the law of gravitation which accounts for the fact that objects near the surface of the Earth, will, when released, fall at pretty much the same acceleration. The fact that the world exhibits such regularities allows us not only to predict future events, but also allows us to exercise a degree of control over our environment. Thus modern times has witnessed a bewildering proliferation of various machines capable of carrying out all sorts of tasks. But no matter how complex such machines might be, ultimately they are simply operating according to such physical laws that we have observed, and their behaviour is just as explicable with reference to physical laws as the motion of an apple is when released.
Especially pertinent to our consideration here are those machines labelled computers. Computers can now carry out many tasks that were formerly thought to be exclusively a preserve of the human intellect. The most obvious example here are the playing of games such as chess, where it is now possible to program a computer that can outperform the best chess players in the world. We even have computers that can carry out rudimentary conversations with people. These computers, at least for a while, might well manage to fool us into believing that we are conversing with a genuine person.
This being so are there any reasons for supposing that human beings are anything more than extremely complex machines? Biological machines for sure, but machines nevertheless? As such they would operate according to the physical laws of nature, just as much as any man-made machine. It should be pointed out here that even if one successfully argued against the notion that the brain operates on similar principles to a computer, it arguably would still operate according to physical laws. Thus the brain would still be a machine, and, in principle, could be created with a sufficiently advanced technology. Putting it another way, why should brains be the only type of thing that do not operate according to physical laws? And if they do operate according to such laws, then why suppose we differ in principle from any machine? We might admittedly be very complex machines, but essentially machines nevertheless.
Let’s spell this out more carefully. Our brains consist of billions of neurons. It is reasonable to suppose that neurons simply operate according to physical laws just as much as anything else in the Universe. What would happen if we replaced one of our neurons with an electronic circuit which carries out the exact same physical process as the neuron had? If it carried out the exact same physical process or function, would it not be the case that we would notice no difference whatsoever? Furthermore, we can imagine all our neurons getting replaced one by one until every last one of our neurons had been replaced by such electronic circuits. In this case we would have an electronic brain, and yet it seems we should still be conscious and indeed feel exactly the same!
From a completely different direction, and albeit of a more indirect kind, we apparently find yet further reasons to suppose that we are simply machines. It is well known that when particular parts of the brain get injured, consciousness will become effected in predictable ways. Just to mention a couple of examples; our capacity to understand written and spoken words, or the capacity to speak and so on, are impaired or even eliminated with injuries to certain regions of the brain. In addition radical personality change may be brought about by injury to the brain. The most famous example here is undoubtedly Phineas Gage. We can also point to the effects of drugs which have a propensity to effect our emotions, attitudes and dispositions. Indeed even alcohol and caffeine do this.
These facts regarding not only the apparent tight correlation between our states of consciousness and physical states of the brain, but, as in the examples cited, such conscious states following physical states of the brain, powerfully suggest to many people that processes in the brain generate consciousness or, alternatively, that consciousness is simply another way of talking about brain processes – the thesis of materialism. But regardless of whether conscious states follow, or literally are brain processes, it is held that such apparent complete dependency of conscious states on the state of the brain almost certainly shows that consciousness, or more generally the mind, has its source entirely in the brain. If this is so then our mental lives simply will reflect everything that goes on in the brain, and we will indeed essentially be machines.
To sum up. The argument that many people make is that we have no compelling reason to suppose we are different from any other object in the Universe, and thus, in common with all other objects in the Universe, we are just as susceptible to physical laws as any other object. In particular, although the brain is extremely complex in its operation, there is no cogent reason to suppose that it is qualitatively different from any complex man-made machine. We might feel that we are different from any other object in the Universe, but the foregoing considerations might make us feel disposed to conclude that it is not a difference in kind we are talking about here, but rather, merely a difference in degree. This notion receives further support when we note that mental states, including our emotions, dispositions, attitudes and general personality, can be effected by injury or alteration to the brain, thereby implying that the source of consciousness is within the brain. This being so, and acknowledging that the brain is a physical object like any other physical object that operates according to physical laws, it seems that a sensible position is to conclude that we are, indeed, essentially machines.
