For Twiffy

Okay, Twiffer - a post to try to answer your question.

There are at least two very important senses of the word “morality” for the philosopher. One sense is this - personal rules for living. In this sense, philosophy can be seen as only morality. “This is what I know, and this is what I don’t know - so how shall I live best?” sums up philosophy understood as an activity - as what a given philosopher does qua philosopher.

The other sense is as one of several fields of study within the discipline of philosophy - the study of known and putative moral systems. For a perspectivist (at least), the latter is often informed by the former.

For context, the main philosophical influences on my view are, as I have stated many times, Hume, Nietzsche, Russell and Ayer. It is true that I left some questions unanswered in the thread about Evolution and Morality, but that is because my vocabulary is very different from Cyrene’s. I was struggling to use a style of expression that I am not comfortable with. This mainly because I was seeking the common ground between Cyrene’s and my positions. I didn’t want to stray too far from that task.

One or two of my basic assumptions are quite obvious - I am an atheist and a materialist. And a perspectivist.

Materialism is, of course, entirely consistent with Cyrene’s view. I simply draw a distinction that was not evident (to me) in Cyrene’s recurring thesis - the distinction between physical responses (including what we refer to as emotional responses) and moral judgements. The analogy I would draw is this - one can walk around a meadow and get a sense of its size, and one can measure it - mathematically. Moral grammar is, by this analogy, the ability to understand measurement. Morality is the measurement itself - and like all mathematics, is not real. It’s an abstraction, made possible by an innate ability. And like mathematics, I don’t have to have invented it myself in order to understand it when it is presented to me. And our physical responses, or processes, are like walking around and actually experiencing the object of our moral thinking. But not every walk in a field is necessarily a candidate for moral thinking - the ones we choose are. Or that are chosen for us.

As a materialist/atheist, I must of course rule out any unreal inspiration for moral thinking, but I am not required to allow that morality cannot itself be unreal. It can be as unreal as such useful conventions as God or mathematics. By “aesthetics” I mean personal tastes, even very commonly found ones - yes, like taste in who to have sex with. I do not see homosexuality as a moral issue, and I would not easily accept that any evolutionary psychologist would. What I see as moral is the (unreal) measurement of that taste. Yes - emotional, visceral, unmeasured reactions to homosexuality are real - as Cyrene has pointed out - they are brain activity, that can be observed. But morality is only claims about those brain activities - and in that way exist only in language.

Morality can only belong to philosophy, for morality exists only in language.

With me so far?

It seems a large issue of people being comfortable with different uses of the word morality in different contexts. I take morality as a sense of right/wrong people have about specific subjects, other people may take the word to mean, whats actually moral or immoral in practice.

I think we are in agreement that whether or not homosexuality is actually moral in practice, what I meant was by morals was people’s beliefs about the right/wrong of homosexuality and what you meant, was the issue of it actually being moral or not as would be argued by moral philosophers of some kind.

For example, people have adaptations that influence them to feel that incest is morally wrong in X situation, but that feeling itself, and the influences it has on people, can be IMMORAL if these people act out to stop incestual sex, which wasn’t hurting anyone and if the people envolved in that were in love or whatever.

adaptations can produce behavior, concepts of right/wrong, which make people act out in immoral ways, to stop precieved wrongs, which don’t hurt anyone.

I agree that morality can only belong to philosophy or whatever in-so-far that I mean, its up to moral philosophy to decide what is right or wrong based on specific factors of the people envolved, knowledge about specific human tendencies or behaviors can make one self-aware enough to add things to their moral philosophy that they may not have thought about before hand though. (like step-children abuse rates are high, if people realize that they may actively resist negative emotions associated with their step-children if they reflect the child doesn’t actually deserve their anger).

But its up to the person’s moral philosophy, to decide whether the beating of step-children is right or wrong in the first place.

Cyrene - I think we both see the same distinctions. And I think it’s those distinctions, or the lack of them, that makes people misunderstand evo-psych, and, at least sometimes, misunderstand you. Also, in reviewing some of the literature of evo-psych, I think I have seen some scientists dance around these distinctions, some embrace them, and some ignore them. Which is why I can sometimes agree with the validity of the data, but disagree with some of the conclusions. In practise, science is often imprecise in this way, because scientists can be imprecise in this way. And scientists have their own (sometimes individual) assumptions and prejudices.

Perhaps an example might help. I rarely kill a spider. I like spiders, and the great majority are harmless. And even helpful. I do not see spider-killing as a moral issue, but an aesthetic one. But I am told that “it just feels right” for people to kill them, and that this might be an adaptation, or a byproduct. Is this so, in your opinion? In this sense, “right” can mean several things, and can certainly be transformed from a physical (emotional) reaction to a moral rule. But the “right” of the feeling may or may not be connected to, or in agreement with, the “right” of the rule, as you pointed out in your own example.

The distinction I make is that by perfectly cogent reasoning, killing spiders can be seen as morally correct, morally incorrect, or neutral (amoral).

But who decides?

And on what basis?

