Metaphysical–epistemological divide is, I think, one of the most complex issues in philosophy. The first makes claims about what exists ultimately (reality), the latter deals with what we know or can be known. It is difficult to imagine a metaphysical enterprise without talk of epistemic concepts and/or perceptual concepts at the same time. Yet there have always been arguments purporting the distinction between the two. Metaphysical (traditional) description of reality-as-it-is is indispensable and rightly so. But this traditional view has been hotly contested in the modern philosophy. (There is a view that says talk about the external world existing without our mentality getting in the way is incoherent.) So much so, that perhaps, coherence theory of knowledge has been the most invoked counter-argument against (the traditional) talk of the external world existing as-it-is.
Is it coherent to speak of the external world, especially of ascribing truth condition between what we say and what is out there, without mentalizing it? I don’t think it is. The coherentists deny that our understanding, and hence knowing the truth of what we say, lies simply in the correspondence—sort of like a perfect match—between our belief/assertion/claims and the things existing in the world. What makes the external world relevant, they say, depends on whether we can, or we do, conceptualize it or not. Conceptualizing lies in the heart of propositions which mark our epistemic knowledge. It is our way of representing the external world and make it coherent—this is how understanding of what we say is possible.
So, turning our beliefs (or perceptual beliefs) into epistemic knowledge is the idea behind coherence in our system of beliefs. This is how the external world becomes relevant to us. The unrestricted correspondence between what we think and what is out there that gives us truth, as the traditionalists claim, is not unrestricted after all, hence not what gives truth to what we say or believe. This restriction is provided for by the coherentists’ idea of epistemic responsibility: we have a responsibility to make our beliefs be justified or warranted. And this is possible only if we have the conceptual tool and the capability to form propositions to represent the external world.
Saying the above opens up quite a few implications, especially towards the traditionalist’s conception of ultimate reality—that is, if the coherentist approach (representationalist) really does make a good objection against the traditionalist’s view.
If you think this is all funky and you’d rather stick to the traditionalist view of reality, feel free to comment.
You were gone, too, James? Lots of catching up then. )
Kenneth,
I’m not surprised. Coherentism has been linked to relativism—sort of like name-calling. haha. But, really it isn’t. Coherentism does have a “external constraint” unlike relativism which is stuck in its own social or cultural orientation. The external constraint, though, as far as coherentism is concerned, works as evidence or justification–not what the traditionalists call direct access to the world. This is, I think, one of the most misunderstood views. Coherentism does not deny that there is an external world, but going by our conceptual and perceptual limitation, we must necessarily form concepts to understand the world.
Btw, the author who wrote that is a math prof. I am currently reading on philosophy of math that is headed towards the same trend (moving away from traditionalist conception of knowledge).
One more thing—it is not all linguistic, rather it is epistemic which involves justification, warrant, evidence of the beliefs we form.
You presented an article written by a math prof. It is not by accident that he must necessarily have a view with a perspective of mathematician. Epistemology covers not only metaphysics, but also philosophy of math.
Why don’t you tell me your own version of what you think about my OP. I want to know how you refute coherentism as viewed like this. (It is good to quote but please present your take of what you quote).
James Franklin is a math professor? How do you know that? And what difference would that make anyway?* He was talking about what Stove called “the worst argument in the world”. Again, I am baffled. And I don’t go around trying to refute vague and nebulous views like “coherentism” whatever that is supposed to be. I would have no idea where to begin, since I don’t have any clear idea what that view is supposd to be. And what would that have to do with it anyway? The argument, such as it was, seems to be that since I can know of things only as I know of them (a tautology if ever I have seen or heard one) nothing exists other than what I know. Which is an obvious non-sequitur But if you want an argument that it is a non-sequitur here it is: the premise is a necessary truth (as are all tautologies). The conclusion is a statement about what exists, and, therefore is a contingent truth. It is a theorem of modal logic that a contingent truth cannot follow from a necessary truth. Therefore, the argument is invalid.
*Are you arguing that since the article is by math professor, and (according to you) mathematicians “move away” from the traditional conception of knowledge (whatever that is), that I have to take notice of what some mathematicians have to say about epistemology? Can you really be arguing that?
Click on his bio, it’s right there. It does make a difference whether reality or what we know about it is presented through the perspective of a math philosopher, a scientist, or a metaphysicist.
