Below, I suggest that under certain conditions, to speak of equality, and not ensure equality of outcome as a result, is contradictory. My stipulative definition of equality considers equality to be a product of consensus about what goods are valuable in a society; leading from that is a secondary definition of equality as a normative device for sustaining the worth of human beings in their own estimations and in the broader concept of a society. In short it is an answer to the question: “what treatment is this person owedâ€? Equality is, in this sense, a valuation of dignity, NOT necessarily of status. This is the question my thread addresses: can we say that equality is “equal dignity” and not ensure that equality of outcome, where outcome is dignity, is necessary?
Equality is not the same as similarity, nor is it yet a synonym for “identical”. Indeed, it would be a paradox to call two similar or identical things “equal”, because equality is a standard against which competing claims to similar treatment are judged: the subjects themselves need not be similar.
The extent of suffrage rights remains the single most telling indicator of how equal people in a society are on paper. But the correlation of democracy and equality I think has had an unfortunate and ironic effect in the political process. First, misunderstandings of the term have led to unrealistic expectations about what one is owed materially and in terms of status. For this reason it presents no contradiction to some that in spite of their sloth, they ought to be entitled to the same dividends as the conscientious. Secondly, that in spite of ability, the material outcome must be identical.
I would like to refine this latter point slightly. I remain committed to equality of outcome in the dispensation of social goods such as education, access to the law, legal rights, and any social good by which basic human dignity is sustained, such as housing, health and a basic sustenance. Indeed, I would make so bold as to say that to speak of people being equal, and not allow for the aforementioned to be accessed with the same rate of “success”, by all people in a society, is nothing more than empty double speak. For example, if we say that equality is measured by the overall degree to which people possess a basic social good, then those who do not have access to it, ought to have it, even if it means a certain amount of extra government initiative. In otherwords, to say that people are “equal”, is to say they are “equally able to…”. I believe that this argument justifies certain forms of positive discrimination.
However, while outcome must be similar when the outcome is little more than human dignity or welfare, it cannot of course be similar where the outcome is a matter of choice. Part of the job of a state in a democracy where equality is meaningful in theory and practice, is to provide choice as well as access to it. In short, what you do not choose, must never be an obstacle to accessing a right or a justified claim. A justified claim is any claim which is relied upon as a result of a consensus about what freedoms are considered valuable in a society. People mistakenly assume that to say two people are equal is to say they are equally deserving. This is not necessarily so.
Equality can therefore be thought of, at least in one sense, as a means of maximising choice, and with it freedom, working on the assumption that if all came from the same original position, there would be equal chance of maximum dividends being accrued from such choices. But once choices are made available, it is in fact contradictory to suggest that how these choices are acted upon must yield a similar result for all. So, for instance, so long as access to education is similar, it is impossible and undesirable for all incomes to be in line with the highest earners just because of this. This is a misunderstanding about equality that many people hold. Another example is the “humiliating revelation” problem. Briefly, this is where somebody has expected a particular outcome but becomes aware that their abilities are inadequate to the task, and so, weaned on the doctrine of equality as “similar status” rather than “similar choices”, becomes disillusioned. And THIS is where democracy and the modern paradox comes in.
But equality of status and equality of worth are not the same thing. Because of the near-universal access to suffrage, we have been given a very superficial basis for assuming equality of status. Few will be disabused of it, and so the state is under pressure to make the prophecy true. The state takes on a greater burden for ensuring not simply choice, but similarity of welfare, and any other means by which the pretence of equal status can be maintained. The paradox of democracy is that it misrepresents the meaning of equality, and so must effectively build that meaning into existence if it is to sustain itself as a system of government. It’s a difficult and counterproductive endeavour, and prone to lead to huge disappointments for the undeserving, penalisation of the deserving, and disillusionment of all. Uniformity is not the same as equality. It does not translate to equality of status. Status is a system of value-distribution that has different origins to equality, in my view, though they often overlap.