Empiricism vs Rationalism

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
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This is my first thread regarding philosophy, so excuse the lack of experience regarding forum interaction, I hope I’m doing things correctly. I haven’t been much of an internet user, and since I’ve recently discovered how to use google, I came across this place! I told my friend about this internet thing, to which she said “prepare for your own demise”.

Anyway, to the point, I’m interested in the rationalist view of the members here, compared to the empirical notions, hopefully sparking a discussion with arguments over the two positions.

For those in need of a summary of these; the basic claim of a rationalist would be the use of reasoning to prove an external entity, such as God. They believe in a priori use of knowledge, where one would have innate ideas, inborn, unbound knowledge within them at birth. Such philosophers inclined to this view - Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza. Empiricists rejected this stance, claiming knowledge derives from sense-experience and observation. Such empiricists include Locke, Hume and Berkeley.

I’ve always been attracted to the Lockean ideas, but the problem I’ve been having with every claim is that regardless of the arguments, everyone reaches the same assumption of “there must be a cause for these ideals, a being that is capable of such ideals, therefore God exists.” - this seems very absurd to me; everyone travels different paths to the proof of the existence of God, be it rationally or empirically, yet arrive at the same, assuming, non-proof of the actual existence. Saying this, I really dont want to follow someone like Nietzshe!

So, which would you place yourself under?

-Arri

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I’m with Nietzsche, who largely ignores epistemology. But if you can coax out some rationalists, I would love to do battle with them. It’s my favorite sport.

By the way, don’t be starting out with any apologies - you’re doing things just fine. Yours is a more coherent post than half the ones you will see. For all I know, you will think me incoherent, so that may not matter.

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I tend to side with Hegel, who disagrees with both rationalists and empiricists. For Hegel, cause-and-effect are only surface scratches of a deeper issue; for instance, “God is being” is not enough for Hegel. He views this phrase with subject-predicate logic: the subject, “God” is reflected into the predicate, “is being,” and fundamentally relies upon this predicate for its Notion. Instead, Hegel argues, the subject should be reflected into itself, a negation of negation, in order to reach an Absolute.

As to the argument for or against God, who cares? It is not so much God that is emphasized in religions as it is the practices of those religions, e.g., Christians are not so much about “following God” as they are “following Christianity.” I try to abstain from absolute metaphysical reflections, since by very nature of being metaphysical they will be something which is not logical, as the human is not metaphysical. Like Hegel, I also disagree with the anti-metaphysical approach (Rationality), which is absorbed in the object is contemplating, losing itself, the Subject, in the process of examining the Object.

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I’m with Hume

inductive reasoning is not reasonable…

-Imp

p.s. welcome to the boards

5

I’m with Frank Zappa.

Nobody looks good in brown lipstick.

  • détrop
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Incandenscence, can I call you “candy”? That’s a long handle you got there. Are you claiming that Hegel was not a metaphysician? I’m trying to reconcile two statements that you make - first, that you side with Hegel, and second, that you refrain from absolute metaphysical reflections. Is there a way to read Hegel without seeing nothing but absolute metaphysical relflections? If not, how can you “side” with him? On anything, I mean.

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Or “Incan,” heh, whichever you prefer.

Hegel openly condemans metaphysics at various points throughout his “Philosophy of History” and his “Phenomenology of Spirit (Mind).” He established himself as a phenomenologist, not a metaphysician. I suggest you return to the section “Religion” in his Phenomenology, where he ambivalently both defends and critiques Christianity. For Hegel, the origin of man is not at all important – he is not metaphysical --, to the contrary, Hegel is most definitely concerned with man’s thought, how he thinks – Hegel is ultimately a “dialectical epistemologist.”

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I resalise that Hegel thought he was talking about real phenomena. That “reason is a substance” stuff is a humdinger. But Plato thought that Forms were real, Hobbes thought that there was no conflict among classes, Kant thought morality resided in Reason itself. I am not asking what Hegel thought of himself, but what you think of him.

The origin of man is a metpahysical concern only to a metaphysician. To a biochemist, metaphysics doesn’t even come into play.

Your conception of Hegel is unique in my experience. That, of course, does not make it incorrect. Hegel - not a metaphysician. Just wondering.

I read Hegel all the time for amusement, and have, off and on, for some twenty-five or thirty years. I’m not sure a reread will sway me. Mebbe.

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I think absolutely what Hegel said – his famous statement, “The Spirit is a Bone,” is to be read literally, not metaphysically. Not only can we perceive in the Spirit, from this statement, the Lacanian Real, but also that Spirit exists only insofar as it exists as Bone, as “real” substance.

