I anticipated this and note my point 3 above [your borrowed my idea?].
Reflect on this very heavily loaded point,
how can you get this point [in red below] across without relying on any human conditions?
“There was a moon before there were any human conditions to condition it.”
Therefore whatever that is, it is ultimately conditioned by human conditions.
The above is one way to demonstrate there is no escape from human conditions.
There are many other perspectives that converges to support the main point, that whatever is objective is ultimately intersubjective. For example, note Kant’s Copernican Revolution;
Kant proceed to explain the possibility of his thesis with the Critique of Pure Reason.
Note I mentioned elsewhere ‘intersubjective’ and interdependently emergent.
This mean the subject and object emerge spontaneously without considering which comes first.
Again you conflate statements with states of affairs. Take the quotes out, I'm not talking about a sentence. How is it that there could be a moon before there were any human conditions to condition it? very easily- humans haven't always been around, the Moon has been around a fair bit longer than we have. How do we "get the point across" that "There was a moon before there were any conditions to condition it"? We don't, but that's you confusing states of affairs with the sentences that name them. If all you meant to say in this thread is that the meaning of sentences is intersubjective, then I doubt anybody would disagree. But clearly you mean something more.
It’s not clear to me that what you just wrote is a coherent reply to the statement of mine you seem to intend to be replying to.
Yes, there is something to more than what ‘you’ have been engaging with.
I understand when you classified the following;
Statement
State of affairs
In one perspective 1 and 2 are independent, but my point is in its ULTIMATE perspective, both 1 and 2 are interdependent and intersubjective as in what I stated earlier, i.e.
Note I mentioned elsewhere ‘intersubjective’ and interdependently emergent.
This mean the subject and object emerge spontaneously without considering which comes first.
It is definitely coherent to me but not to you because you are stuck in one perspective only, i.e. the philosophical realist standpoint.
I asked you to reflect deeply on the statement and its referent, ‘The moon predated humanity’
My point is both the statement [reference] and the reality of the referent are both conditioned by the human conditions.
From one common perspective, this does not sound logical as it is non-sequitor and contradictory, i.e. if the moon predated humanity, then how can human predate the moon?
But logic is merely a representation of reality, i.e. the map is not the territory.
Thus to be more efficient we have to ask, what is the realistic reality of the referent and its element, i.e.
What is the reality of the moon.
What is the reality of time, i.e. the concept of ‘predate’ in relation to ‘before’ and ‘after’.
What is the reality of humanity and the individuals that comprised reality?
Now when we move to a meta-level above the logical perspective and reflect deeply, one will face with truth that ultimately the reality of the referent(s) individual or in combination into complex ideas are interdependent with the mind(s) and intersubjective.
One starting clue is the element of time within the referent. Time is not absolutely mind-independent. Time is interdependent with human mind(s) i.e. the human condition.
If you reflect on the reality of the moon, it is also interdependent with human minds. Note the work of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, et all and other philosophical anti-realists.
As for humanity, this is obviously mind-interdependent and mind(s) are intersubjective.
Therefore the so-called referent ‘the moon predate humanity’ is ultimately interdependent with the human conditions at a meta-level.
It is only at the conventional level that the moon is independent of human conditions and this is to facilitate survival at the conventional level. It is because ‘survival’ is so critical that most philosophical realist cannot let go of their savior perspective that they are unable to see the other finer perspective of reality.
It is like one who cannot see the other cube in another perspective in this Necker Cube example. e.g. this case could be like,
You can only see one cube and accuse me of hallucinating when I insist there are two cubes.
Write novel and earn pitty nonsence applaud and mere money.
better write something which impresses those people who use dollar as currency.
and they pay in dollar as appreciation.
