Experienced vs. Remembered Pain

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
1

There’s an interesting experiment described in Daniel Kahneman’s book, Thinking Fast and Slow.

In it, subjects are told they will undergo three tests.

  • In one test, they made to feel (strong, but non-damaging) discomfort which is suddenly alleviated; they are to hold their hands in icewater for one minute. During this time, they report their relative pain levels.
  • The other test is exactly the same procedure, but instead of removing their hands after a minute, the water is then slowly warmed by around a degree for thirty seconds, and then they remove their hands. The second test causes more pain, aggregated over time; the same as the first test and then thirty seconds’ reduced discomfort on top of that.
  • The test order is randomised, and after the second test and a rest of a few minutes, they are allowed to choose which of the tests they wish to repeat for the final test.
    The interesting result is that the first group have more negative memories and associations with the experiment than the second, longer test: 80% of subjects chose to repeat the second test, rather than the first.

The theory presented is that the human mind has an experiencing self and a remembering self, and these don’t communicate very well. Part of us is taking in information, responding to the immediate surroundings, and part of us is learning from all this data, building narratives and filing it away for future decisions. The “I” that you think you are, and that makes your considered decisions, is fundamentally your remembering self. The data suggest that the remembering self remembers the peak amount of pain, and pain at the end of the experience, and takes an average of the two to calculate how unpleasant to consider similar experiences. The duration of the pain doesn’t figure into it at all (I’m not sure how this relates to chronic pain as what I’ve read has only dealt with procedures of limited duration, but let’s run with it for now).

Kahneman’s view is that the remembering self has a heuristic that’s presumably been useful in some way, but is wrong; rationality demands that we should choose the lowest aggregate pain, not undergo needless pain. It’s clearly better for us to ignore the heuristic and minimise what we can measure as painful, because as rational beings we want to minimise pain and maximise pleasure. But even if we accept the hardline utilitarian view, it’s incorrect and the alternative view isn’t even touched on:

if we’re fundamentally our remembering selves, the error is not in that judgement mechanism at all: the error lies in our assumption that as rational beings we want to minimise pain.

This is quite a change from the traditional Benthamite view of things, but that was argued from a faulty understanding of human psychology, with the point of view that it “stands to reason”. Careful scientific investigation and argumentation shows otherwise: what we want to do, as healthy and positive psychological beings, is minimise what we’re averse to (which we had until now erroneously thought was simply experienced pain) and maximise what we’re in favour of. We shouldn’t be minimising the aggregate experienced pain, we should be minimising the peak and the end pain, even if it means accepting that the pain will go on for longer.

We should cultivate endurance under stress, not do everything in our power to push through and get it over with as a short, sharp shock.

2

Right.

That said, I’m not surprised. Understanding the difference between average and marginal utility takes committing one’s sense of time.

Also, some people like to be teased. They’re impressed by teasing because it seems intelligent in understanding what it means to have a sense of time. They want to be dominated by those who are smarter.

3

yeaaahhh. But some of us didn’t need experiments by scientists to tell us that.

4

That’s very interesting.

It’s interesting what it says about the way we segment experiences into beginnings and ends. It seems the first group marks the end of the experience at the peak of the pain (because that’s when they get to take their hand out). The withdrawal of the hand from the cold water may be a very relieving feeling but that doesn’t get counted as part of the experience because by then the experience is over. But the second group gets to feel the relief from the pain throughout the last minute of the experience (which gets remembered as part of the experience as the end is not marked at the peak of the pain). So the first experience is remembered as just pain, whereas the second is remembered as a mix of pain and pleasure.

It’s also interesting what you suggested about the differences between making the “rational” choice and the “natural” choice. I’m inclined to agree. Is it rational to make choices that go against the way our minds are naturally fitted out to make decisions after eons of evolutionary tweaking and perfecting? We often mistake rationality with knowing-it-all. The problem here is that we don’t know the reason why evolution designed our memories to remember our experiences in less-than-accurate ways, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t work. What may seem rational is often based on incomplete information. Sometimes, therefore, the most rational decision is to not fix something that isn’t broken, to not interfer with the natural order of things (even if that order belongs to our own minds).

