Equivocation Rampant in Philosophy?

Something has occured to me, in the vein of what I’ve been writing about on the differences between the philosopher and the everyman. Let me give an example of the phenomenon before I generalize it.

It is said by some that everything man does is ultimately out of selfishness.

The vulgar see this, and find it unbelievable immediately- they recall times that they did things they didn’t want to, out of obligation or, duty, love, or somesuch. To them, there is altruism everywhere.

The philosopher says that no, if you do something out of a sense of duty, then you do it because answering that duty makes you feel good. The same with love or obligation.

The vulgar responds, perhaps, that they do not feel this satisfaction the philosopher is talking about.

The philosopher says, that it must be there, for if they didn’t want to do it, they wouldn’t have.

And here we have the equivocation. The philosopher has here used ‘want’ to mean ‘will’, while the vulgar is still understanding it to mean “A desire for pleasure or satisfaction”.

The problem is, if the philosopher means only “People do what they will,” then he’s simply speaking a tautology. The only reason why this argument for selfishness bears any weight, is that because when we hear it, in the back of our minds we are hearing the vulgar definition of ‘want’, where the philosopher is using his other definition to defend his position.

Argue with me about altruism if you must, but my real question is, how common is this mistake? That the philosopher seems to be saying something profound and important, only because we fail to recognize the exotic way they are using common words?

it’s common. i’m glad someone can see through that horrible sophism.

That’s a pretty good example of a generalisation, Ucci. I think perhaps you’ve been reading Kant again. I have tried to warn you - it’ll rot your brain. But yes, many philosophers do just what you say - common sense with a nifty vocabulary, the prejudices of their zeitgeist recast in Platonic terms, transmogrified religion, unfortunate and ultimately fruitless wordplay.

Wait a minute, Ucci - you’ve been reading Sartre! Hey, let me know what “isness” is. Always wondered about that one.

Isn’t language itself really just a string of equivocations? The word “pizza” is an equivocation of all the pizza’s I’ve experienced. If I come from a pizza-loving-vegan household, and you tell me that pizza has cheese, I will fervently disagree.
This is a silly example, but it illustrates the point. All dialogue, or even thought structured in language, must contain a level of equivocation. I don’t think that’s a terribly big problem, because it does not seem that all equivocation is bad. The pizza I ate yesterday will probably be relevantly similar to the one I will eat today.

There are different types of fulfillment. “The Vulgar” pursue the lowest type.

Here is the difference between will and want. Willing is active parttaking in the world, creating beyond oneself. The opposition altruism/egoism seemes meaningless to me here. The word altruism leaves a nasty aftertaste with me - it suggests very much expecting a reward for a sacrifice.

Carleas,

I think the magnitude of the problem can be measured by how much confusion it causes. I think quite a bit of confusion has been caused by the selfishness mistake.  I think quite a bit of confusion has been caused by the 'Might makes right' equivocation, where 'might' is quietly defined as "What is successful" and 'right' is quietly defined as "what succeeds". 

faust

You talking about the nature of Being according to Sartre? I can’t define it (just like free will can’t be defined) because it’s not a thing in itself, it’s a state signified by definable things that surround it. Free will is the presense of the plenum of motive, means, and end. In a holistic sense, it is more than that presense, but it cannot be defined apart from it.
Being (which I hope is the same as isness) is not a property, it is a holistic way of refering to a thing’s being able to have properties.
How’s that?