Yeah, I get that that’s your point, you just haven’t argued for it yet. Every attempt you’ve made so far as just been to switch a state of affairs with a statement and rely on the intersubjectivity of language to say ‘look how intersubjective everything is’. But it simply isn’t the case. If you take language out of it, this is clear: we all know of situations in which what one person knew affected another person who didn’t know any better, or situations in which what everybody knew was wrong, and so on. So here’s a common enough scenario:
I hit you in the head from behind with a snowball. You knew nothing of me or the snowball until you were struck- you are cold and wet as if from nowhere and much reach back and look around to figure out why. Unknown to either of us, there was a rock in the snowball, so you are also bruised.
Now, this all fits together quite nicely if reality isn’t intersubjective- the snowball doesn’t need your input to affect your head, the rock doesn’t need input from either of us. Objects more or less are as physics describes them to be, our perceptions affect things more or less as daily life suggests that they do. So what is the problem in this scenario that intersubjectivity is required to solve? What does it contribute?
When we move away from the logical arguments that show that you're wrong and just accept your un-argued for premises at face value, we can begin to see that you were right after all. That isn't how I do philosophy though. I'm simply not in the market for a guru, I require arguments. Neither Locke, nor Berkeley, nor Hume, nor Kant saw themselves as anti-realistists. Even Berkeley, the one who came the closest to saying everything was mind-dependant, didn't believe this lead to intersubjectivity; his argument was that everything is objectively grounded within the mind of God. And anyway, if I'm aligned with anybody from that period, it's Thomas Reid, so dropping these names means little to me.
I’m not accusing you of hallucinating, I’m accusing you of not bothering to argue for your positions.
Btw, I did not say that the intersubjectivity is based on language.
I did say somewhere, the ultimate inter-subjectivity is because humans has generic DNA that enable objectivity based on shared-experiences, necessity and universality.
Let say it is me who hit you in the head from behind with a snowball.
Now lets assume both of us are a species of monkeys (M).
There is still intersubjectivity involved within the species of monkeys that they their actualization of snow and snowball, via the reading the mind of the other, will have an effect on the other monkey.
In addition, there is also intersubjectivity in the realization of their own crude sense of self [slightly above proto- level] and that of others.
These impulses are built into the generic DNA of such a specie of monkey. No sophisticated language is necessary for this kind of intersubjectivity.
As for humans, there are different levels of intersubjectivity, from fundamental to gross. The human fundamental levels of intersubjectivity are inherent via DNA from primate, monkeys and other lower animals down to the first one-cell-entity.
In the event of me hitting you with a snow-ball, all the basic physical elements down to their quark levels are objective and based on intersubjectivity via Science at the gross level and towards the finer forms right up the first one-cell-entity.
It is based on this intersubjectivity thus generalization that any human will understand it is and dangerous if one do not check for stones when making snowballs with intention to throw them at another person.
The same principle of objectivity = intersubjective in all aspect of reality.
Note the understanding of such is not based on one syllogistic argument. It justifications from all perspectives that converges to support the main point.
Berkeley, Hume, and Kant are definitely philosophical anti-realists in their own ways. Hume and Kant imply objectivity as grounded in intersubjectivity.
All humans are hallucinating within a continuum. The problem is you are ignorant of it and thinking what you are hallucinating is absolute real. Schizophrenics has their own kind of extreme hallucinations that are specific while normal humans has mild hallucination which can be shared based on their generic DNA.
Note;
The fact is the philosophical realist has no way of ever proving nor experiencing what they think is really real out there. Note Meno’s paradox. There is always a gap between the human experience of X and what is really X.
Is there something that is a real-X? Kant asserted there is no such thing as a real X-in-itself.
If you think otherwise, show me your proof you can experience the real X-in-itself or even an apple-in-itself or even when you are eating an apple.
As Dr. Ramachandran (world famous neuroscientist) stated we are all hallucinating all the time and the only real objective reality is the one we shared collectively based on our generic DNA and intersubjectivity from the finest to the grossiest levels.
And now you’re just refusing to address my point. I didn’t ask you how it is people understand that snowballs with rocks are dangerous. That is, once again, you swapping out a perfectly ordinary question about reality and replacing it with a statement of human attitude.