It also reminds me of a certain prejudice I think we hold about consciousness. We think of the function of consciousness to be simply a direct and accurate awareness of reality as it really is. Rational thought, therefore, is assumed to be an accurate depiction of reality (as if we could never get it wrong). But I think that sometimes consciousness works best when it distorts reality. Being aware of reality or experiencing it excatly for what it is is sometimes best, but it can also be debilitating (useful fictions, Nietzsche called these instances). Would it be better if we remembered each and every one of our experiences exactly as they were, or is there a reason the “remembering self” distorts our experiences when it transforms them into memories? The knee jerk reaction that we need to do something about the way we remember pain (because it results in the seemingly irrational decision to choose more aggregate pain) or how to make decisions on what kinds of painful experiences we undergo is a result of this assumption that consciousness is supposed to act with rationality, that if it isn’t acting so, there’s something wrong with it. But this is a non-sequitor if we suspend this assumption that consciousness functions to be aware of reality as accurately as possible.

I considered this after reading the OP: maybe we remember the first experience of pain (where we got to abruptly withdraw our hand) as more painful because it ended by our deliberate withdrawal. And we remember the second experience as less painful because we experienced the pain going away by itself. In other words, we don’t know how long the pain in the first case would have lasted if we didn’t pull our hand away when we did, but we know that the second case of pain lasts for only so long and then goes away by itself–it’s more reliable and known to be not-that-bad. The first pain is more uknown and no indication exists that it would go away on its own. The solution to the first pain is remembered as being to deliberately stop it (i.e. you had to do something about it), whereas the solution to the second is remembered to be to just let it slide (i.e. you didn’t have to do anything). Therefore, the first experience seems more dangerous, more menacing, requiring more avoidance, whereas the second seems more tolerable and acceptable.

5

I believe that this also go for all other senses.

There has been an experiment with a picture of a person being switched when the person are distracted, with a similar picture and the test person won’t notice because they have the clear memory of the former person.

In psychosomatic terms it seems it can go both ways, act like a placebo curing people, but also as a noncebo making people ill or suffer.

6

No, the error is quite obviously in the judgement mechanism—the same way that the error is in your eyes, when you see the pencil break in a glass of water. The pencil didn’t break, even though it looked like it did, to you----you were wrong. Likewise, you have reason to minimize pain, even if you misjudged those two scenarios.

I am a river.

7 
 We think of these two processes as one, but in fact it's still two processes.  We see the pencil as broken, but we still have doubts, so we withdraw it to see if it is so.
8

It’s interesting that our minds demarcate the experiences like that; I think that aspect of narrative seems to be bound up in our patterns of thought far more importantly than many give it credit.

I think it’s more complex, as far as I’m aware having control over the situation significantly reduces perceived pain, danger and so forth (because of the perceived danger and menace). It’s another variable.

It’s traditional to provide supporting arguments, if one thinks one has any; at the very least to address the points made.

The reason you minimise pain is because it’s unpleasant and aversive to you as a living being with a neural system, etc. The simple fact, as demonstrated by these tests, is that pain’s unpleasantness and aversiveness is not proportional to the total amount of pain experienced, and so that is not what we should be minimising. It’s proportional to the immediate level of the pain for the experiencing self, and the max/end average pain for the remembering self. If you insist on reducing the total amount experienced instead of this, you may well be increasing suffering.

The pencil analogy isn’t valid, as the pencil is an external object which we can verify; our pain is the experience of pain. You don’t get to tell someone whether or not they are in pain, they get to tell you.

9

blah!

10 
 /Or
11

I really wish you would have. You drew an unrelated moral conclusion from your scientific study. All anyone has to do to dismiss you is to draw a relevant conclusion.

No, you simply misjudged the unpleasantness of the experience. The same way you misjudged the pencil when it appears to break in a glass of water. Nobody who knew what the experiment was in advance would want to take the option with more overall pain… and nor fucking should they. Nobody who sees the pencil break, should think that the pencil breaks. Period.

Once, twice, threeee timesss a riivvveerrrr.

12

But that’s exactly what they are thinking.