- Preliminary Response
Imagine if you will 2 very intelligent people from the early 18th century who, by some means or other, are miraculously transported to our present day. Imagine further they encounter a television set showing a film. After being suitably astounded, and after tinkering around with its internal components and finding that tinkering with particular components effects the picture quality in particular characteristic ways, you can imagine one of them claiming that not just the picture, but the storyline of the film must be wholly generated by these internal components since tinkering with them affects the picture. He might claim there is overwhelming evidence that this must be so. The other person, however, will rightly point out that although he grants that the picture itself is generated by these internal components, it cannot be the case that the actual contents of the movie, the actual storyline with its depiction of various emotions and so on, can be generated by just these internal components. This is because there is nothing about the physical processes within the TV set which could conceivably lead to the generation ex nihilo of such a storyline.
So with a television set the state of its internal components will affect the quality of the picture, but this does not entail that the storyline depicted by the picture is affected too. Indeed no matter how poor the picture quality might get e.g. a snowy picture, ghosting etc, a given film will continue to show the same events.
I want to suggest that some useful insights into trying to understand a possible relationship of the self to its brain might be gained from consideration of this television set metaphor. A loose analogy might be drawn between the television set and the brain, the storyline of a TV programme and the self, and finally the picture quality of programme displayed and the mind states undergone by the self. Thus, just as tinkering with the internal components of a television set will have consequences for the quality of the picture displayed, but will not change the storyline of the programme, so too might alteration of the brain’s processes affect states of the mind without bringing about any change in the actual self.
Thus the suggestion here is that just as the storyline of a film does not have its origin in the television set’s internal components, neither might the self have its source or origin in the brain. Rather it conceivably could be the case that the self’s existence is ontologically self-subsistent and is “filtered†by the brain. What I mean by “filtered†is that although the self does not change as the state of our brains change so as to become a literally different self, the self’s mind states do change. That is to say differing particular mind states change according to the particular physical configuration of the brain. Thus the various mental states we experience during our lives are a result of both the self - accounting for the feeling of a persistent self and the more general dispositions of selfhood - and also the particular physical configuration of the brain the self is “filtered†by. The feeling of a persistent enduring self remains intact, but, due to the change in mind states, our moods, interests and intelligence will vary. This then will account for the correlation between brain states and mind states. This account of the self and its brain which I have provided here is referred to as the transmission theory.
I think this corresponds very nicely with our intuitive notions we have regarding the self. After all, the self is the essential you. To elucidate: although our apparent personality, and intelligence, and interests may change radically throughout our lives, nevertheless we feel very strongly that there is a real sense in which we are one and the very same person throughout our lives. Thus despite, for example, our 5 year old self, our sober adult self, or our drunk adult self exhibiting quite radically different personality traits, and having differing intelligence and differing interests, we are still generally very firmly convinced that we are literally the same self throughout our lives and therefore throughout these various differing mind states. Thus I (that is the self) might, for example, be in a good mood or a bad mood. But my self is not to be equated by such given mind states. Rather I experience being in a good mood, or a bad mood, or indeed any other mental state. The I or the self is that which endures, but which can experience various mental states such as differing moods. Such a self is known in philosophical parlance as a substantial self.
Note that this notion of a literal same self is difficult to maintain if we suppose that the self is actually generated by the brain. For example, if we happen to be materialists - by far the most common group to hold self is generated by the brain (see the next section for an explication of this term) - we must maintain that any “self†must simply be equated with the brain, or more precisely with the processes taking place within it. Given that brain states are in a constant state of change, it would certainly seem that, in a literal sense, the self must also be in a constant state of change. Be clear as to what this means. It means that there can be no unchanging enduring self, i.e. substantial self, under materialism. Our selves are quite literally equated with our mind states. Later, under the duplicate experiment section, it will be argued that under materialism that we must effectively think of our selves as literally ceasing to be, only to be replaced by an almost exact duplicate, spontaneously springing ex nihilo into being every infinitesimal fraction of a second. Within this scenario it might be difficult to avoid concluding our sense of self is effectively an illusion. Indeed this is precisely what many philosophical materialists maintain.