The issue is, how can you be hit from behind by a snowball that you didn’t know was there, from a thrower that you didn’t know was there, and be wet prior to discovering the source, if the snowball is intersubjective- you know, occuring between the minds of the thrower and the target. How can there can be a rock in the snowball that bruises the target when neither the thrower nor the target are aware of the rock until after the bruise- or perhaps not even then?
The problem is that you don’t have any straightforward way to speak about the point you’re trying to make without revealing that you can’t support it, I fear.
Which would not mean reality is intersubjective. Not being able to prove the reality of YOUR OWN sense experiences means not being able to prove they relate meaningfully to anybody else’s, or indeed that there is anybody else for them to relate to. I.E, it’s an argument towards solipsism, not intersubjectivity.
In order for intersubjectivity to even be coherent at all, it is you who who needs to prove that people other than yourself are real in themselves. It takes two to ‘inter’ after all. Any argument you want to make against an apple not really being there, I can make against other people not being there.
The good doctor, if indeed he said that, should stick to neuroscience and not get into philosophy, because he's made a rather basic error, it seems. He thinks we are all hallucinating all the time, and yet stands firm in his belief that there is something like DNA, and something like other people we share it with. Nah.
It is only gibberish from your ignorant, narrow and shallow perspective. Monkeys may not have intersubjective consensus on a highly intellectual level and sophisticated language like humans, but they do have basic intersubjectivity because they share the same DNA. There are a lot of research done on this.
Note I used the monkey [note primates] example and if you understood that this point will make sense.
Note I posted an OP on schizotypalism and religion which is one of the basic of this point. youtube.com/watch?v=4WwAQqWUkpI
This is aligned with the point raised by Dr. Ramachandran.
Not sure of your point.
What I am saying is the philosophical realist cannot prove mind-independence, thus the viable explanation is ‘intersubjectivity’ as discussed.
This is why you are off.
There is no thing-in-themselves including no “I-in-itself” which is the “I AM” of Descartes.
According to Hume the ‘self’ [the subject] is merely a bundle of perceptions.
From Kant the self is more than that, i.e. it comprised more complex a priori variable, but there is no “I-in-itself” i.e. the “I AM”. In Kant case, what is real and verifiable is the “I” that thinks and there is no “I” that is “AM.” The argument is complex so I won’t go into the details.
So what we have here is the ‘inter’ of two “I-think.”
As you can see, physical reality is intersubjective and fuzzy. The subject itself is also fuzzy. What we have as reality is something like jazz [iterative intersubjectivity], i.e. spontaneous emergent.
Dr. Ramachandran’s subject is cognitive neuroscience not purely philosophy.
In the course of philosophy, I have borrowed his point which would have been based in depth analysis and knowledge. You will need to step into his arena and understand from the depth he is speaking from before criticizing him.
Note: when presenting my points I do not simply pick them from the air nor they are from a spontaneous impulse. Personally, to maintain a reasonable degree of integrity and credibility I make sure I have done sufficient research to the best of my ability on the subject and the point I made.
Really? “That they their actualiation of snow and snowball” means something to people other than me, such that the part about monkey’s reading each other’s minds doesn’t sound like crazy ranting? Cause I’m pretty sure that’s gibberish.
If you can't prove mind-independence, then you can't prove the existence of people other than yourself for the exact same reason. If rocks might all be in your head, then so might your neighbor. This is direct from Kant, this is direct from Descartes: they make no special exception for other minds. Just as you can't prove mind-independance of a raindrop that seems to fall on your face, you can't prove mind-independence of a stranger who asks you for the time. No other people means no intersubjectivity. Your argument is self-refuting. Very straightforward.
I have this safe in my apartment and on one side of it there’s a great big stack of american money, like the fiat kind that everyone is so against. On the other side there’s a fairly large pile of gold coins, small bars, (like 1 oz each), and a huge pile of silver.
If I want to get anything for myself, or pay my rent, or satisfy any debt, the bills are useful. The gold and silver are not.
Fiat money is probably the last step before the step of no money: the machines pay instead of the moneyless humans who are more effectively controlled than ever before.