I think there is a range, from emotional response to well-considered personal ethics to inherited moral tradition. It’s a continuum, and where we choose to demarcate ideas along that continuum should be, and roughly is, determined by an idea’s usefulness. But we must still ask whose utility we are talking about. And yes, it may help to have an ever more precise knowledge of the biological basis for those decisions. But even if that knowledge informs personal ethics, those personal ethics have a way of conflicting with whatever societal norms are extant in the immediate environment.

I’ve never fully understood why constructs aren’t real. Polyester is certainly real, though it exists purely because of human creativity. How are math and logic different?

Polyester has weight, mass, density, dimension. How much does “equals” weigh?

shrugs

As much as the ink it takes to write it.

Okay, let’s try this - what’s the difference between a numeral and a number?

A numeral is a symbol representing a number, just like a word is a symbol representing a concept.

Edit: One thing I’ve been thinking about for a while, actually, is that numbers are adjectives that we treat as nouns within mathematics to simplify matters. If I describe someone as ‘cute’ or ‘dirty’ or ‘quick’ or ‘sane’ should I take it that these things don’t exist because without a referent they don’t make much sense?

More or less, yes.

Well, I guess we’re at a bit of an impasse then. But I suppose that does clarify why we disagree.

Though I don’t see why you don’t think they do exist. Is it because they are not autonomous? Sure, they exist only as a modifier, but we can see a wide range of things that are modified in that manner and can coherently agree that such a modification is there. They can be modified by language to a certain degree, sure, but that shouldn’t surprise us too much since the symbolic representation whereby we explain our world is heavily embedded in culture. If everything that can be said to be influenced by culture “doesn’t exist” then nothing exists – as a Perspectivist surely you’d agree with me on that.

They don’t exist phenomenally. I think things that don’t have height, length, and depth don’t phenomenally exist. That’s just definitional.

If mental attitudes are reducible to neuronal states, why shouldn’t they be said to exist? Furthermore, to be actual, something needs both an expression of physicality (to be real) as well as an arrangement that is actually that object. I can’t well call a cat a dog despite the fact that they are essentially made of the same stuff. Adjectives modify that second category. So a girl can have the property of cuteness; indeed, it is often a signifying aspect of that particular person.

I think the problem is what they are real as. To say that morals are real because we invented them is essentially to say they are purely mental - or imaginary. Yes, the imagination exists - we have it - and its contents exist in the same sense, but morality advocates don’t really have a strong case then. They need to get beyond moral relativism if they are to argue a case for why a certain moral system X should apply not only to them but to everyone.

Xunzian - I don’t know what a “mental attitude” is. I didn’t even knbow that we were talking about mental attitudes.

Gib - that’s exactly why the distinction I make is useful. Metaphysical entites are said to exist independently of human thought - to in some way exist - not quite as a table does, but separate from firing neurons. So strong is metaphysical lust in some that this distinction means everything and nothing to them.

Unity of thought and action. Morals are, admittedly, only as actual as they are actualized. But the same can be said of anything. I’ll go back to the polyester. Polyester is clearly actual, but not everyone wears it. Same deal here. Likewise, a drawing of polyester is not polyester.

Edit: You can replace “mental attitude” with “taste”, if you like. Does that make sense?

Moral actions - acts that are judged morally, or can be judged morally, exist. The people doing the judging exist.

“Morality” is a collective noun - very collective.

Each moral act exists, but “moral action” does not “exist” - it’s referent is a multitude of acts. It’s an abstraction. Abstractions or generalisations (themselves) don’t phenomenally exist. This was Plato’s mistake when he dreamt up Forms. An abstraction is an activity.

The genralisation of particulars does not generate another particular, and only particulars exist phenomenally.

You are attempting a reification.

What is the difference between “morality” and “moral action”? I think you are trying to create a separation where none exists.

“Moral actions” are either good or bad. They are a subset of “all actions”. Morality applies only to those actions. The actions are the objects and the morality is the measurement of those actions.

I cannot make it any more clear than this:

Table is to inches as action is to moral judgement.

Tables are not inches.

There are (geometric) points along the edge of a table that can be measured in inches, but those points are not said to phenomenally exist. Neither are the inches.

Geometric lines “exist” in only one dimension. That is not phenomenal existence.

But you are entitled to your view - I cannot provide any further explication of my own.

That seems like cognitive dualism to me. Sure, a table isn’t inches, but a table takes up space and so can be measured in inches. The inches reflect the space taken up by the table. An arbitrary measurement, but so what? Morality is the same way. An arbitrary measurement that allows us to better understand the space in question. I can say an inch exists because I can ask anyone who is familiar with the Imperial units of measurement to show me an inch and within a reasonable margin of error, everyone will demonstrate the same space. Inches applies to the space in the same way that numbers apply to the objects being counted in the same way morality applies to actions. Given the systems regularity, I honestly don’t know what “does not exist” can mean in this case. You can say, “does not exist phenomenally” but then do the numbers exist noumeally? Why invent a separate space that we cannot access or even refer to?