Also, your comment that Hegel “thought he was talking about real phenomena” misses Hegel’s point. Hegelian philosophy demands that we take up “real phenomena” as a starting point – to never move beyond that is to fall into the trap of the thinkers you listed (Plato, Kant, Hobbes, Schelling, Fichte, etc.), all of whom Hegel, to wit, condemned for getting caught up in the “real phenomena” of their ideas. While Hegel certainly believes “the Spirit is a Bone,” he also believes that this is simply where the Spirit resides, not what the Spirit does.

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Wow. I didn’t think there were any real Hegelians left. Thank you for your patience with me. Yours is a fascinating position.

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I find it strange that there’s such a perceived dichotomy between empiricism and rationality.

Rationality is simply the rigorous application of deductive logic. Empiricism is two things - 1) a means of acquiring facts about the universe (observation), and 2) a method for prediction - making conjectures about the universe (which uses induction).

None of these are at all exclusive. When a physicist wants to know if his current theory is right, he makes predictions, and then tests those predictions using observations. If an observation contradicts his theory, he scraps it, and looks for a new theory. He finally selects a theory that he likes by finding one that matches past observations (the principle of induction - if it matches past observations, it’s likely to match future ones as well). All the while he uses lots and lots of math (deductive reasoning) to formulate his theory.

We don’t seem to be born with innate knowledge, but we’re clearly born with innate levels of instinct (eat when hungry, have sex, etc.), and the predisposition to behave or think in certain ways. A priori knowledge isn’t innate knowledge, it’s knowledge that doesn’t absolutely require experience. Math is a priori because some genius brain-in-a-tank could, theoretically, make mathematical deductions with absolutely no sense input. Trees are not a priori because you’d need to see them in order to truly know that they existed.

Our knowledge, as developed humans, is mostly empirical, and somewhat a priori. I know a lot of math, and that’s all a priori knowledge - but I know much more about people, cars, food, plants, and so on, and that’s all empirical.

In short: pure logic can argue and prove some things, but there are many things that require empirical evidence and the principle of induction, TOGETHER with logical reasoning, to argue. These aren’t exclusive in the least. The logician who eternally rejects sense data is a fool; the scientist who doesn’t use deductive reasoning doesn’t exist. You must have both.

That’s my stance. Thoughts? Objections?

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if you really want to understand the analytic/synthetic logic problem and science, read this debate (particularly between membrain and myself):

ilovephilosophy.com/phpbb/vi … sc&start=0

-Imp

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Imp,

Thanks for the link - it’s definitely relevant. But it seems that at the core of almost all of your points in the linked post, and so far on this one, are based on the fallacy of induction. And honestly I think that stance could bear some closer examination.

First of all, logic is an axiomatic system. Our universe works on axioms too, including logic, but including other workings as well. It is the goal of physics to try and discover those additional axioms. (Whether or not it is working reasonably towards its goal can be debated, of course - but that is the stated goal of physics.)

So when you are working within the axiomatic system of logic and you argue that “induction is a fallacy”, what exactly do you mean? After all, the assertion “induction yields true conclusions” is either provably true, provably false, or unprovable, within the context of logic.

If induction is provably true, science works and we’re done. However, I don’t know anyone who believes that logic can prove induction.

If it’s provably false, science is based on an error, and we’re done. It seems like this is what you believe - however, it seems very unlikely that you could offer anything close to the logical disproof required.

Much more likely is that the idea of induction is independent of logic. Logic cannot prove induction, but also cannot disprove induction. If this is true, then there are some possible worlds in which induction, as a general principle, works great. And there are other possible worlds in which there is no past/future patterning or predictability at all, and everything is really freakin’ random.

My overall point is this: if you’re going to claim induction is a fallacy, you should be more precise. Either you think logic can disprove induction, or else you think that logic can’t prove induction. If you’re going to claim the former, you need to offer a proof (not a Humean linguistic argument, but a real logical proof) that induction is false.

On the other hand, if you’re going to claim just that logic can’t prove induction to be true or false, that seems like a very reasonable stance, and you’ll get no argument from me. However, if it can’t be proven true or false in logic, that tells us exactly nothing about whether or not induction is true in our universe.

So: true, false, or unprovable? Which is it? I am interested to hear all your thoughts and arguments, but I would also appreciate a commitment to one of these three, since they, logically, cover all the possibilities.