13

I provided them; you’ve so far failed to address them. In case you missed them:

  • if we’re fundamentally our remembering selves, the error is not in that judgement mechanism at all: the error lies in our assumption that as rational beings we want to minimise pain.
  • what we want to do, as healthy and positive psychological beings, is minimise what we’re averse to (which we had until now erroneously thought was simply experienced pain) and maximise what we’re in favour of.

So you presume to tell me how unpleasant my experience was, since you know these things better than I? That is quite the arrogation of authority.

That’s because they’re misguided about what they think would be more unpleasant to their real, remembering selves. Stamping your feet and swearing notwithstanding; your only argument seems to be “more aggregate pain JUST IS worse”. That’s not an argument, unless you can define “worse” in some way other than related to the way we experience the pain, which the experiment shows.

Please keep your replies civil.

Drusuz - I’m not sure I follow your point in terms of placebos/nocebos: is that to do with our experience of pain?

14

The first point is a declarative sentence, supported nowhere, and it is straightforwardly false. If we are fundamentally our remembering selves, or any other kind of self, the error is in the judgment mechanism—the same way the error is in your eyes, when you see a broken pencil in a glass of water. Why should I need an argument when you haven’t given one? The study doesn’t support either one over the other. But when you ask yourself in advance whether you want to be tortured for 5 minutes or 7, I think the answer is obvious. It’s obvious even after going through the study.

That is exactly right. I know for a fact which experience you would rather have again. Would you rather be tortured for 5 minutes or 7? Answer the question. After having the study uncovered for you, you don’t judge that 7 minutes of torture is better, and you prefer that, you judge that you misremembered the experience. Going forward, you have a choice… answer the question please: Which’ll it be, 5 minutes of torture, or 7?

Do you have an argument for anything you’ve said? Or are you just going to stamp your foot and insist that hte pencil really did break in the water?

Once, twice, threeee timesss a riivvveerrrr.

15

It is supported by the second point, given right underneath it. Hence, the two points. Is there something in the second point you disagree with?

I’ll take the seven, as long as they ease up for the last couple of minutes. It will be less traumatic; I have another 40 years to live with the memories, all things going well; a couple of minutes here or there is nothing.

You’re going in for an operation. You have the option of an anaesthetic which paralyses you and during which you feel everything, but afterwards remember absolutely nothing of it, or one in which you feel only 75% the sensation, but remember every moment. Which do you choose?

16

I want you to read the following very carefully: There is no connection between the second point and the first. Yes, both points are straightforwardly false, but more importantly for you, neither one supports the other. That we want to (#2) minimize what we’re averse to, DOES NOT support (#1) rational beings don’t want to minimize pain, or anything similar—because both have an entirely different content. They are entirely separate claims, about separate things. And nothing you’ve said is in anyway justified or supported by any other claims. —Not from the study, and not from anything you’ve said.

You asked for a refutation of the second point. That’s fine, here it is: Nobody wants to simply maximize what they are in favor of—they only want to do so if they are in favor of the right things. Talk to any addict—they’d prefer not to be an addict. Anytime someone makes a wrong decision, what do they say? They say, “I wish I wouldn’t have done that”, even though they wanted to at the time.

Here’s the answer to your wandering question… Quite obviously, I would chose to have the one where I feel 75% of the pain, as opposed to 100% of it. That’s a very easy decision to make, in advance of the operation. That I won’t remember the pain of the operation afterwards is irrelevant, because pain doesn’t cause me pain after it has ceased to cause me pain. If you are trying to sneak in “psychological trauma” of the surgery into the 75%, then you had better be explicit about it----because I would not choose a lifetime of psychological trauma, but then neither is that less pain than 100% of the operation.

Recognize what you just said… you just said that you prefer 7 minutes of torture to 5. That was bad faith. Combined with the fact that you’re not supporting what you say, I’d say we’re done here.

I am a river regardless.

17

I believe this is what we need to focus on, if we agree with it. I’m not sure I do. I agree we have an experiencing self and a remembering self, but I don’t agree that the remembering self remembers the actual pain felt at the time. Just as we reject pain, we reject the memory of how pain feels, other than pain isn’t good.