You are the one ranting gibberish from ignorance. Btw, I don’t simply spout on impulse like you do, rather what I post is based on at least some research I have read. Note
Note Kant explained and justified the existence of other minds and the external world within his Refutation of Idealism and yet justify intersubjectivity via his basic Copernican Revolution.
What you do not understand is perspectives. You have perspective blindness and a biasness for concreteness [a degree of schizotypalism].
A diamond is one of the hardest element in one perspective but soft in another. Same for water.
In another perspective, that same diamond is merely a cluster of atoms, electrons and protons in almost empty space, wave or particle, and in another perspective it is ‘nothing.’
Kant’s Copernican Revolution places the the self at the center of knowledge, as in singular, as in not intersubjective. That doesn’t save your argument.
Name dropping and you accusing me of mental conditions doesn’t interest me. Arguments interest me. If mind-independence can’t be established, then that applies to other minds just as much as it does other matter- if not, show me why. If you can’t establish that other minds exist apart from your own, you can’t have intersubjectivity. Your position is self refuting.
You seem to blind to the other part i.e.
“Note Kant explained and justified the existence of other minds and the external world within his Refutation of Idealism …”
The copernican revolution establishes the self as the center of knowledge. It’s an explicit denial of intersubjectivity. It makes intersubjectivity impossible.
Kant’s refutation of Idealism means to established a mind-independant reality, which undermines everything you’ve said. Can realists like Kant establish a mind-independant reality, or can’t they?
You’re the one who wanted to argue so hard that mind-independant reality couldn’t be established. Given that, your argument is self-refuting. You can’t just invoke the name of Kant like a magic spell and make my argument go away.
Again: If you believe mind-independance can’t be established, there goes your evidence for the existence of other minds. No other minds, no intersubjectivity. Self-defeating argument.
Your way out is to explain to me how you can deny that snowballs and such are mind-indepedent while at the same time making a case for the reality of other minds. Kant simply did not do this for you.
Yes, you are blind to see the two perspectives together within the following statement,
Prismatic: Note Kant explained and justified the existence of other minds and the external world within his Refutation of Idealism and yet justify intersubjectivity via his basic Copernican Revolution.
There are two critical elements here;
Kant basic Copernican Revolution that reality is conditioned upon the human conditions
Refutation of Idealism - recognition of external world and other minds
1 and 2 are not contradictory, rather 2 is a subset of 1.
Note Kant explained in great detail his refutation of idealism, thus one need to be familiar with the very complex and subtle arguments.
Note my consistence point;
Objectively is ULTIMATELY instersubjectivity, meaning in this case, the objective of an independent world is ultimately rested upon the intersubjectivity from 1.
Subjects recognize they are independent of each other but yet understand the minds of others and that they have the same basic mind explicitly and instinctively.
You are spouting gibberish because you do not understand Kant’s philosophy but want to post as if you are a Kant expert [I am not, but merely very familiar with his work].
Considering I make the fourth person to come to this thread to try to explain to you that you aren’t grasping some basic ideas of what objectivity is, maybe you should be slower to attrbute blindness to others.
No it isn’t. Kant’s point there is that knowledge of the world is dependant on the constitution of the mind It is about how we know things, not what things are. You have consistently ignored this distinction in your replies to everybody in this thread. In other words, I find myself pointing out the same misunderstanding that Only Humean pointed out on page one, and I and James on point two.
Well Kant argued Metaphysics is an impossibility, so your last point is baseless until you can proof the existence of an absolute ontological substance.
The link you provided justify my argument and not yours.
Make measurements? Of what? Each other’s opinions? Their own opinions? The habits and customs of their society?
This is completely irrelevant. If I say it’s 100 miles from NYC to Philadelphia, that’s correct as long as it’s 100 miles from some point in NYC to some point in Philadelphia. And correct enough if I’m within 10 miles or so for the centres, for most purposes. Sub-quark accuracy at all times is not a condition of factuality.
Since it seems most people in the thread disagree with you, can we intersubjectively conclude that you’re wrong?
e.g. this case could be like,