If you don’t understand then, learn it. The purpose of philosophy forum is so we could debate, discuss, philosophic issues. Saying it sounds like “the worst argument” is not an argument. You have not presented anything to counter my post.
Aha! Correction. Coherentism does not deny the external world, so they don’t deny that things exist. Only, we must necessarily use some kind of epistemic tool to make sense of them–and these are the concepts, contained in propositions. Remember, their goal is to make reality coherent. Coherence is a claim in epistemology. Knowing does not exhaust all that we can know.
Nope. It is not tautology. I know x. By definition, to know means we understand it. To understand it we know what justification or evidence we need. I know x because I understand what justification I need.
I don’t know. You tell me. You think it is foundationalism in drag? One way to say this, is perhaps, whether coherentism gets rid of “basic beliefs” that traditionalists insist must be free from justification.
If you are not employing the worst argument in the world, then I apologize for imputing it to you. However, I have to say it certainly gave all the appearances of it. I can know only what I can know will certainly do as an example of a tautology until a better one comes along. And if you were not denying that, therefore, we could know there are external objects, it certainly looked as if you were. And I still don’t know whether you are denying the existence of external objects, or whether you are denying that we can know that they exist. Or whether that they exist is somehow reducible to our justification for their existence, which seems to be some kind of Idealism cum verificationism. If I am sure of anything, I am sure that the existence of a great many objects antedated the existence of human beings. and that it follows from that fact alone that any form of Idealism is false.
As I pointed out, “coherentism” is too vague and nebulous to discuss, much less “refute”, and certainly not in a few posts. If the sort of thing Quine (for instance) describes in his The Web of Belief is “coherentism” it seems to me a reasonable view of justification. And I would not undertake to refute it because of that.
Thankfully, this is not a form of idealism. And I can accept what you said before this, too. Coherentists certainly do not deny the external world, their claim is rather about our beliefs of the world—mere perceptions or experiences of the world do not constitute justified claim of them (just like what the traditionalists would like to claim that they are) unless they are conceptualize. Imagine pre-linguistic experiences, similar to an animal’s experiencing pain or feeling cold or feeling hot. These, if we go by coherentism, would not count as knowing, though it is real, it exists.
Yes! Quine. The web of belief. Which pretty much refutes foundationalist linear claim of basic beliefs supporting other beliefs.
id say the worst argument is the foundationalist one against the coherentist.
Everitt in the Non-Existence of God says it well:
p19 : “A number of philosophers (so-called coherentists)… have faced the obvious objection that arguing in a circle cannot provide real justification. If your justification for belief A is belief B, it must not also be the case that your justification for B is A; and on the face of it, the same would be true if we had a larger circle with n beliefs (for any value of n) rather than a very small circle with just two beliefs.”
He is of course demanding that coherentists use a foundation for ‘real’ justification, when thats specifically what they are against.
Relevant knowledge is subjective. But what of the person that seeks knowledge for the sake of the truth at the expense of the support of their beliefs? This seems to me to require development in the ability to digest knowledge. Knowledge is one thing but in the pursuit of objective understanding, by definition we have to let go of our subjectivities.
In Buddhism the experience of satori allows one the ability to understand in a new way. The same is true with the Christian concept of gnosis. These experiences allow us to reason by deduction in matters of ontology as opposed to being limited to induction. Actually in cosmolgy, these two modes of reason can be very enlightening in reconciling Phenomenon with Noumenon. Consider the following description of the contrast between inductive and deductive reason in understanding the nature of our universe.
The “Metaphysical–epistemological” discrepency exists because of the limitations of relevance spawned from preconception. If this is true, how can one become more open so as to expand the conception of relevance and reconcile the metaphysical with the epistemological?
Yes. (If I understood it correctly) coherentism is against the traditionalist view that basic beliefs (true foundational beliefs) do not need justification themselves–that is, they are intrinsically true, or something like that. Coherence theory rejects this idea----it does require that what we believe is not merely perceptual or experiential, but epistemic—hence everything, if it is to count as knowledge, must have justification of some sort.
Hi, Nick.
In what way are you using “subjective” here?
You have stated something that coherentism supports----in the face of new evidence, we must be prepared to change our view if it undermines what we believe. “Knowledge”, which implies truth based on justification, is objective in this sense. I mentioned “external constraints” to explain how it is coherentism is different from relativism.
