Games! All of them.
Relativism and subjectivism aren’t only impossible positions to uphold but they also aren’t positing a real problem because of several proposition “sleights.”
A claim about a thing such as ‘morality’ is treating ‘morality’ as if it were an object, something that is true or false, or, is or is not. From here a proposition will ask not only if an action is “moral,” but also if it is morally “good” or “bad.” But the only thing that can be asked legally here is whether or not there are morals taking place. Essentially the only question asked so far is: what is the difference between amoral and moral.
A relativist or subjectivist question regarding the nature of morals, after the rule is established that I mentioned above, becomes a metaethical proposition and therefore loses any of its real contingent authenticity-- the question doesn’t deal with whether or not there is such a thing as “good” or “bad,” but rather if certain acts are either good or bad. These premises are granted before the question can be asked, for to ask a moral statement that does not evaluate something is an empty concept, and such a question would be smoke.
The prescription precedes the premise in the assertion that morals cannot be objective, but not because morals aren’t objective, rather because qualities such as “good” and “bad” must be treated as objective functions in the proposition, that is, as happening or not happening. For example, the relativist might say:
“His act wasn’t objectively wrong.”
Look at the anatomy of the propostion and consider what premises must be in place for it to have a true/false potential. What is not assumed is that morality does not exist, because the subject of “wrong” is an evaluation. Just as if it were reversed, and “good,” it would there too be an evaluation. So far the relativist isn’t arguing that morals do not exist, but instead: which morals are right and wrong.
But he can’t do that. That’s smoke. What he can do, however, is propose that morals do not exist, but again this is an argument that does not concern epistemology and the logical consequences of propositions. For how could I know the difference between a moral event and a nonmoral event? Without the levels or degrees and valuations, that is, their “relative” value, I wouldn’t know where to look.
A subjectivist/relativist claim about morality must always be metaethical or impossible. The word-question simply cannot be asked without the rules of logic following it into certain and rigid definitions, not only for its concept value but also its truth function in the proposition. To merely make a statement is to assume some objective truth. Somebody put the gag back on the relativist.
Also you might have a look at the thread in the essays forum entitled “Why I am not an Ethical Relativist” by our resident Mexican Phenomenologist “Friedrich.”