It’s difficult to measure human pain for this reason–plus the fact that no two people have the same pain reactions. My hand may grow numb before my husband’s because of our weight differences and I might not find the numbness painful whereas his hand could grow numb a few seconds after mine and he may find that very painful. I might find the returning blood flow more painful than the numbness while he could feel instant relief once his hand was out of the ice.

That would seem to indicate subjectivity in assessing the feeling of pain. How much of that subjectivity can be measured?

18

PHT, the Perception of Hopes and Threats.

19

That’s a refutation of hedonic utilitarianism outright; in the OP I accepted the hardline utilitarian presumption for the sake of the argument.

The reason addicts would prefer not to be addicts is not to do with pleasure alone, sure. This experiment is purely about pain, and the icewater test was used because it is purely about painful sensation and causes no lasting damage. There are, I agree, other factors besides pain and pleasure involved in making decisions, and hedonic utilitarianism leads nowhere very interesting.

I wouldn’t. Honestly. Here’s my reasoning:

I’ve been under general anaesthetic (have you?) I had my jaw broken on both sides and reset, and two wisdom teeth removed for good measure. For all I know, I could feel everything that went on. All I remember is going under, then waking up groggy after. Having the wires removed from my jaw, on the other hand, was more or less unanaesthetised. Much less damaging, no bones were broken, they just yank out dental wire that’s wrapped around your tooth roots through your gum flesh. It’s pretty superficial, but it really, really smarts like hell.

In terms of pain experiences, I would definitely, and vastly, choose the operation over the wire removal every time. Other factors aside (like residual pain after the operation, six weeks on a liquid diet, the risk of choking on vomit with a wired jaw and so on) - as discrete parts of my life, give me a few hours’ with the pain (but not the damage, which is another matter) of smashing my face about that I remember nothing of, over twenty minutes’ having wires pulled out through my gums that I remember in detail. If I had to go through that every week for a year, I’d be fine with the former and a wreck with the latter.

The key is, we’re not really our experiencing selves. That’s a process that informs us, and makes decisions on the immediate environment. It’s possible that after 6 minutes of torture I’d regret choosing seven over five, but that’s not a rational decision: it’s equally possible you’d choose one minute torture at 10/10 intensity over five minutes’ at 7/10 intensity, but be begging to change after 20 seconds at 10/10.

I did say that, and I stand by it. If you’re done, that’s fair enough, I won’t chase you; I’m only giving the explanation above to show I’m not arguing in bad faith.

The remembering self doesn’t experience the pain in remembering. It just remembers the unpleasantness of it; how much of an impact it made. The experiencing self experiences the pain.

All of the pain levels were reported by the subjects themselves, that’s the only measure. That accounts for differing subjective pain tolerances.

I read the book back in November, and this bit stayed with me. I’ve been doing some high-intensity interval training recently, repeated short bursts of full-on exercise, the sort that has your lungs heaving and muscles about giving up. And I’ve found that doing a couple of extra reps at lower intensity, while being more work and having a negligible benefit on strength or fitness, makes the whole thing a lot less of a drag. I don’t approach it thinking “let’s get this over with” anything like as much. I’ve done martial arts for two decades, and I’m working this into training.

20

What I said is entirely unconnected to anything about hedonic utilitarianism. There’s absolutely no connection, whatsoever. That’s the very same mistake you made earlier, with those two points. It’s time for you to slow yourself down, and recognize this. If I had said that pleasure and pain weren’t the right things, then that would have been opposed to hedonic utilitarianism, and still not a refutation.

Irrelevant, again.

It’s very simple: Do you want more pain, or less pain? The fact that you won’t remember one makes no difference, unless you sneak in the assumption that remembering the lesser pain actually causes you more and longer lasting psychological trauma. But it’s quite clear, then, that that wasn’t actually the lesser pain. So, do you want 5 minutes of torture, or 7? No study showing how you can be tricked to thinking the 7 was better should affect the judgement you make to a simple question about which you’d prefer. No study showing why you can be tricked to think the pencil breaks in water should convince you that it’ll break, when you put it in water.

Q.E.D.

I am a river.