Coherentism does support deduction. One of their salient points, though, is against “basic beliefs” (whatever they are) that the traditionalists claim to be exempt from epistemic justification.
But in philosophy, we do want demarcation between the two. Rightly so, because as I said earlier, “knowing” does not exhaust all that actually and possibly exist.
By subjective I mean our self interests. Our view of the objective universe is skewed through our discrimination between what supports and what inhibits our self interests.
The whole difficulty lies in the phrase “what we believe”. You are assuming an impartiality that IMO is rare. The only knowledge that can penetrate this obstacle must be of such quality that it must virtually hit you on the head with a neon sign.
It may support it but is it capable of it without experience? There is a difference between a blind belief and the ability to be open to a hypothesis in which the experience of ontological truth requires more than reason. I started a thread on that a little while ago but didn’t stir any interest,
It raises the question as to the nature of “evidence” in the pursuit of self knowledge.
As long as philosophy separates itself from psychology in the real meaning of the word, as it did in the twentieth century, there will always be demarcation. Do you think it’s possible appreciate the meanings of Plato’s cave allegory strictly through the literal mind? If you do, there will always be unnecessary demarcation because what Plato is referring to is knowledge beyond that of the literal mind and can only be verified through the experience of ontological knowledge with the whole of oneself and not just the speculations of the literal mind. We may want demarcation, but it doesn’t have to exist to the extent that it does severing man from his rightful ability to “understand” ontological meaning and purpose?
I know that the New York Yankees won the World Series in 1978 by beating Los Angeles.
That’s just something I happened to read while looking up something else. I have no interest (or self-interest) in that fact, but I know it anyway.
Habitual reactions are based on self interest. This is why they become habitual. There is nothing conscious in it. Part of our habitual reactions is remembering certain things of no objective importance but in some way “fill up space.”
If we didn’t fill up space like this, we would be inclined to reason more objectively which is unpleasant. So we fill up space in our psych instead to make life more pleasant for us.
I wonder if you mean a divide between ontology and epistemology? In which case the two are interdependant. We cannot make knowledge its own autonomous force unless we are taking a leap of faith, and faith and knowledge are incompatible in the realms of theology. So how can knowledge be without our being? There is an old addage that reads: “Man is a being who in his being his being is in question.” So knowledge and being are inextricably linked when we begin to question.
It is funny that one would use the word metaphysical to describe reality when it seems as if one is restating the Kantian question of Noumena vs. Phenomena. However, i feel a more appropriate question would be of the demarcation between a primary and secondary intelligibility. In short, the primary and synthetical view of the object of knowledge in question and the secondary or subsequent catabolic breaking down (analysis) thereof would be a better starting point. In essence, the truly metaphysical only exists in the heads of all the bishop berkleys in the world. But when we come out of the clouds of metaphysics or the matrix the world as we know it, on both a synchronic and diachronic plane, exists.
peace, love and pitbulls
the practico-inert
ps. I don’t understand how conceptualization and belief figure into this. It would seem that beliefe would be presentiment based upon experiece a posteriori. Could it be that faith is a priori and belief its a posteriori equivalent? Could it be that conceptualization is awareness of our minds dialectical schemata?
Haha. Good point. Yes. Coherentism puts premium on justification and warrant–which I think implies that we can attain impartiality such that we would actually embark on looking for evidence just so we could say we are wrong. They are trying to dismantle the traditionalist’s “basic beliefs”–now imagine that. Some beliefs are so entrenched in us that you are right to call them obstacle. Though the coherence theory has good intention, it would be an uphill battle to apply it in ordinary, everyday life.
No, no. I didn’t mean to say they deny that experience is important—remember, I said earlier the “external world constraint” (implying “experience of the world”). What they deny is, these basic beliefs, which are really perceptual beliefs, are exempt from justification besides saying, because the external world caused me to have them. This, to them, is not epistemic justification. Causation is not justification.
Now, did you mean “what Plato is referring to is reality beyond that of the literal mind?” I suppose when you say “not just the speculations of the literal mind” you mean our ordinary observation using our senses to experience the world. True. Modern philosophy does acknowledge the limitation of our way of knowing–to mean our senses cannot transcend the empirical nature of our reality.
I will check it out. (I have been rationing my time between ILP and the actual world).
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