Having stated this, there is, nevertheless, one difficulty against the notion of such a substantial self. If our personalities, interests, desires, intelligence and dispositions can vary so much in our lives, then what is it that actually characterises this substantial self? It seems that we can say very little about it indeed. We always seem to refer to particular mind states, and never to a self that has such mind states. Nevertheless it certainly seems we are implicitly aware of a self to which all of the operations of a self belong, whether these be perceptual experiences, thinking, imagining, recollecting memories, or the simple undergoing of emotions. One might suppose that we can no more imagine ocean waves existing without the sea through which they move, than we can imagine all these mental operations subsisting without a self. This at least gives us a compelling reason to believe in a substantial self even though we are unable to precisely furnish a proof.
Before concluding this sub-section it will be as well as to address an interesting aside. One of the arguments mentioned above for the notion that we are essentially machines is that we could imagine replacing our neurons one by one with electronic circuits which carry out the exact same physical processes or functions as the neurons had. It was implied that if we could do this, then this would show that our mind or self simply results from these physical processes. But it can now be seen that we are not forced to come to this conclusion. To see this let us return to the television set metaphor. With a television set we could replace some or all of the internal components with other components that perform the same function, and both the picture quality and the television programme being screened will be exactly the same as before. We also recognise, whether we are talking about the original internal components, or their replacements, that this does not imply that the storyline has its genesis in any internal components. But it has already been argued that the self might be considered to be analogically similar to the storyline of a television programme. This being so, then it is possible that even if our neurons could be replaced with electronic circuits performing the exact same function, then just as we would still have the exact same picture quality and television programme being screened in the case of the television set, we will have the exact same mind and self in the case of the electronic brain. And just as changing the internal components in the case of the television set does not alter the storyline of the television programme being screened, neither would replacing our neurons by electronic circuits have any implication for our self. In short then, even if we are to be identified with a non-material substantial self which is not created by the brain, but operates through the brain, we could, in principle, replace our neurons one by one by functionally equivalent electronic circuits, and we would notice no difference whatsoever.
There are a couple of caveats. First of all I am not claiming that electronic circuits can in principle replace our neurons. Perhaps it is possible that the exact function of neurons could never be exactly duplicated by any electronic circuits. Secondly, even given that it is possible, it is important to understand that this does not mean that we can actually build a machine from scratch that will be conscious. By replacing neurons with electronic circuits we need to bear in mind the self already exists, and should all neurons be replaced with electronic circuits, it would simply mean the self now operates through a brain composed of electronic circuitry. But we cannot create a self from building a machine ground up. Compare going back in time a couple of hundred years and creating a television set. Even if in perfect working order the television set would not be able to receive a TV signal, but would simply display white noise.
In this section I have addressed the question of whether the apparent dependency of mind states on states of the brain compels us to conclude that we are essentially no different from any other physical object in the Universe, and that our brains must be the source of our conscious lives. It has been argued that we need not be compelled to accept such a conclusion. It has been suggested that it might well be the case that our essential selves simply operate through our brains as proposed in the transmission theory of the self. This has the significant advantage of fitting in well with our deep-seated notion of the self that has it that our essential essence remains unchanged throughout our lives, even though our mind states might change quite radically. On the other hand one might object that it is not clear why our feelings and intuitions should be a guidance in such matters. Perhaps we are mistaken in our beliefs in an enduring unchanging self. Perhaps we really are just biological machines and that the notion of an enduring self is an illusion, caused perhaps by the fact that successive psychological states tend to be very similar. In addition it might be pointed out that the correlations between brain states and mind states, although possibly equally explicable on the transmission hypothesis, nevertheless certainly seem to be more congenial to the arguably more simple and less convoluted hypothesis that the brain simply generates our conscious experiences. In an attempt to resolve such questions we now turn to examine the chief representative of the position that brain generates mind; that is philosophical materialism.
Hell, it’s only going to be about the first 20% of the section entitled “Are we Machines”. And then there’s other sections to my website all basically arguing that mind is special.
And it will get more involved later on 