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that depends on how you use it

-Imp

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Twiffy - “Logical proof” is a term used to describe the reduction of statements to tautologies. A = B. Any proof provided by induction would constitute a different sense of the word “proof.” You suspect your girl is cheating on you. One day, you catch her in bed with another guy. I would accept that as proof of your suspicions, but it is not a logical proof. You may use your deductive powers to construct a logical proof based on what you have seen, of course. But to ask if induction itself can be proven is meaningless.

Induction is a method of proof, or it is not. You can believe your own eyes, or not. You can believe that tautologies show proof, or not. Belief is never escaped. But to ask if a method of proof can be proven correct by a method of proof is like asking if reality is real, or if youth is young. It is nonsensical. I do not entirely agree with Imp, here. Induction is the formalisation of habit, an arrangement of observation. There are those who would try to make it into a form of logic. I do not think they have succeeded.

Deductive logic requires primises that are accepted as true, but certainty is a psychological state only. Direct sensory perception is accepted by most. But if that cannot be “proven” to be reliable, then no logic can escape belief.

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Faust,

Yes, everything you said is true, but I fail to see how it addresses the issue. I’m well aware that deduction provides formal proof, whereas induction (in the scientific sense) does not. Induction is not a fixed rule; rather, it’s a general observation, that patterns of the past tend to apply to the future.

This doesn’t seem to address whether induction is provable, disprovable, or unprovable.

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I was discussing the different senses of the word “proof”. If induction can’t be “proven” in the sense of that word that we use in logic, which you have just agreed to, what potential way can it? I mean, what are the possibilites? My view is that there are none. What do you believe the choices are?

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I don’t think induction can be proven or disproven logically, and I don’t think there’s another meaningful sense in which it can be proven or disproven. I’d be hesitant to attribute the word “proof” to something besides logical proof anyway.

Thoughts?

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Okay. So the only potential way of proving inductive logic is by some logical means. My point is that this is like asking if we can see eyesight, or hear our auditory sense. Logic is a method, not a thing or an event. Logic is not a fact. It is to ask if proof can be proven. It is a nonsensical question to begin with. Can numbers count? Can mathematics be shown to be mathematically correct?

Do you see what I mean?

Proof is a concept that is not applicable to every other concept. You cannot ask if proof can be proven. Because logic is the proving itself - that’s all it is. It does not contain truth values. Logical arguments do. I can’t seem to explain it any other way.

My further point is that induction does not belong within the category of logic, but I am answering based on the premise of your question, which is that it does.

“Induction is a fallacy” means that it is not a valid argument form. On this I agree with Imp. I believe he was speaking loosely even in calling it logic. I could be wrong.

addendum - induction must be accepted on grounds other than “proof”. “Blind faith” comes to mind. I have faith in induction (although I wouldn’t call it blind) - what little epistemology I have depends upon this. It works for me.

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Yeah, I see what you mean. I don’t think it quite applies, though. Certainly logic is a method and not a thing, but it’s still true that 1) either the method can prove that the method of induction yields true results, 2) it can disprove it, or 3) it can’t really address the question one way or another. It seems clear to me that it’s 3, simply because of what you said, that induction does not belong within the category of logic. Logic talks about implication. You can logically prove that (A → B) → (\B → \A). You can’t logically prove “Trees exist” or “Induction yields true results” or statements of that form.

And I can certainly agree with you that induction is not a valid argument form. If I am trying to prove that there is no highest prime number, and my argument is that we’ve factored numbers up through the trillion trillions and still haven’t found any, and therefore we never will, I’d be laughed out of my math class.

However, I get the impression that Imp actively believes either that science is “wrong”, or that scientists aren’t aware of the precise nature of induction. (Imp, please feel free to correct me if I am mistaken, or to elaborate on your views.) Neither of those are valid conclusions. Regarding the latter, no scientist would accept the above argument on prime numbers, either. No scientist thinks that induction can be used to give proofs. They simply view induction as a method, imperfect but useful and indeed essential to the scientific process. And regarding the former, you can certainly say that the methods of science cannot be proven to work - clearly that’s true. But you cannot at all say that they are in any other sense “wrong”, I don’t think. Science has “worked” remarkably well, much more than any other explanatory system (e.g. religion / mysticism / etc.) in making predictions that happen, curing diseases, making computers, etc. Even if their methods aren’t firmly demonstrably perfect via logical proof - what methods are, besides those of math? - that doesn’t at all suggest that the conclusions of science, and the theories of science, are unsound.

And yes, certainly induction must be accepted on grounds other than proof. So must a great many things about how our world seems to work. It’s all part of the fact that, while our universe may operate in accordance with logic, it has more specific rules as well. Physics is about identifying those more specific rules, and using them to our advantage.